Universal Express (920232) STRONG BUY!
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Werde das aber genau beobachten.*g*
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Da kommt vielleicht wirklich noch was??!
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
aus seinem langfristigen downtrend heraus brechen (Fig. 1) valuting auf
wachsendem Volumen, das durch seinen 1. Bereich des Overheadwiderstands,
s 0,13 für einen 300% schlägt, den+vor dem Zurückfahren auf Oberseite der
Unterstützung im 0,07 Bereich gewinnt. Der Vorrat bleibt in einem festen Aufwärtstrend, den
leiten, (Fig. 2). Sobald der Vorrat Widerstand auf der 0,16
Ebene zerkaut, können wir einen geführten bis zu 0,27 erwarten Bereich und von dort wir konnte
eine explosive Aufwallung zu 0,65 sehen oder zu verbessern.
Grüße
und viele %%.
Konlin Letter Vorab-Auszug:
On page 2...since we recommended the stock in July at 0.03, it has
broken out of its long-term downtrend (Fig. 1) valuting on
increasing volume through its 1st area of overhead resistance,
hitting 0.13, for a 300% + gains before pulling back on top of
support in the 0.07 area. The stock remains in a solid uptrend
channel (Fig. 2). Once the stock chews up resistance at the 0.16
level, we can expect a run up to 0.27 area and from there we could
see an explosive upsurge to 0.65 or better.
Also es soll hoch gehen bis 0,65$ oder noch höher!!!
So jungs ich haue mich hin,damit ich für morgigen Tag ausgeschlafen bin.
Wunderschöne Träume wünsche ich allen
joker
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Bei der NAA-Airline, die sie aquirieren wollen ist Bush involviert - schaut Euch Worldcom an; die haben mal eben 35 Milliarden geschenkt bekommen. Der CEO hat nicht umsonst vorm Kongress gesprochen - wir stehen am ansoluten Anfang.
Wir haben die Möglichkeit von Anfang an bei einem potenziellen
Highflyer mit dabei zu sein.
Morgen wirds spannend.
Bis dahin
Auf das es so weitergeht wie die letzten 2 Tage.
Grüße vom joker
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
WKN Börse Kurs Trade Vol. Tages Vol. Zeit Datum Bid Bid Vol. Ask Ask Vol. T.hoch T.tief Vortag Diff. Änd. Realtime
920232 FRA 0,098 15.000 123.400 09:39 07.11. 0,093 0 0,099 0 0,098 0,095 0,095 0,00 +3,16%
Die Spekulation wg.Konlin könnte uns schon vor der Ami Eröffnung über 0,10 treiben.
Aber das ist hoffentlich nur der Anfang.
Von mir aus könnte es laufen wie gestern beo AGIS:*g*
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Das ist das Ende der "Leerverkäufer"!!!
Hier ist die lange Meldung:
Regulation SHO Posted, Comments Invited Until Jan. 5
Nov 7, 2003 (financialwire.net via COMTEX) -- (FinancialWire) Regulation SHO, which U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissioners hope will put a stop to naked short selling and other forms of manipulative trading that has embroiled at least 119 identified public companies, has been published at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48709.htm, and the public comment period extends until January 5.
Some thirteen on the list of 119, such as A.G. Edwards, Inc. (NYSE: AGE), Ameritrade Holding Corp. (NASDAQ: AMTD), Deutsche Bank AG (NYSE: DB), and E*Trade Group, Inc. (NYSE: ET), have been accused by one or more public companies as allegedly participating in short selling activities or abuses, or of failing to settle trades.
Others include FleetBoston (NYSE: FBF), Goldman, Sachs & Co. (NYSE: GS), Knight Securities, LP (NASDAQ: NITE), Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. (AMEX: LHS), M. H. Myerson & Co., Inc. (NASDAQ: MHMY), Olde / H&R Block (NYSE: HRB), Charles Schwab (NYSE: SCH), Toronto-Dominion`s (NYSE: TD), TD Waterhouse Group and vFinance, Inc. (OTCBB: VFIN).
During discussions about the proposed new rule, which would make it illegal for anyone to sell a company`s shares short without having first finding stock that can be delivered within two days, the Commissioners sharply disagreed with the staff that the accompanying new " rising bid" rule could not be applied equally to over-the-counter stocks.
The staff was insistent that OTC and OTCBB stocks do not have reliable consolidated prices, but the Commissioners, including Chairman William Donaldson, implored the staff to try harder, and suggested that public commentators " may help us find a solution."
The proposed rule states that if a broker or an investor fails to deliver within two days after the settlement date, the account of that firm or individual will effectively be unable to short sell that stock for 90 days.
Critics already disagree with that, believing that it should be the brokers and dealers who " assist" the short selling process who should be banned from short selling if their firm is in violation.
Since the proposed rule will effect short selling outside the U.S. as well as within the borders, the biggest campground for manipulative traders, Canada, would be sharply curtailed.
Staff said that in 1999 when short selling was last examined, the SEC got over 2,000 comments. The upcoming 60-day comment period could see that record broken.
The SEC said that comments should be sent by hard copy or e-mail, but not by both methods. Comments sent by hard copy should be submitted in triplicate to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-0609.
Comments also may be submitted electronically at the following E-mail address: rule-comments@sec.gov. All comment letters should refer to File No. S7-23-03. Comments submitted by e-mail should include the file number in the subject line. Comment letters received will be available for public inspection and copying in the Commission`s Public Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549. Electronically submitted comment letters will be posted on the Commission`s Internet web site (www.sec.gov).
The proposed Regulation SHO, according to the SEC summary, would replace Rules 3b-3, 10a-1, and 10a-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
" The Commission is also proposing amendments to Rule 105 of Regulation M.
" Proposed Regulation SHO would, among other things, require short sellers in all equity securities to locate securities to borrow before selling, and would also impose strict delivery requirements on securities where many sellers have failed to deliver the securities, according to the summary.
In part, the SEC states, this action is designed to address the problem of " naked" short selling. " Proposed Regulation SHO would also institute a new uniform bid test allowing short sales to be effected at a price one cent above the consolidated best bid. This test would apply to all exchange-listed securities and Nasdaq National Market System Securities (NMS Securities), wherever traded."
The SEC is also seeking comment on a temporary rule that would suspend the operation of the proposed bid test for specified liquid securities during a two-year pilot period. The temporary suspension would allow the Commission to study the effects of relatively unrestricted short selling on market volatility, price efficiency, and liquidity.
The SEC notes that Congress, in 1934, " directed the Commission to `purge the market` of short selling abuses, and in response, the Commission adopted restrictions that have remained essentially unchanged for over 60 years. Originally adopted in 1938, the Commission`s short sale rule, Rule 10a-1, is designed to restrict short sellers from effecting short sales in an exchange-traded security when the price of that security is declining.
" Since its adoption, the Commission has engaged in studies, investigations, and reviews of the efficacy of the Rule. Most recently, in 1999, the Commission issued a release requesting public comment on the regulation of short sales of securities. The Concept Release examined ways to modernize our approach to short sale regulation. We received 2778 comment letters in response to the Release."
The SEC further states that since Concept Release was published, " we have reviewed the comment letters and reexamined the structure and operation of Rule 10a-1, and related Rules 10a-28 and 3b-3. We also considered the status of short sale regulation in the context of requests for relief from Rule 10a-1 submitted to the Commission for a wide range of short selling activities. Finally, we considered recent market changes, including increased instances of " naked" short selling, i.e., selling short without borrowing the necessary securities to make delivery; decimalization; the advent of security futures trading; and an increasing amount of Nasdaq securities being traded away from the Nasdaq market, and thus not subject to any short sale price test.
" As a result of this assessment, we are seeking comment on proposed Regulation SHO, which would replace Rules 3b-3, 10a-1, and 10a-2."
A short sale is the sale of a security that the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller, explains the SEC. " In order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short seller will borrow the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. The short seller later closes out the position by purchasing equivalent securities on the open market, or by using an equivalent security it already owned, and returning the security to the lender. In general, short selling is used to profit from an expected downward price movement, to provide liquidity in response to unanticipated demand, or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same security or in a related security. "
As an example, the SEC states that " XYZ stock is currently selling at $50 per share. An investor anticipates that the price of XYZ stock will decline and wants to sell short 100 shares. The investor`s broker borrows 100 shares for the investor and executes the short sale. The $5,000 proceeds from the sale (plus, usually, an additional 2%) are posted as collateral with the lender and the investor must also post margin equal to 50% of the purchase price with his broker. At some point in the future the investor must purchase 100 shares to return to the lender. If the investor can purchase the XYZ shares at a price below $50, the investor can cover the short position at a profit. If the price of XYZ shares rises above $50, the investor may have to cover the short position at a loss."
Section 10(a) of the Exchange Act gives the Commission plenary authority to regulate short sales of securities registered on a national securities exchange (listed securities), as necessary to protect investors. After conducting an inquiry into the effects of concentrated short selling during the market break of 1937, the Commission adopted Rule 10a-1 in 1938 in order to restrict short selling in a declining market.13 The core provisions of the Rule are largely the same today as when they were adopted.
Paragraph (a) of Rule 10a-1 generally covers short sales in listed securities if trades of the security are reported pursuant to an " effective transaction reporting plan" and information as to such trades is made available in accordance with such plan on a real-time basis to vendors of market transaction information. Paragraph (b) applies to short sales on national exchanges in securities that are not covered by paragraph (a).
Rule 10a-1(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a listed security may be sold short (A) at a price above the price at which the immediately preceding sale was effected (plus tick), or (B) at the last sale price if it is higher than the last different price (zero-plus tick). Short sales are not permitted on minus ticks or zero-minus ticks, subject to narrow exceptions. The operation of these provisions, commonly described as the " tick test," determines the minimum shortable price (MSP) at which a security can be sold short.
In adopting the tick test, the Commission sought to achieve three objectives:
(i) allowing relatively unrestricted short selling in an advancing market;
(ii) preventing short selling at successively lower prices, thus eliminating short selling as a tool for driving the market down; and
(iii) preventing short sellers from accelerating a declining market by exhausting all remaining bids at one price level, causing successively lower prices to be established by long sellers.
In 1994, the Commission granted temporary approval to the NASD to apply its own short sale rule to Nasdaq NMS securities. NASD Rule 3350 prohibits short sales by NASD members in Nasdaq NMS Securities at or below the current best (inside) bid when that bid is lower than the previous best (inside) bid (commonly referred to as the bid test).
According to the SEC, short selling provides the market with at least two important benefits: market liquidity and pricing efficiency.21 Market liquidity is generally provided through short selling by market professionals, such as market makers (including specialists) and block positioners, who offset temporary imbalances in the buying and selling interest for securities. Short sales effected in the market add to the selling interest of stock available to purchasers and reduce the risk that the price paid by investors is artificially high because of a temporary contraction of selling interest. Short sellers covering their sales also may add to the buying interest of stock available to sellers.
Short selling also can contribute to the pricing efficiency of the equities markets. Efficient markets require that prices fully reflect all buy and sell interest. When a short seller speculates or hedges against a downward movement in a security, his transaction is a mirror image of the person who purchases the security based upon speculation that the security`s price will rise or to hedge against such an increase. Both the purchaser and the short seller hope to profit, or hedge against loss, by buying the security at one price and selling at a higher price. The strategies primarily differ in the sequence of transactions. Market participants who believe a stock is overvalued may engage in short sales in an attempt to profit from a perceived divergence of prices from true economic values. Such short sellers add to stock pricing efficiency because their transactions inform the market of their evaluation of future stock price performance. This evaluation is reflected in the resulting market price of the security.
" Although short selling serves useful market purposes, it also may be used to illegally manipulate stock prices. One example is the " bear raid" where an equity security is sold short in an effort to drive down the price of the security by creating an imbalance of sell-side interest. Further, unrestricted short selling can exacerbate a declining market in a security by increasing pressure from the sell-side, eliminating bids, and causing a further reduction in the price of a security by creating an appearance that the security price is falling for fundamental reasons," the SEC added.
Short selling was one of the central issues studied by Congress before enacting the Exchange Act, but Congress did not directly prohibit short selling. Instead, Congress gave the Commission broad authority to regulate short sales in order to stop short selling abuses.
The SEC states that " many issuers and investors have complained about alleged `naked short selling,` especially in thinly-capitalized securities trading over-the-counter. Naked short selling is selling short without borrowing the necessary securities to make delivery, thus potentially resulting in a `fail to deliver` securities to the buyer.
" Naked short selling can have a number of negative effects on the market, particularly when the fails to deliver persist for an extended period of time and result in a significantly large unfulfilled delivery obligation at the clearing agency where trades are settled. At times, the amount of fails to deliver may be greater than the total public float. In effect the naked short seller unilaterally converts a securities contract (which should settle in three days after the trade date) into an undated futures-type contract, which the buyer might not have agreed to or that would have been priced differently. The seller`s failure to deliver securities may also adversely affect certain rights of the buyer, such as the right to vote. More significantly, naked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time period, and they may use this additional leverage to engage in trading activities that deliberately depress the price of a security.
" The Commission recently brought an enforcement action against certain parties, alleging manipulative naked short selling, in a scheme sometimes termed as a " death spiral." These schemes generally involve parties arranging financings in public companies that are unable to obtain more conventional financing in the capital markets due to their precarious financial condition. The party providing financing receives from a public company debentures that are later convertible into the stock of the issuer. The terms typically provide that the conversion ratio will be tied to a fixed value of the aggregate underlying shares (typically a discount from the market price of the security at the time of the conversion rather than a conversion price per share). In some cases the parties providing financing have engaged in extensive naked short selling designed to lower the price of the issuer`s stock, thus realizing profits when the debentures are converted to cover the short sales.
" Naked short selling has sparked defensive actions by some issuers designed to combat the potentially negative effects on shareholders, broker-dealers, and the clearance and settlement system. Some issuers have taken actions to attempt to make transfer of their securities " custody only," thus preventing transfer of their stock to or from securities intermediaries such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC) or broker-dealers. A number of issuers have attempted to withdraw their issued securities on deposit at DTC, which makes the securities ineligible for book-entry transfer at a securities depository. Withdrawing securities from DTC or requiring custody-only transfers undermine the goal of a national clearance and settlement system, designed to reduce the physical movement of certificates in the trading markets."
The SEC states that SROs have adopted rules generally requiring that, prior to effecting short sales, members must " locate" stock available for borrowing. For example, NYSE Rule 440C.10 states that no NYSE member or member organization should " fail to deliver" against a short sale of a security on a national securities exchange until a diligent effort has been made by such member or member organization to borrow the necessary securities to make delivery. An NYSE interpretation to the rule further states that member organizations effecting short sales for their own account or the accounts of customers must be in a position to complete the transaction. The interpretation states that no orders to sell short should be accepted or entered unless prior arrangements to borrow the stock have been made or other acceptable assurances that delivery can be made on settlement date7 These provisions apply to all NYSE member organizations, whether effecting transactions in exchange-listed securities on the NYSE, another national securities exchange, or in the over-the-counter market. Exceptions from the rule are provided for short sales by specialists, market makers, and odd lot dealers in fulfilling their market responsibilities.
" The comparable NASD Rule 3370 generally provides that no member, or person associated with a member, shall effect a short sale for a customer or for its own account unless the member makes an `affirmative determination` that the member can borrow the securities or otherwise provide for delivery of the securities by settlement date. The affirmative determination must be annotated in writing, evidencing that the member firm will receive delivery of the security from the customer or, if the member firm locates the stock, the identity of the individual and firm contacted who offered assurance that the shares would be delivered or were available for borrowing," says the SEC.
This requirement applies regardless of how a short sale order is received, e.g., by the telephone, an electronic transmission, the Internet, or otherwise. This requirement does not apply to transactions in corporate debt securities, to bona fide market making transactions by Nasdaq market makers, or to transactions that result in fully hedged or arbitraged positions.
The NASD has also adopted several rules addressing failures to deliver. NASD Rule 3210 prevents a member, or person associated with a member, from selling a security for his own account, or buying a security as a broker for a customer if, with respect to domestic securities, he has a fail to deliver in that security that is 60 days or older. NASD Rule 11830 imposes a mandatory close-out requirement for Nasdaq securities that have a clearing short position of 10,000 shares or more per security and that are equal to at least one-half of one percent of the issue`s total shares outstanding. NASD Rule 11830 generally requires that a contract involving a short sale in these securities, for the account of a customer or for an NASD member`s own account, which has not resulted in delivery by the broker-dealer representing the seller within 10 business days after the normal settlement date (currently transaction date + 3 business days), must be closed by the broker-dealer representing the seller by purchasing for cash or guaranteed delivery of securities of like kind and quality. This mandatory close-out requirement does not apply to bona-fide market making transactions and transactions that result in fully hedged or arbitraged positions.
" The Commission believes that these SRO requirements have not fully addressed the problems of naked short selling and extended fails to deliver. We believe it would be beneficial to establish a uniform standard specifying the procedures for all short sellers to locate securities for borrowing," the SEC says. " This would further the goals of regulatory simplification and avoidance of regulatory arbitrage, as well as address some areas not currently covered. We are therefore proposing to incorporate in proposed Regulation SHO a uniform " locate" rule applicable to all equity securities, wherever they are traded. Proposed Rule 203 would prohibit a broker-dealer from executing a short sale order for its own account or the account of another person, unless the broker-dealer, or the person for whose account the short sale is executed (1) borrowed the security, or entered into an arrangement for the borrowing of the security, or (2) had reasonable grounds to believe that it could borrow the security so that it would be capable of delivering the securities on the date delivery is due."
Consistent with the current SRO requirements, the proposed rule would require that the locate be made and annotated in writing prior to effecting any short sale, regardless of the fact that the seller`s short position may be closed out by purchasing securities the same day. The Commission is proposing an exception from these requirements for short sales executed by specialists or market makers but only in connection with bona-fide market making activities.
" We believe a narrow exception for market makers and specialists engaged in bona fide market making activities is necessary because they may need to facilitate customer orders in a fast moving market without possible delays associated with complying with the proposed `locate` rule. Moreover, we believe that most specialists and market makers seek a net `flat` position in a security at the end of each day and often `offset` short sales with purchases such that they are not required to make delivery under the security settlement system.
" As an additional safeguard against some of the problems associated with naked short selling, we are proposing a delivery requirement targeted at securities where there is evidence of significant settlement failures. We are incorporating the same threshold currently used in NASD Rule 11830,50 i.e., any security where there are fails to deliver at a clearing agency registered with the Commission of 10,000 shares or more per security, and that is equal to at least one-half of one percent of the issue`s total shares outstanding.
" We are incorporating this standard into proposed Rule 203 because we believe that the levels set in NASD Rule 11830 characterize situations where the ratio of unfulfilled delivery obligations at the clearing agency where trades are settled represents a significant number of shares relative to the company`s total shares outstanding, thus requiring remedial action designed to address potential negative effects. The proposed rule would specify that for short sales of any security meeting this threshold, the selling broker-dealer must deliver the security no later than two days after the settlement date.
" We believe a two-day grace period is appropriate to allow for transfer delays or delays due to a variety of circumstances that prevent timely delivery. If for any reason such security was not delivered within two days after the settlement date, the rule would restrict the broker-dealer, including market makers, from executing future short sales in such security for the person for whose account the failure to deliver occurred unless the broker-dealer or the person for whose account the short sale is executed borrowed the security, or entered into a bona fide arrangement to borrow the security, prior to executing the short sale and delivered on settlement date. This restriction would be in effect for a period of 90 calendar days."
In addition, the rule would require the rules of the registered clearing agency that processed the transaction to include the following provisions: (A) A broker or dealer failing to deliver such securities shall be referred to the NASD and the designated examining authority for such broker-dealer for appropriate action; and (B) The registered clearing agency shall withhold a benefit of any mark-to-market amounts or payments that otherwise would be made to the party failing to deliver, and take other appropriate action, including assessing appropriate charges against the party failing to deliver. Both of these requirements should assist the Commission in preventing abuses and promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions.
The SEC says that the proposed requirements in Rule 203 would differ from the current SRO rules in several respects.
" First, the proposals require action two days after settlement, as opposed to the current ten days after settlement provided in Rule 11830. Further, the mandatory close-out provision in NASD Rule 11830 currently only applies to Nasdaq securities. We believe that securities with lower market capitalization may be more susceptible to abuse, and therefore believe that these additional delivery requirements should be extended to all equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act."
Finally, although market makers engaged in bona fide market making are currently exempted from NASD Rule 11830, the SEC says it believes that extended failures to deliver " appear characteristic of an investment or trading strategy, rather than being related to market making. We believe it is questionable whether a market maker carrying a short position in a heavily shorted security for an extended period of time is in fact engaged in providing liquidity for customers, or rather is engaged in a speculative trading strategy. Therefore, we are not proposing an exception from these additional delivery requirements for short sales in connection with market making."
The SEC is asking for general comments, as well as specific comments in response to its questions:
Q. What harms result from naked short selling? Conversely, what benefits accrue from naked short selling?
Q. Are there negative tax consequences associated with naked short selling, in terms of dividends paid or otherwise?
Q. What is the appropriate manner by which short sellers can comply with the requirement to have " reasonable grounds" to believe that securities sold short could be borrowed? Should short sellers be permitted to rely on blanket assurances that stock is available for borrowing, i.e., " hard to borrow" or " easy to borrow" lists? Is the equity lending market transparent enough to allow an efficient means of creating these lists?
Q. Should short sales effected by a market maker in connection with bona fide market making be excepted from the proposed " locate" requirements? Should the exception be tied to certain qualifications or conditions? If so, what should these qualifications or conditions be?
Q. Should the proposed additional delivery requirements be limited to securities in which there are significant failures to deliver? If so, is the proposed threshold an accurate indication of securities with excessive fails to deliver? Should it be higher or lower? Should additional criteria be used?
Q. Are the proposed consequences for failing to deliver securities appropriate and effective measures to address the abuses in naked short selling? If not, why not? What other measures would be effective? Should broker-dealers buying on behalf of customers be obligated to effect a buy-in for aged fails?
Q. Is the restriction preventing a broker-dealer, for a period of 90 calendar days, from executing short sales in the particular security for his own account or the account of the person for whose account the failure to deliver occurred without having pre-borrowed the securities an appropriate and effective measure to address the abuses in naked short selling? Should this restriction apply to all short sales by the broker-dealer in this particular security? Should the restriction also apply to all further short sales by the person for whose account the failure to deliver occurred, effected by any broker-dealer?
Q. Should short sales effected by a market maker in connection with bona-fide market making be exempted from the proposed delivery requirements targeted at securities in which there are significant failures to deliver? If so, what reasons support such an exemption, and how should bona-fide market making be identified?
Q. Under what circumstances might a market maker need to maintain a fail to deliver on a short sale longer than two days past settlement date in the course of bona fide market making? Is two days the appropriate time period to use?
Q. Are there any circumstances in which a party not engaging in bona-fide market making might need to maintain a fail to deliver on a short sale longer than two days past settlement? If so, can such positions be identified? Should they be excepted from the proposed borrow and delivery requirements, and if so, why, and for how long?
The SEC is also asking for comments on long sales that pertain to shorting, as well as changes from the tick test to the proposed bid test, the special pilot program, and special exceptions.
Many of the complaints about naked short selling is related to offshore abuses. The SEC is addressing that:
" In July 1992, the Commission announced that it was undertaking a study of the U.S. equity markets and of the regulatory environment in which those markets operate.218 As part of the study, the Commission addressed and sought comment on the practice of U.S. broker-dealers " booking" trades through their foreign desks or foreign affiliates to avoid U.S. transparency requirements, off-board trading restrictions, transaction fees, or limits on short sales. In what is commonly referred to as the " fax market," a U.S. broker-dealer acting as principal for its customer negotiates and agrees to the terms of a trade in the U.S., but transmits or faxes the terms overseas to be " printed" on the books of a foreign office.
" Consistent with prior Commission action, we view short sale regulation as applying to trades in reported securities when the trade is agreed to in the United States, even if the trades are " booked" overseas. For example, a U.S. money manager decides to sell a block of 500,000 shares in a NYSE security. The money manager negotiates a price with a U.S. broker-dealer, who sends the order ticket to its foreign trading desk for execution. In our view, this trade occurred in the United States as much as if the trade had been executed by the broker-dealer at a U.S. trading desk. Under the proposed rule, if the sale agreed to is a short sale in an exchange-listed or Nasdaq NMS security, unless otherwise excepted, it must be effected at a price one cent above the current best bid displayed as part of the consolidated best bid and offer regardless of where it is executed."
The SEC is soliciting comments to the following questions related to offshore trading:
Q. What factors should be used to determine whether a trade in a covered security is agreed to in the U.S.? If a trade is agreed to by a broker-dealer located outside the U.S., should the trade be viewed as agreed to outside the U.S., regardless of the location of the seller? Would the requirement that trades agreed to in the U.S. be effected at a price above the current best bid disadvantage U.S. broker-dealers in favor of foreign broker-dealers? If so, please explain.
Q. For trades agreed to in the United States and executed overseas, is the time of agreement a sufficient determinative event for the triggering of the rule?
The Commission is also proposing additional delivery requirements targeted at securities where there is evidence of large settlement failures. The proposal would specify that a short sale in any security that meets the threshold, i.e., any security where there are fails to deliver at a clearing agency registered with the Commission of 10,000 shares or more, and that is equal to one-half of one percent of the issue`s total shares outstanding, must be delivered, or the broker-dealer would be required to enter into a contract to borrow the security, or effect a buy in so that, in either event, the security would be delivered within two days after the settlement date.
If the securities are not delivered within two days after the settlement date, for a period of ninety calendar days the broker or dealer shall not execute a short sale in such security for his own account or the account of the person for whose account the failure to deliver occurred unless the broker or dealer or the person for whose account the short sale is executed has borrowed the security, or entered into a bona fide arrangement to borrow the security, and will deliver the security on the date delivery is due.
The proposed Rule would also require the rules of the registered clearing agency to include the following provisions: (A) A broker or dealer failing to deliver securities as specified in subparagraph (3) above shall be referred to the NASD and the Examining Authority (as defined in 15c3-1(c)(12)) for such broker or dealer for appropriate action; and (B) The registered clearing agency shall withhold a benefit equal to any mark to market amounts or payments that otherwise would be made to the participant failing to deliver, and assess appropriate charges.
" The Commission believes that these additional delivery requirements would protect and enhance the operation, integrity, and stability of the markets. In particular, this requirement is targeted at securities with lower market capitalization that may be more susceptible to abuse. We also believe that clearly articulated rules restricting naked short selling would assist the Commission in its enforcement efforts," the SEC states.
The Commission said it also believes that a large amount of fails at the clearing level may impose costs on the clearing agency. For example, the SEC notes that certain issuers have taken steps to make themselves either " certificate only," which require physical certification of company ownership for all share transfers, or " custody only," which restricts ownership of their securities by depositories or financial intermediaries. The Commission believes these custody arrangements are highly costly to the clearing agencies, depositories and financial intermediaries. The Commission believes this proposed additional delivery requirement would provide a benefit because it would mitigate some of these costs.
The SEC asks for commentators to " please provide data supporting this, and any other, benefit that the proposal would provide in mitigating such costs, including benefits to clearing agencies, depositories and financial intermediaries in implementing and complying with this proposal."
This proposal would apply to all equity securities, including securities that have quotations published on the OTCBB and Pink Sheets, the SEC says. " Issuers and investors have complained about `naked short selling` in these thinly-capitalized securities trading over-the-counter. The proposed locate and delivery requirements would address some of these concerns. There may be costs associated with implementing these borrowing requirements for OTCBB and Pink Sheets securities. The Commission requests comment on the costs of implementing these requirements, as well as costs associated with ongoing compliance and surveillance associated with this proposal.
" The Commission is also concerned with the impact this proposal may have on small issuers. Please provide data to quantify the costs to small issuers and potential investors in these small issuers, including whether reduced short selling opportunities may make the securities in these markets more susceptible to having overvalued stock prices. In addition, we request comment on the extent to which the recommended proposals may affect the ability of small issuers to secure financing through the issuance of convertible debentures. Please describe and analyze any other costs associated with this proposal.
" The Commission also recognizes that there would be costs to market participants in implementing and complying with the proposed additional delivery requirements targeted at securities with substantial settlement failures. The Commission seeks estimates and views regarding these costs for particular types of market participants, as well as any other costs or benefits that may result from adoption of the proposal.
" The Commission is not proposing any exception from the proposed additional delivery requirements for shorts sales in connection with bona-fide market making because we believe that extended fails to deliver appear characteristic of an investment or trading strategy, rather than one related to market making. The Commission believes that there may be costs to market makers that have open extended fail positions. We have requested comment on the need for market makers engaging in bona-fide market making to maintain extended fail positions. Please provide information detailing any costs that may be associated with not providing a market maker exception to the proposed additional delivery requirements. In particular, we request comment on any lost trading or business opportunity costs to market makers, any potential impact on investors, and a detailed description of any such costs.
" In general, the Commission acknowledges that the proposed additional delivery requirements may bring about new costs for market participants. The Commission requests data to quantify the costs identified. Broker-dealers, market makers, SROs, and clearance and settlement firms may incur costs in making initial system changes necessary to implement these new requirements, as well as maintain ongoing compliance and surveillance mechanisms. We request specific comment on the system changes to computer hardware and software, or surveillance costs necessary to implement this rule. If this rule requires additional labor, please indicate what type of jobs are affected, how many additional hours are required and the approximate costs of these additional hours.
Observers have said that trades to not settle because broker-dealers do not effect buy-ins, as required by law, and that there is an unspoken understanding that any brokerage that tries to force a buy-in will be retaliated against.
Some 106 companies among the 119 named to date have issued press releases or been named in the media as having been victimized, or as taking various actions, either alone or in concert with other companies, to oppose manipulative trading in the form of illegal naked short selling. The actions have ranged from lawsuits to withdrawals and threatened withdrawals from the electronic trading system managed by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., to withdrawals from toxic financings, to the issuance of dividends or name changes designed to squeeze manipulators, to joining associations or networks or to contacting regulatory authorities to provide documentation of abuses or otherwise complain.
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Ich krieg die Nachbarinsel von deiner *g*
so, noch 1,50 Stunden
shot-selling bedeudet, dass man Aktien verkauft, die man gar nicht hat, sondern sich theoretisch vom Broker leiht. Mit diesen geht man jetzt short (verakuft also), weil man auf sinkende Preise kalkuliert, um dann zu einem niedrigeren Preis einzukaufen. Die Differenz, die man zwischen dem künstlichen Verkauf und dem Einkauf tätigt ist der gewinn. Das Problem ist bloss, wenn die Person pleite geht und gar kein Geld hat, um die Aktien zu kaufen. Dann hat der Broker ihm was geliehen, die Kurse fallen erstmal nicht und der Broker will sein Geld. Dann darf er das zur Verfügung stehende Depot einfach verkaufen - der sogenannte Margin-Call. Dumm nur, denn jetzt wirds doppelt teuer. Er verkauft ohne Marktgrunf, sondern nur um seine Schulden zu bekommen und das im Zweifelsfalle zu irrwitzigen Preisen. Resultat: Der Kurs fällt erbeut und rutscht ins bodenlose.
So und jetzt können die shorties brennen .
Bin mal auf die Auswirkungen gespannt!!!
Noch 57 Minuten... bis zum Countdown.
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |
Heute bist Du dran*g*und mach das bloß richtig.
Grüße joker
P.S. Du weißt youcanwinifyouwant.
Optionen
| Boardmail an "joker67" |
Wertpapier: UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC |