http://www.tullettprebon.com/Documents/...I_009_Perfect_Storm_009.pdf
hier ist der Research mit 84 Seiten und nicht die og. Kurzfassung
Miit der Parellelentwicklung der Bevölkerung und des Energieverbrauchs muss man ihm zustimmen.Auch dass Energie im Jahr 2020 möglicherweise 50% teurer ist.Ob aber auch mit der Schlussfolgerung, dass Schulden in Wirklichkeit ein Anspruch auf künftige Energie sind? The appreciation of the true nature of money as a tokenisation of energy also enables us to put debt into its proper context. Fundamentally, debt can be defined as ‘a claim on future money’. However, since we have seen that money is a tokenisation of energy, it becomes apparent that debt really amounts to ‘a claim on future energy’..... Therefore, the viability (or otherwise) of today’s massively-indebted economies depends upon the outlook for energy supply...If such enlargement cannot be relied upon, however, then the debt burden can only be regarded as unsustainable. ... interessanter Gedanke!
Mit dem oben von permanent zitierten Auszug finde ich schon,dass Morgan recht hat,denn Shale Gas verbraucht sich noch schneller als Öl und kann wohl langfristig kaum mit arabischen Öllagerstätten verglichen werden.Ich hatte dazu schon was gepostet vor einigen Tagen.Es werden nur immer mehr Bohrungen nötig um den Stand aufrecht zu erhalten (derzeit 5000/ Jahr),nur dass diese dann in Bereiche vordringen,wo der Gewinn immer geringer wird
Ähnlich argumentiert übrigens Morgan über die kanadischen Ölsands die Energiergewinnung durch Windkraft,die Biofuelgewinnung,die er völlig negativ bewertet und er kommt zu dem Schluss,dass die Politiker an die unconventional hydrocarbon sources glauben ,einem aussergewöhnlich hohen Grad an Selbsttäuschung unterliegen
Hubbertians argue, the supply of oil will decline, in pretty much a mirror-image of the increase in consumption which has taken place since the 1850s. Much the same, they argue, will eventually happen to supplies of natural gas and of coal, with depletion of these sources accelerating as a result of substitution from oil. the critical issues are energy returns on energy invested (EROEI) and deliverability. The best way to illustrate the deliverability issue is to compare oil sands reserves in Canada (about 170 bn bbls) with conventional reserves in Saudi Arabia (about 270 bn bbls). Given that Saudi production capacity is about 12 mmb/d (million barrels per day), one might, on a simple pro-rata basis, expect Canadian oil sands output to reach perhaps 7 mmb/d. But the reality is that output is most unlikely to reach even 3.5 mmb/d. Deliverability from the Canadian resource, will, then, be less than half of that attained from conventional reserves in Saudi Arabia
substantial new sources are needed each year simply to replace natural declines from already producing fields. As the industry moves from higher- to lower-deliverability fields, maintenance of existing production levels, let alone growth, becomes ever more difficult.
supply from existing sources of oil is declining by about 6.7% annually.
future supply projections assume that a large proportion of all future net gains in production will have to come from OPEC countries. This might be difficult to achieve, particularly given that Saudi Aramco admits that it is injecting 13 mmb/d of treated seawater, most of it to sustain production at its giant (but ageing) Al Ghawar field, historically the source of about half of the kingdom’s production.
At first glance, the claimed EROEIs for onshore wind power look pretty reasonable at perhaps 17:1. However, the returns claimed for wind seem to make some pretty heroic assumptions about the longevity of generating plant and, in any case, wind turbines produce electricity, not the highly-concentrated transport fuels upon which the economy depends.
Other energy sources look even worse in EROEI terms. Biofuel EROEIs seldom exceed 3:1, and some are negative. The much-vaunted “hydrogen economy” is a myth, because hydrogen acts as a store (not a source) of energy, and is very inefficient in the way in which it converts energy obtained from conventional sources. About 40% of the initial energy is lost in conversion, perhaps another 15% is lost in the collection process and, if the hydrogen energy is reconverted into electricity, the process losses mean that one finishes with barely 15% of the energy put into the process in the first place. Policymakers who pin their hopes on unconventional hydrocarbon sources are guilty of a quite extraordinary degree of self-delusion..... |