Leser des Bären-threads
Seite 44 von 108 Neuester Beitrag: 25.04.21 00:14 | ||||
| Eröffnet am: | 23.02.08 10:39 | von: Rubensrembr. | Anzahl Beiträge: | 3.691 |
| Neuester Beitrag: | 25.04.21 00:14 | von: Katharinaqtrv. | Leser gesamt: | 340.365 |
| Forum: | Börse | Leser heute: | 7 | |
| Bewertet mit: |  | |||
| Seite: < 1 | ... | 41 | 42 | 43 | | 45 | 46 | 47 | ... 108 > | ||||
Pleite gehen, als dass er staatliche Hilfe beanspruchte. Denn das bedeutete
gewaltigen Gehaltsverzicht, nämlich Hartz 4 für Bank-Manager (500 000 €).
Da lässt er lieber ein paar Mitarbeiter mehr entlassen. Aber ist die Deutsche
Bank ohne Staatsbeteiligung konkurrenzfähig? Wir werdens sehen: Eintritt
frei.
Deutsche Bank hat zu wenig Eigenkapital
Die Deutsche Bank steht nach Recherchen von Capital keineswegs so blendend da, wie es ihr Chef Josef Ackermann glauben machen will.
Laut Capital (Ausgabe 14/2008) ist im vergangenen Krisenjahr die Bilanzsumme des Instituts, also das gesamte Geschäftsvolumen, dramatisch gestiegen, ohne dass ihr Eigenkapitalpuffer entsprechend erhöht wurde. Das Institut bewegt dadurch wesentlich mehr Masse, der aber nahezu gleichbleibend viel Eigenkapital als Sicherheit gegenübersteht. Diese Relation vom Eigenkapital zur Bilanzsumme lag zuletzt bei mageren 1,6 Prozent. Damit landete die Deutsche Bank bei einem Bilanzvergleich unter den 50 führenden Banken der Welt (Tabelle) im Schlussfeld.
Hier klicken!
Die als gesund geltende britische Großbank HSBC kommt bei der Verhältniszahl, die den Sicherheitspuffer der Bank ausdrückt, auf fast fünf Prozent und die Bank of America sogar auf mehr als acht Prozent.
Dennoch erklärte Josef Ackermann am Wochenende: "Wir sind eine der stärksten und am besten kapitalisierten Banken der Welt." Ackermann verwies wieder einmal auf die hohe "Kernkapitalquote" der Bank. Er will diese Kennziffer, die nach den Regeln des Basler Ausschusses für Bankenaufsicht verlangt wird, von 9,3 Prozent auf rund zehn Prozent erhöhen, sagte Ackermann. Zudem will er die Quote durch eine bilanzielle Umschichtung verbessern.
Hoher Verschuldungsgrad: Die Tabelle zeigt das Verhältnis des Eigenkapitals zur Bilanzsumme in Prozent bei 25 internationalen Großbanken, deren Zahlen vom 30. Juni 2008 verglichen wurden. Diese Verhältniszahl drückt den Sicherheitspuffer einer Bank aus. Sie zeigt, wie viel Masse mit dem Eigenkapital bewegt wird. Dabei steht die Deutsche Bank auf dem vorletzten Platz. Nur die belgische Dexia lag schlechter, sie musste mit Staatshilfe gestützt werden. Und dass selbst ein Vielfaches bei einigen nicht gereicht hat, zeigen die Beispiele der amerikanischen Krisenbanken Wachovia und Washington Mutual. Bei einem Vergleich der Bilanzzahlen vom 30. Dezember 2007 unter den 50 größten Geldhäusern der Welt landete die Deutsche Bank sogar auf dem letzten Platz.
Quellen: Bloomberg, SNB; Stand: 30. Juni 2008.
Renommierte Risikospezialisten halten die Fixierung auf die Kernkapitalquote für gefährlich. Der Züricher Banken-Professor Hans Geiger, ein Freund und Weggefährte von Josef Ackermann, nennt die Kennziffer ein "Schönwetterprodukt", das den Krisentest nicht bestanden habe. So kam auch die Hypo Real Estate auf 9,3 Prozent Kernkapitalquote, bevor sie Probleme bekam. Die Kernkapitalquote wird nach sehr komplizierten Regeln erstellt, wobei die Kredite und Vermögenswerte der Bank mit Risikogewichten beurteilt werden. Die Berechnungen sind selbst für Fachleute kaum zu durchschauen. Der Clou bei der Sache: Wer seine faulen Kredite mit Kreditversicherungen abdeckt, schneidet bei der Risikogewichtung blendend ab. Aber gerade die Geschäfte mit diesen Kreditversicherungen sind jetzt ins Zentrum der Finanzkrise geraten, weil die Versicherungsgeber ausfallen können.
Daher wollen sich Aufsichtsbehörden im Ausland künftig nicht mehr auf die Kernkapitalquote verlassen. In der Schweiz zum Beispiel verlangt die Notenbank stattdessen eine höhere Eigenkapitalbasis im Verhältnis zur Bilanzsumme und somit eine absolute Verschuldungsgrenze. Die deutsche Bankenaufsicht Bafin blieb bislang untätig.
Risikoexperten beunruhigt unter anderem, dass die Deutsche Bank sehr hohe Vermögenspositionen hält, deren Wert derzeit gar nicht genau beziffert werden kann, sondern nur geschätzt wird. In dieser Kategorie wies die Bank im Sommer 86 Milliarden Euro aus – mehr als doppelt so viel wie das Eigenkapital der Bank, das nur 33,6 Milliarden Euro betrug.
von Leo Müller
capital.de, 08:43 Uhr
http://www.capital.de/unternehmen/100015841.html
Dienstag, 21. Oktober 2008
Auf der Jagd nach Barem entdecken Finanzminister die Steueroasen. Schwarze Liste geplant. Schweiz in Schwierigkeiten?
Unter dem Vorwand der weltweiten Finanzkrise planen Finanzminister aus aller Welt einen Rundumschlag gegen Steuerparadiese. Diese stehen nun unter Generalversacht, unversteuertes Geld zu beherbergen.
Deutschland und weitere Staaten wollen gemeinsam gegen Länder vorgehen, die Steuerbetrug begünstigen. Bei einem Treffen in Paris verständigten sich mehrere Staaten der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (OECD) darauf, dass Steueroasen zu mehr Transparenz gezwungen werden sollen.
Das bedeutet im Klartext:
Das Bankgeheimnis soll aufgehoben werden. "Betroffene" Staaten, wie zum Beispiel Deutschland hätten direkten Zugang zu den Konten. Da man weiß, dass zum Beispiel die Schweiz so etwas niemals freiwillig machen würde, überlegen sich die Finanzminister bereits, wie man die "Niedrigsteuer-Länder" dazu zwingen kann. Es dürfte nur noch eine Frage der Zeit sein, bis es zu Sanktionen kommt.
Gegenwehr ist nicht zu befürchten. Wer will schon böse Steuerflüchtlinge schützen. Über die Folgen einer solchen Vorgehensweise dürfte sich kaum Widerstand regen.
Bei Ländern, wie der Schweiz, Österreich oder Liechtenstein, stieß das von der OECD organisierte Treffen auf wenig Gegenliebe. Sie nahmen an der Veranstaltung gar nicht erst teil. Bundesfinanzminister Peer Steinbrück (SPD) forderte, neben der Schweiz auch Andorra, Liechtenstein und Monaco auf eine "schwarze Liste" von kooperationsunwilligen Steuerparadiesen zu setzen. Für keinen Standort dürfe sich ein schädlicher Steuerwettbewerb auf Kosten anderer auszahlen, so der Finanzminister. Wörtlich sagte er:
"Die Schweiz bietet Bedingungen, die deutsche Steuerzahler einladen, Steuern zu hinterziehen. Deshalb gehört das Land nach meiner Auffassung auf eine solche Liste."
Die wenigen Kritiker, die dieses Vorgehen bemängeln, führen folgendes Argument an: Wenn Staaten alle "Steueroasen" = Niedrigsteuergebiete auslöschen, dann brauchen die Regierenden mit ihren Steuerssystemen nicht mehr zu konkurrieren und können machen, was sie wollen.
Ausserdem wird bef Größte Bargeld Kontroll Aktion in Deutschland
-ý Geld Kontrollen: Szenen wie im 3. Reich
http://www.mmnews.de/index.php/200810211363/...f-schwarzer-Liste.html
Und nun 80 Jahre später. zuviele ......
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTCKxye9_so
Von Heinz-Jürgen Fandrich
Donnerstag, 23. Oktober 2008
Alles muss raus. Nur der Dollar nicht. Erklärungsversuche zum starken Greenback.
Es ist kein Geheimnis, die USA ist überschuldet. Die FED hat die Kontrolle über das US Finanzsystem verloren und das Vertrauen in der Welt verspielt. Manipulationen der US Finanzsysteme haben auf ganzer Linie versagt. Hemmungslose Geldmengenerweiterung ist die einzige Lösung, welche die USA anzubieten hat.
Nun droht auch noch Exportkollaps, Hyperinflation und Staatsbankrott. Da muss der Außenwert des Dollar doch gegen alle anderen Währungen verfallen, sollte man glauben.
Tut er aber nicht. Er wird immer stärker. Seltsam.
Das kann man nicht einmal mit Manipulation erklären. Aber vielleicht gibt es eine andere Erklärung. Weltweit geraten derzeit Fonds, Banken, Anleger und Investoren unter existenziellen Verkaufsdruck. Alles muss raus, Aktien, Anleihen, Zertifikate, Rohstoffe.
Da diese Transaktionen überwiegend in Dollar abgerechnet werden, gibt es, ausgelöst durch die Erwerber der abgestoßenen Wertpapiere, eine erhöhte Nachfrage nach Dollar.
Die Banken der USA vergeben derzeit nur zögerlich Kredite an Fonds, Anleger und Investoren. Gleichzeitig liegt der internationale Interbankenmarkt lahm. Der Kreditkreislauf ist unterbrochen. So bleibt den Erwerbern der Wertpapiere nur der Weg über ihre geschäftsabwickelnden Heimatinstitute an den Devisenmarkt, um die notwendigen Dollar zu beschaffen.
Ähnlich dürfte es derzeit an den Rohstoffmärkten ablaufen. Öl und Gas werden immer noch zu einem hohen Prozentsatz in Dollar abgerechnet. Für Länder mit hohen Dollarreserven kein Problem. Länder ohne Dollarreserven müssen direkt an den Devisenmarkt.
Also können im großen Stil Dollar ins System gepumpt werden, ohne dem Außenwert zu schaden. Dollar gibt es mehr als genug. Aber nicht da wo sie gebraucht werden. Es entsteht eine erhöhte Nachfrage, die den Dollar steigen lässt und bläht die Dollarmenge weiter auf. Wenn die Bemühungen der vielen Regierungen, den Kreditkreislauf wieder herzustellen, Früchte trägt, platzt der Superstar.
Bild Nr. 28031 - 4 mal gesehen
Werbung
Wenn Sie diese 5 Fragen mit JA beantworten können, ist Ihr Geld sicher
1. Sie haben etwa 10% Gold in Ihrem Portefeuille?
2. Sie konzentrieren Ihre Investments und verzetteln sich nicht auf der ganzen Welt?
3. Sie haben nur Anleihen mit Top-Ratings in Ihrem Portefeuille?
4. Die Emittenten Ihrer Zertifikate sind wirklich zu 100% sicher?
5. Ihr Cash-Anteil im Portefeuille ist vor der Inflation gesichert?
Wenn Sie nur eine Frage mit nein beantworten m Erfahren Sie HIER, wie Sie Ihr Vermögen schützen
http://www.mmnews.de/index.php/200810231382/...-Dollar-Superstar.html
Figures published by Statistics New Zealand yesterday show about 47,200 people left New Zealand for Australia on a permanent or long-term basis during the year to September. About 13,200 came the other way.
That produced a net outflow of 33,900 people from NZ to Australia - the highest since records were first compiled in 1978.
The previous peak was 33,700 in January 1989.
Immigration has also fallen to its lowest level in nearly seven years. In the year to September, the country gained only 4400 migrants - down from 8300 last year.
Tourist numbers slumped by 11,100 in the same period as tougher economic conditions affected overseas visitors, especially from China and Australia.
Richard Howard, chairman of the NZ Association for Migration and Investment, said the immigration figures were a worry, as the country was struggling to replace skilled workers.
"The people who are moving are those with skills who see more opportunities for themselves, and the skills available here are just reducing.
"Employers seeking skilled workers in New Zealand are going to find it harder, irrespective of the economic conditions.
"Many who move perceive that they and their families' lives and future, at this point in time, are better off in Australia than it is in New Zealand ... with higher wages, more job opportunities. The weather is also a factor."
Immigration consultant Tika Ram said his business had plummeted 30 per cent in the last year, and business migration interest had been "close to zero".
He said the "arrogance" of Immigration New Zealand and New Zealand's "impractical immigration policies" were a turn-off to would-be migrants.
"The immigration policies we have are not well thought-out, and written as knee-jerk responses - they are ridiculous and killing the flow of migrants," said Mr Ram.
National Party finance spokesman Bill English said the statistics were a reminder that New Zealand had major fundamental economic issues long before the current international crisis, and the increasing pace of the exodus showed New Zealand needed growth so New Zealanders could earn higher wages and have a better quality of life here.
Act Party candidate and former finance minister Sir Roger Douglas warned that more New Zealanders would leave if nothing was done to the economy, which he said was "hanging in the balance".
"The avalanche of people leaving New Zealand to go to Australia over the past year will be seen as a trickle if we don't put our house in order," Sir Roger said.
"The global meltdown means we're facing a financial tsunami.
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/...?c_id=1&objectid=10539016&pnum=0
A bad investment ripples through Main Street
By Dennis Cauchon, USA TODAY
ORLANDO — Main Street USA in Walt Disney World's Magic Kingdom seems far, far away from the meltdown on Wall Street.
Children hug Winnie the Pooh. At Town Hall, the mayor sings, Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious. Yet Wall Street's financial mess has touched even this idyllic world.
The natural gas that cooks the food on Main Street USA was one of the many things that Wall Street bought and sold with borrowed money. The gas deal went belly-up in September, costing investors $700 million when Lehman Bros. failed. Now, it will cost more for Disney to light the flame to roast the chicken to feed the children at the Crystal Palace.
Wall Street's financial crisis flows to Main Street in unexpected and sometimes imperceptible ways. The same bum deal that will raise Disney's natural-gas costs will make it more expensive to buy electricity for residents on Main Street in Tallahassee.
It also cut the value of a dozen mutual funds that lent the money for the deal. And it put a team of bankruptcy lawyers to work in New York and Atlanta.
The tale of Main Street Natural Gas — the sponsor of the obscure financial deal that failed — reveals how risky investments flourished in an era of easy credit and how everyday people are now paying the price.
It's a story of how $700 million was vaporized in just a few months, and of how the deal's investment bankers got paid while investors and consumers got stiffed.
"I feel badly about the investors who lost money and about losing a cheap supply of natural gas," says Arthur Corbin, chief executive of Main Street Natural Gas of Kennesaw, Ga.
The financial system is staggering under the weight of Wall Street-manufactured debt that cannot be repaid.
Main Street Natural Gas' $700 million is a small but revealing part of that problem. Losses on home mortgages alone will reach $1.4 trillion, the International Monetary Fund estimates. Financial institutions are suffering additional losses on home equity loans, student loans, credit cards and other debt.
The details can seem complex when buried in the language of finance — leverage, derivatives, credit default swaps.
Yet, at the core, the deals were simple: Banks and investors borrowed trillions of dollars and bet the money — on home values, natural-gas prices, the probability of bond defaults.
Main Street Natural Gas was typical. It put none of its own money into the $700 million deal. Every penny was borrowed, even the millions paid to the investment bankers. Main Street Natural Gas will lose nothing in the failed transaction.
Instead, the lenders — mutual funds, insurance companies, individual investors — will take the hit.
Long-term promises
Main Street Natural Gas is part of the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia, a government agency established by the Georgia Legislature 20 years ago to buy natural gas for city-owned utilities that now serve 243,000 customers.
A few years ago, investment bankers from several Wall Street firms approached the authority with a plan to help the agency lock in cheap supplies of natural gas for decades.
The idea: Borrow money at low, tax-exempt interest rates available to government and give the money to the investment banks. The banks would use this inexpensive debt to invest for a profit and, in return, supply natural gas at a below-market price.
In November 2006, the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia set up Main Street Natural Gas as a non-profit corporation to do the Wall Street deals.
Main Street's sole purpose was to borrow money to buy natural-gas derivatives — contracts that bet on the future price of natural gas.
"A bond lawyer suggested naming the company after 'Main Street' because that's who we were serving," says Corbin, who is also chief executive of the Municipal Gas Authority.
The goal was to secure an inexpensive, long-term natural-gas supply for 73 municipal-owned utilities, including the government district that serves Disney World.
In April, Main Street borrowed $700 million and gave it to the Lehman investment bank. In return, Lehman promised to arrange delivery of 160 billion cubic feet of natural gas over 30 years at a below-market price.
That's like a taxi driver borrowing $7,000 and giving it to a man who promises to supply gasoline for the next 30 years at 50 cents per gallon less than the market price.
The long-term savings would be huge — if the fellow who got the cash doesn't go out of business.
Lehman filed for bankruptcy Sept. 15, having delivered less than 1% of the promised gas.
The fate of the $700 million?
It's in a pool with the rest of Lehman's assets. The money will be spent repaying Lehman's creditors, not buying natural gas.
Main Street Natural Gas' lenders are standing in line with other unsecured creditors, hoping to get 30% to 50% of what they are owed. The bonds they purchased to help finance the natural-gas deal now sell for 5 to 15 cents for every dollar of original value.
City put in money bind
Main Street Natural Gas took advantage of the grand innovation of this Wall Street era: using borrowed money to acquire an asset while transferring risk to others.
Like a homeowner who puts zero-money down, the investor looks smart when the risky deal starts off great.
But things often end badly.
Main Street Natural Gas did its first deal in January 2007. Within 16 months, it borrowed $2.2 billion by issuing tax-exempt bonds and gave them to Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan Chase and Lehman.
Main Street planned to borrow more but couldn't when the financial markets came to a standstill.
The investment banks sold Main Street's tax-exempt bonds to investors, mostly mutual funds, insurance companies and wealthy individuals. The investment banks kept the cash and promised to deliver natural gas at below-market prices.
The Lehman deal would have saved the municipalities about 10% of the cost of natural gas.
That promise thrilled officials in Tallahassee.
The city has some of the highest electricity prices in Florida. It operates natural-gas electric plants that consume more than $200 million in fuel a year. The Lehman deal would have supplied enough fuel to save the city $3 million a year.
"It was a nice program," Tallahassee treasurer-clerk Gary Herndon says. "We saved money and had no liability."
Now, the city will pay a price.
Since Lehman went bankrupt, the city has been forced to purchase natural gas at higher prices. The city raised electric rates 8.3% this month, citing higher fuel costs, to an average rate of $158 per month for residential customers.
The higher electric costs will trickle down to all Florida taxpayers. The city's biggest electric customers: Florida State University and Florida's state government.
The Reedy Creek Improvement District — a special government district that contains Disney World outside Orlando — was the second-biggest buyer of natural gas in the deal.
"It was an excellent position for us to be in — cheap gas and no obligations," district administrator Ray Maxwell says.
The natural gas would have been used to generate electricity and supply natural gas for cooking at Disney, he says.
"There's lots of natural gas out there to buy. That's not a problem," Maxwell says.
"We just won't have a long-term contract and as good a price."
'Great tool' — or 'toxic'?
Investors took the loss.
The Franklin Federal Tax-Free Income Fund, for example, bought $25 million of the bonds sold by Lehman.
The interest rate was attractive — as high as 6.6% annually through 2038 — and interest payments were exempt from federal income taxes.
The mutual fund lost about $22 million on the Main Street bonds, based on their current market value. That's equal to a dent of about one-third of a percentage point in the value of the $6.6 billion fund.
Fidelity, Morgan Stanley, Oppenheimer and Nuveen were among the other mutual funds to buy the bonds, according to Securities and Exchange Commission records.
Natural-gas derivatives "can be a great tool if used appropriately," says economist Thomas Lee of the federal Energy Information Administration. "They also can be very dangerous and toxic. The key is to know what you're doing and not cross the line."
Natural-gas derivatives are financial instruments — options, futures contracts, swaps — that are commonly traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange and elsewhere.
In these deals, investors promise to buy or sell natural gas sometime in the future at a specific price.
For example, a contract may call for the purchase of natural gas for $8.25 per million British thermal units (mBtu) in 2013. If the market price of natural gas is $15 per mBtu in 2013, the derivative is a big-time winning bet. If the price is $7.21 per mBtu (the market price Tuesday), the derivative is a money loser.
Lehman commodity traders had the job of betting the $700 million in a way that was profitable for the investment bank and delivering the natural gas to Disney World and Tallahassee when it was due.
Main Street Natural Gas' deal was riskier than ordinary natural-gas derivatives because it placed the entire bet with one company: Lehman.
As it turned out, the deal was a $700 million bet on the financial health of Lehman.
Federal law opened the door
Federal tax law encouraged the deal.
Lehman obtained inexpensively borrowed money by using the tax-exempt status of Main Street Natural Gas.
This borrowing technique had been uncommon until a few years ago because of questions about its legality.
Then the Energy Policy Act of 2005, a 1,700-page energy bill supported by Congress and President Bush, confirmed that tax-exempt borrowing to obtain a long-term energy supply was legal.
Investment banks took advantage of this access to tax-exempt money to raise billions of dollars to bet on the derivatives market.
Lehman was counting on its low cost of borrowing $700 million, plus its investment prowess, to generate enough cash to cover the natural gas it had promised.
For its no-risk role as a tax-break vehicle, Main Street Natural Gas would earn an administrative fee equal to about $4 million over the life of the deal, according to the bond contract. That $4 million would provide earnings to help its parent, the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia, keep natural gas prices lower for the customers of municipal utilities.
Lehman's bankers, bond lawyers, the bond rating companies and others took home about $4.5 million in April from the bond issue.
Main Street's tax-exempt status would have saved investors — and cost the U.S. Treasury — about $300 million in taxes over 30 years, if the deal hadn't gone bust.
"Lehman Bros. was a highly rated firm," Corbin says.
"We were talking to them right up until they declared bankruptcy."
In April, when the bonds were sold, Lehman stock was trading for about $40 per share. Credit rating agencies gave the bonds good ratings based on the creditworthiness of Lehman, a firm that traced its roots to the cotton trade in the 1840s.
"Every time you borrow money," Corbin says, "there's some risk."
Hitting close to home
At Walt Disney World, the price of roasting chicken at the famous Crystal Palace on Main Street USA is likely to cost more soon.
"It's all very expensive but all very wonderful," says Sandra Rodriguez, an Indianapolis mother who ate at the restaurant with her two children.
When she returns home, Rodriguez and her husband will have to find new jobs. They both were laid off from jobs in the homebuilding business.
"Wall Street problems have affected us," she says.
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/...t_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip
There Will Never Be Another Warren Buffett
Investors Will Likely Immediately Dump Shares If Buffett Is No Longer at the Helm
Growth Has Slowed Recently:
Buffett Says the Salad Days For Insurance, the Cornerstone of the Berkshire Complex, Are Over
An Outlook for Substandard Investment Returns and Uneven Economic Growth Will Provide a Headwind to Berkshire's Growth
Berkshire Hathaway's Premium Valuation Has Seemingly Been a Byproduct of the Credit Crisis and the Perception of the Company As a Safe Haven
A Sum of the Parts Analysis, Relative EPS and Price/Book Comparisons of Peers Suggests that Berkshire's Shares are Overpriced Relative to the Market
As Stock is Sold in the MarketPlace, Buffett's Contribution of (85%of his) Berkshire's Shares to Charity Could Create an Imbalance Between Demand and Supply as Stock is Sold in the Marketplace
Some of Berkshire's Most Significant Stock Investments Seem Vulnerable to a Post Credit Bubble Crisis and May Not Recover for Years
The Law of Large Numbers Works to Berkshire's Disadvantage
Berkshire's Disclosure is Weak and Opaque
hier der komplette artikel
Kass Katch: 11 Reasons to Short Berkshire
Doug Kass
03/10/08 - 01:48 PM EDT
Updated from 10:35 a.m. EDT.
"The investor of today does not profit from yesterday's growth." -- Warren Buffett
I have worshiped at the altar of Warren Buffett since the late 1970s -- ever since an investor and acquaintance, Conrad Taft, introduced me to his investment methodology and style at Berkshire Hathaway(BRK.A Quote - Cramer on BRK.A - Stock Picks). Indeed my writings over the last seven years have often been punctuated with Buffett-isms. I have repeatedly objected to, scoffed at and refuted criticisms of Buffett's strategy on this site and elsewhere.
That said, the rationale behind avoiding/shorting Berkshire Hathaway's common stock must be segregated from my respect/worship of the greatest investment icon of the last half century.
Berkshire Hathaway's beginnings were as humble as Warren Buffett has remained today. Its birth took place when he began to acquire the shares of Berkshire Hathaway (nee Berkshire Spinning and the Hathaway Manufacturing Company) in the early 1960s. His initial investment performed poorly but provided a platform for unprecedented growth through a series of well-timed acquisitions of publicly held companies. Berkshire stands, with a market value of about $200 billion, as the sixth largest company in the U.S. -- behind ExxonMobil(XOM Quote - Cramer on XOM - Stock Picks), General Electric(GE Quote - Cramer on GE - Stock Picks), Procter & Gamble(PG Quote - Cramer on PG - Stock Picks), Microsoft(MSFT Quote - Cramer on MSFT - Stock Picks) and AT&T(T Quote - Cramer on T - Stock Picks).
The insurance business line represents the most important contributor to Berkshire -- both as a percent of aggregate earnings as well as the all-important generation of cash flow for Buffett to invest in companies that are perceived to sell at a meaningful discount to estimated intrinsic value. Berkshire's shares have compounded in excess of a 21% annual rate -- or at twice the rate of growth for the S&P Index. Last year Berkshire's shares rose by over 25% against a 3% rise in the S&P Index.
"The future is never clear, and you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty is the friend of the buyer of long-term values."-- Warren Buffett
As discussed below I have concluded that Berkshire's shareholders face a number of headwinds. Value will be more difficult to add than ever before, reflecting (among other things) the company's size, fiercer competition in the search for undervalued investments and a potentially more hostile economic and stock market backdrop. As well, the issue of Buffett's stewardship could weigh on the shares over the near term. In the extreme, the company could (without Buffett at the helm and in the fullness of time) be viewed as just another diversified conglomerate without a "moat."
1. There Will Never Be Another Warren Buffett: However, in part because of lucrative hedge fund compensation, the investment landscape is now inhabited by a lot more smart and aggressive managers combing for "value" -- far more than five, 10, 20 or 30 years ago. Over time Buffett has been increasingly willing to "guide" investors through his strategy by providing investment insights. It is said that imitation is the greatest form of flattery, and, through the years, a number of managers have imitated Buffett's strategy of "stepping over 1-foot bars" and buying at a discount to intrinisic value (making, in cases, the search more of a science than Buffett's "art" by even computerizing his process). Importantly, "newer" hedge fund managers -- like Duquesne's Druckenmiller, and SAC's Cohen -- have become the "new" Buffetts by developing more aggressive multi-strategy styles that have produced returns far in excess of Berkshire Hathaway. Others (particularly private equity firms like Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers) have realized more ebullient returns by embracing the technology sector, an integral growth driver that Buffett refuses to invest in. As a result of the above developments, the degree of outperformance of Berkshire's shares vis a vis the market has been narrowing - over the last decade (+12.5% vs. +4.7%) from the prior two decades (+31.7% vs. 15.0% and +36.8% vs. +9.7%). I expect that outperformance to continue to narrow. Not only is the value approach becoming a more efficient proposition as it is today littered with more participants, many more smart investors (activist hedge funds, longer term Buffett-like investors such as Edward Lampert and private equity firms) -- are armed with large and ever growing war chests putting them on the same level playing field today as Buffett. This leaves fewer rocks for Buffett to uncover. Finally, the timely and comprehensive dissemination of information is vastly superior in 2008 vis a vis the past. As a result (and in regards to investing in Berkshire), Mae West might have been wrong when she said, "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful." To paraphrase Buffett, the future holds less "cinches" and finding investment "fish in a barrel" will likely grow more difficult.
2. Investors Will Likely Immediately Dump Shares If Buffett Is No Longer at the Helm:Warren Buffett will be 78 years old in August 2008 (Charles Munger is 84). I am not signaling that he plans to step down even though his diet apparently consists almost entirely of unhealthy Cherry Cokes and cheeseburgers! (His actuarial life expectancy is another nine years!) Buffett has said that he intends to split his job into two positions -- a CEO and a CIO (he has already announced that a search is on). But should he decide to begin to delegate responsibilities (sooner than later), it can be expected that many long-term investors in Berkshire will likely consider cashing out. Considering the shares' liquidity (the average daily trading volume is roughly 1,000 shares) and the disproportionate role that Berkshire has on many individual and institutional investor Buffett devotees' portfolios this could put pressure on the stock.
3. Growth Has Slowed Recently: Berkshire has achieved compounded annual investment returns of 24% over the last 40 years, but returns have been less over the last five years. The market values the company at a premium to its peers as it appears to many that the historic outperformance and his investment alchemy can be duplicated. By implication, the $40 billion cash hoard at Berkshire is assumed to be a shore of latent investment value upon employment. By contrast I would argue that a combination of a more difficult stock market and economic backdrop when coupled with fiercer competition from other investment managers might render that $40 billion as having a "value" not much more than that $40 billion figure. In a recent Barron's column, Andrew Bary suggested that another conglomerate, Loews(LTR Quote - Cramer on LTR - Stock Picks), could provide more value as (at that time) its shares sold at only 12x projected earnings and at a discount to its net asset value.
4. Buffett Says the Salad Days For Insurance, the Cornerstone of the Berkshire Complex, Are Over: After several years of no catastrophic experience it is inevitable that "the winds will roar or the earth will tremble... and results could be worse" in Berkshire's insurance segment. Regardless of 2008 catastrophic experience, profit margins will be under pressure in the face of a more competitive landscape. (Buffett expects insurance industry profit margins will shrink by about four percentage points in 2008 -- even barring a catastrophe).
5. An Outlook for Substandard Investment Returns and Uneven Economic Growth Will Provide a Headwind to Berkshire's Growth: My baseline view is that we are in a period of Blahflation (blah and inconsistent economic growth coupled with stubbornly high inflation) -- a difficult environment of headwinds for even The Master.
6. Berkshire Hathaway's Premium Valuation Has Seemingly Been a Byproduct of the Credit Crisis and the Perception of the Company As a Safe Haven: Its shares trade at a large premium to like financials and have increased in value by about 12% over the last six months (compared to an 11% decline in the S&P Index). Since March 5, 2007, Berkshire's shares are up by 26% vis a vis a 8% drop in the broader indices. Should stock market conditions improve, Berkshire's shares might underperform as deflated financial company shares regain their footing.
7. A Sum of the Parts Analysis, Relative EPS and Price/Book Comparisons of Peers Suggests that Berkshire's Shares are Overpriced Relative to the Market: A sum of parts analysis that compares Berkshire to its peers produces and assumes a 12x PE multiple on projected 2008 profits of $9750/share and a $121,000/share price target. A similar methodology assuming a melded price-to-book on insurance and other businesses at 1.6x and on finance and financial products of 1.25x yields a fair market value of about $125,000/share.
8. As Stock is Sold in the MarketPlace, Buffett's Contribution of (85%of his) Berkshire's Shares to Charity Could Create an Imbalance Between Demand and Supply as Stock is Sold in the Marketplace: Starting in 2006, Buffett began distributing Class B shares (602,500 shares at first and then declining by 5% a year). A shares convert into 30 Class B shares (1/200th voting rights), but not the other way around.
9. Some of Berkshire's Most Significant Stock Investments Seem Vulnerable to a Post Credit Bubble Crisis and May Not Recover for Years: The company is substantially exposed to not only financials but also to a weakening housing market and to pricing competition in insurance. While American Express(AXP Quote - Cramer on AXP - Stock Picks) ($9 billion investment market value), Coca-Cola(KO Quote - Cramer on KO - Stock Picks) ($9 billion investment), Wells Fargo(WFC Quote - Cramer on WFC - Stock Picks) ($7.8 billion investment) represent historically valuable business franchises, one can argue that they no longer will represent outstanding future value. They certainly have been a meaningful "paper" drain over the last 12 months. For now, Buffett's favorite holding period is forever, but Buffett's replacement could decide to sell any of these core positions (not likely, but always possible) and Berkshire would incur large capital gains taxes.
10. The Law of Large Numbers Works to Berkshire's Disadvantage: Buffett admits in this year's letter to shareholders that "Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future."
11. Berkshire's Disclosure is Weak and Opaque: There is little information on Berkshire's non-insurance operations contained in the company's financial statements and large forays into reinsurance/derivatives are not materially explained. There can always be negative surprises, especially considering the current seizure in the derivatives market and in light of the possibility of a more problematic and volatile future market environment. Over the years, investors have given Buffett a "mulligan" when he has made mistakes (e.g. General Re). When Buffett leaves Berkshire's helm, I expect investors to be less forgiving.
Know What You Own: Berkshire Hathaway's biggest business operates in the insurance sector, and some other stocks in this sector include Allianz SE (AZ Quote - Cramer on AZ - Stock Picks), AXA (AXA Quote - Cramer on AXA - Stock Picks) and Allstate (ALL Quote - Cramer on ALL - Stock Picks). These stocks were recently trading at $16.68, $31.03 and $47.45 respectively. For more on the value of knowing what you own, visit TheStreet.com's Investing A-to-Z section, and to stay up to date on the insurance sector, don't miss TheStreet.com's Insurance section.
http://www.thestreet.com/print/story/10406915.html
..oder wie bring ich reportern bei, dass sie ein bisschen daneben stehen...
http://www.cnbc.com/id/27321400/
partner at hedge fund Eclectica
über Hedge funds Verhalten
über Ungarn
über die Tiere in der Savanne
über Staaten in Osteuropa
über UK und Zinssenkungen
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=899394201&play=1
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1853391,00.html
Benjamin Graham was well prepared for the Crash of 1929. The now-legendary investor had hedged his bets — he would buy preferred stock in a company, and sell short the common stock in the same company. When stocks crashed in October 1929, common shares fell much faster than preferreds, and Graham made a lot of money off short sales.
But after the crash most of those preferred shares seemed so cheap that Graham couldn't bear to part with them, he wrote in his memoirs. They kept falling, and his profit soon turned to a loss. His fund (equivalent to a modern hedge fund) ended the year down 20%. In 1930 it dropped 50.5%. in 1931 16%; in 1932 3%. "The stock market," Graham resignedly put it in the first edition of his and David Dodd's book Security Analysis in 1934, "is a voting machine rather than weighing machine."
It had actually begun voting along with Graham by then — his fund gained 50% in 1933, and he did spectacularly well for himself for the next two decades. "In the short run, the market is a voting machine," he later took to saying, "but in the long run it is a weighing machine." Over time, Graham's strategy of buying stocks that seemed inexpensive relative to a company's underlying assets and earnings really was (and presumably still is) a profitable strategy. But for months and even years on end, cheap stocks are perfectly capable of getting cheaper.
It's an important lesson to remember these days. Stock prices have dropped a lot, so stocks look a whole lot cheaper than they were just a couple of months ago. By some — but certainly not all — measures they even look cheap in historical terms. But that's no guarantee prices won't keep dropping.
So while some value investors, most notably Graham's protege Warren Buffett, have recently announced that they're in a buying mood, that's not necessarily a signal that the market has bottomed out.
Buffett's most famous market pronouncement came in October 1974, when he told Forbes that, with the S&P 500 down in the low 60s after peaking at 120 the year before he felt "like an oversexed guy in a whorehouse. This is the time to start investing." (The quote is from Roger Lowenstein's Buffett. In print, Forbes changed "whorehouse" to "harem.") That actually was pretty well timed — the market rebounded sharply in 1975. Then it dropped again, and the long secular bear market that had begun in 1965 didn't end until 1982. Buffett made tons of money in the second half of the 1970s — because he was a really smart investor and because he'd set up his investment vehicle, Berkshire Hathaway, as a self-funded enterprise that didn't rely on cash from (and thus didn't have to respond to the whims of) outside investors. But the S&P 500 was, when adjusted for the double-digit inflation of those days, actually lower in mid-1982 than when Buffett spoke out in October 1974.
Add in dividends — the yield on the S&P 500 was 5.43% in 1974; it's just over 3% now — and stock market investors came out modestly in the black over that stretch. They would have done much better, though, putting their money in gold or real estate or baseball cards. Then again, most of the gold bugs and baseball fans probably missed out on the market's great turn in 1982. Buffett and his fellow value investors did not.
We appear to be eight years into another of those long, secular bear markets like the one from 1965 to 1982, or 1929 to 1949. If you're looking for a bottom, an end to the pain, you're very likely to be disappointed. "Bear markets behave rather like Lucy in the Peanuts cartoon strip," Phil Coggan writes in this week's Economist. "Just when Charlie Brown is persuaded to attempt to kick the football, she snatches it away."
The corporations whose shares trade on the stock market today are for the most part valuable entities, and the employees of many of them will find ways to make them even more valuable in the future — something that cannot be said of gold or real estate or baseball cards, which is why stocks can be expected to outperform all of those assets over time. It stands to reason that it's better to buy into stocks at today's prices than at those that prevailed a year ago. But it's also possible that they'll be even cheaper next year.
Southern China to shed millions of jobs as economic crisis bites
12 hours ago
DONGGUAN, China (AFP) — At least 2.7 million factory workers in southern China could lose their jobs as the global economic crisis hits demand for electronics, toys and clothes, according to industry estimates.
The region has seen massive export-driven expansion in recent years by supplying the world with cheap consumer goods, but rising production costs and falling US and European demand have marked a swift end to the boom.
Now 9,000 of the 45,000 factories in the cities of Guangzhou, Dongguan, and Shenzhen are expected to close before the Chinese New Year in late January, the Dongguan City Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment estimates.
By then, the association expects overseas demand for products from the three manufacturing hubs to have shrunk by 30 percent, as the knock-on effects of the US housing market collapse and credit crunch filter down to Chinese workers.
"I am afraid it is not going to look good on the Chinese government if the decline of the export-led industries and the unemployment problem continue to worsen," Eddie Leung, the association's president told AFP.
Leung, also a member of the Chinese Manufacturers' Association, said the estimate of 2.7 million job losses was conservative, given that many of the larger factories in Guangdong province employ thousands of workers.
One of them, Hong Kong-listed Smart Union, a major toy manufacturer in Dongguan supplying US giants Mattel and Disney, closed its doors last week, leaving 7,000 workers out of work and with several weeks of back pay owed.
Clement Chan, chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, said a quarter of the 70,000 Hong Kong-owned companies in southern China, 17,500 businesses, could go to the wall by the end of January.
Describing the likelihood as a "worst case scenario," he said Hong Kong firms in the region employed a total of 10 million workers, but did not want to speculate on the extent of possible job losses.
While small and medium-sized factories are especially prone, the threat of lay offs looms just as large over the region's manufacturing giants, further squeezed by the appreciation of the yuan.
Harry To's Mansfield Manufacturing is a classic example of the spectacular growth in China's industrial heartland over the last three decades.
To started a metal business from a small room in Hong Kong in 1975. In 1991, he joined hundreds of other Hong Kong entrepreneurs moving their production across the border into China to take advantage of cheap labour and land.
He now employs 8,500 workers in 11 factories in China and Europe. His six factories in Dongguan cover 140,000 square meters (1.5 million square feet).
To's company, which is now a subsidiary of Singapore-listed InnoTek Ltd. supplies metal components for cars, plasma televisions, printers and other electrical appliances to Japanese brands including Canon, Toshiba, Epson, Minolta and Fuji-Xerox.
Business for the company, among the largest in its field in China, has grown by 40 percent annually in recent years, but with credit being harder to come by, no manufacturer is safe, he said.
"With banks being so tight on their lending policies now, bringing down a factory overnight has now become very easy."
All his expansion plans have had to be put on hold.
"Some of our long-time Japanese and European clients have asked us to stop producing for them in the next two to three weeks," he said.
"They said they did not want to have too much stock piled up in their warehouse as demand continues to dwindle."
To recently started building a new 70,000 square metre factory in Dongguan and was planning to hire 2,000 more workers later this year. But now, all work on the unfinished factory has stopped until more orders roll in.
"No one would expand their business when the prospects for the entire manufacturing industry look so grim," he said.
Instead of hiring more workers, To is looking at cutting 1,000 employees across his operations.
But far from being downhearted, he is shifting part of the company's export-led production to developing energy-saving electrical appliances for the domestic market, which he sees as weathering the current financial turmoil.
"In the long run, I am confident that mainland Chinese consumers' purchasing power will keep rising as their Western counterparts continue to lose out."
Speaking to Bloomberg news Faber said, "I think physical gold will go down some more, but as an insurance policy I'd be very happy if it went down first, allowing us to buy more."
Compared with industrial commodities, "Gold has held up relatively well," says Faber "and it has held up relatively well compared with equities."
Looking ahead, "I think that the governments in this world have no other option than to print money, and that will lead down the road to inflation."
The asset of last resort, gold, has fallen to below US$700. The metal has so far lost more than US$180 in October.
The reason, according to analysts at the World Gold Council, was that the latest bout of the credit crisis has been deeper and more far reaching. Funds were forced to sell desired assets such as gold to meet margin calls, while weakness in European economies lifted the US Dollar, which then pushed dollar-denominated gold prices lower.
"The fact that gold did not head higher during the current leg of the crisis seems to reflect a combination of the rise in the dollar, deleveraging of commodity positions, sales to meet margin calls, and the unwinding of the long gold, short dollar trade," Natalie Dempster, an analyst at the WGC, wrote in a research report released on Thursday.
Meanwhile in India, destination for one ounce in every five of global gold mining supply in 2007, "demand is strong but not as strong as it should be at this time," said Haresh Acharya, a bullion dealer at Parker Agrochem Exports in Ahmedabad, to Reuters earlier.
Next Tuesday will mark the key gold-buying festival of Diwali.
http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=26327&t=1
http://www.faz.net/s/...BDBDF467DABDADD327~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html
Es ist klar, dass sie erheblich Blut lassen. Hedge-Fondsmanager reagieren jedoch rasch auf entsprechende Impulse. Aus diesem Grund könnte ich mir vorstellen, dass ihre Verkäufe rascher aufhören, als manche denken. Der Schwerpunkt liegt derzeit bei den Schwellenländerunternehmen und -banken, die sich refinanziert haben.
http://www.faz.net/s/...BDBDF467DABDADD327~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html
Wenn wir weiterhin falsche Signale bekommen, wird der Kurs des Euro gegen den Yen auf 105 fallen, der Euro wird gegen den Dollar im laufenden Quartal auf 1,17 und im kommenden auf 1,07 Dollar fallen und die japanische Währung wird gegen den Dollar auf 88 Yen im ersten Quartal des kommenden Jahres fallen.
http://www.faz.net/s/...BDBDF467DABDADD327~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html
Je höher die Senkung ausfällt, umso eher hört der $ mit seinen Steigerungen auf. Um nicht das Pulver zu verschießen, wird man wohl mit 50 bp herauskommen. Wenn es dann noch gelingt, die anderen Zentralbanken zu einem gemeinsamen Vorgehen zu bringen, dürfte es zu einer Erholung am Aktienmarkt kommen.
http://finance.yahoo.com/indices?e=treasury
navigatorc
Optionen
VERY wealthy prophet of fiscal woe Marc Faber wrote recently in one of his uplifting Boom, Gloom and Doom reports of the difficulties of saving America’s economy when everything worth buying comes from overseas.
“The Federal Government is sending each of us a $US600 rebate.”
“If we spend that money at Wal-Mart, the money goes to China. If we spend it on gasoline, it goes to the Arabs.”
“If we buy a computer it will go to India.”
“If we purchase fruit and vegetables it will go to Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala.”
“If we purchase a good car it will go to Germany.”
“If we purchase useless crap it will go to Taiwan and none of it will help the American economy,” he opined.
“The only way to keep that money here at home is to spend it on prostitutes and beer, since these are the only products still produced in US.”
“I’ve been doing my part,” he added…
http://www.boom2bust.com/2008/10/20/quote-for-the-week-33/
"I have peace and quiet at night," he said.
Liu may like that tranquility, a rarity in this city of 12 million. But the vacant apartments are a nightmare for the mainly speculative investors who bought them when the complex opened a year ago - and they are part of an emerging problem for Chinese banks.
As in the United States, Britain and Spain, the real estate bubble in China has turned into a bust in many cities; only one of the two dozen towering cranes at projects near Liu's home was in operation one recent afternoon.
Banking experts and economists expect the bust to produce, by next spring or summer, a sharp increase in loan defaults that could erode the high profits earned by Chinese banks over the past three years.
A national index of real estate prices released by Beijing on Wednesday showed a decline of 0.1 percent in September compared with August, the first drop the government has acknowledged. But experts inside and outside China say that actual declines have been much greater, and that municipal officials have been reluctant to reflect this in the data they send to Beijing.
Under the new rules announced Wednesday, mortgage interest rates will be reduced by 0.27 percent for first-time buyers, to 4.59 percent for mortgages of five years or more.
The new rules also leave in place China's many punitive policies toward people who buy real estate as an investment.
"Things are still getting worse," said a top executive at a real estate developer with a variety of projects. The executive insisted on anonymity, citing the government's sensitivity about the housing market.
One Chinese regulation, which would never be allowed in the United States, is widely accepted here as simple prudence: the term of a mortgage must end when the borrower reaches a certain age - 55 for a woman, 60 for a man. This means that a 52-year-old man can obtain a mortgage of up to eight years and that a 52-year-old woman can get a mortgage of up to three years. (Since the 1950s, women in China have retired at an earlier age, as it was thought necessary to protect women's health. Some experts in China are now calling for parity.)
Short durations of mortgages mean that homeowners quickly build up equity in their homes with their monthly payments. That makes them reluctant to mail the keys to the bank and walk away if the market weakens, although a few speculators do so anyway.
It is also nearly impossible for Chinese banks to foreclose on homes. Instead, banks tend to renegotiate monthly payments for borrowers who can clearly demonstrate financial strain.
Chinese banks hold the mortgages they issue instead of following the U.S. practice of bundling them together as securities and reselling pieces to various investors. That process, known as securitization, is now making it hard for homeowners in the United States to renegotiate their mortgages.
For years, U.S. bankers and lawyers urged China, unsuccessfully, to allow securitization, but they have curbed such pleas in recent months after seeing the global financial crisis unfold.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/23/business/chinabanks.php?page=1