Der USA Bären-Thread
Die Ignoranz die Marktteilnehmer gegenüber schlechten Daten an den Tag legen ist schon erstaunlich. Es scheint sich eine Phase der Sorglosigkeit etabliert zu haben.
Gruß
Permanent
La hipotecaria de alto riesgo New Century, al borde de la quiebra
S. POZZI - Nueva York
El Pais
New Century Financial, una de las compañías con mayor peso en el mercado hipotecario en Estados Unidos, está al borde de la quiebra después de que los grandes bancos que le aportan liquidez, como Citigroup, Goldman Sachs o Morgan Stanley, le comunicaran que no le van a dar más fondos. La misma suerte es la que han seguido más de una treintena de entidades que conceden hipotecas de alto riesgo a propietarios de vivienda con rentas bajas.
El New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) optó ayer por suspender la cotización de la firma financiera y se planteaba mantenerla así indefinidamente, para frenar su descalabro y evitar una ola de pánico entre los inversores como la que se vivió en el parqué neoyorquino cuando estallaron los escándalos contables en la eléctrica Enron y la telefónica WorldCom. La compañía ha perdido en pocas semanas el 90% de su capital bursátil.
La medida del NYSE se adoptó después de que New Century Financial, la segunda más importante en el mercado de las subprimas, comunicara a la autoridad reguladora del mercado de valores (SEC) que carecía de liquidez para pagar a sus acreedores. Hasta la fecha se han visto obligadas a declararse en quiebra unas 36 entidades, y algunos analistas temen que esta crisis puede tener un impacto severo en el sector y en toda la economía. New Century Financial concedía hipotecas a compradores de vivienda con un historial crediticio del alto riesgo.
lach mal wieder.
http://videoplayer.thestreet.com/...Street&puc=yahoo&ts=1175538187810
Mit dem Flohmarkt meinte ich:
- Gier bei Angebotsverknappung
- Entscheidung unter Zeitdruck und bei starker Konkurrenz
- Entstehen von Manien und Hypes (Ü-Eier etc.)
- "Panikverkäufe" bei Marktende
Alles an einem Vormittag beobachtbar.
Zyklusvergleich
Charttechnik sieht 2007 als Wendejahr
Von Felix Pieplow, Finanzmarkt- und Wirtschaftsanalyst
Im Vergleich der aktuellen Charts mit denen der dreißiger Jahre fallen erstaunliche Parallelen auf. Wenn der Trend sich bestätigt, geht es ab dem dritten Quartal wieder bergab. Die Inflation spielt dabei eine besondere Rolle.
FRANKFURT. Immer wieder wird spekuliert, dass die aktuelle Dekade hinsichtlich Börse und Wirtschaft den dreißiger Jahren ähnele. Im Chart werden beide Zeiträume miteinander verglichen. Es ist zu sehen, dass auf die beiden Hochs im Dow-Jones-Index in den Jahren 1929 und 2000 ein dreijähriger Bärenmarkt gefolgt war. Danach schloss sich eine vierjährige Hausse an, die im ersten Quartal 1937 durch einen raschen Kurseinbruch beendet wurde. Es folgten ein weiterer Kurseinbruch im dritten Quartal, ein sechsmonatiger, scharfer Bärenmarkt und eine Rezession. Sind ähnliche Meilensteine in den nächsten zwölf Monaten zu erwarten?
Die Frage ist wegen der zusätzlichen, fundamentalen Ähnlichkeiten berechtigt. Zu nennen sind: eine Hausse bei Gold und Rohstoffen, eine sehr hohe Verschuldung (derzeit in den USA dreieinhalb Mal mehr Schulden als Wirtschaftsleistung), die Existenz internationaler Finanzierungslücken, die man mit innovativen Instrumenten, wie beispielsweise der günstigen Kreditaufnahme in Japan zu stopfen versucht. In den dreißiger Jahren gab es ähnliche Erscheinungen, zum Beispiel die berühmten Mefo-Wechsel, die der stark überschuldeten deutschen Wirtschaft weitere Finanzierungen ermöglichten – ohne offiziell die Bücher der Notenbank zu belasten.
Ben Bernanke hatte in einer viel beachteten Rede noch vor seiner Amtszeit als Chef der US-Notenbank in direktem Bezug zu den dreißiger Jahren erklärt, die Notenbanken würden heute alles tun, um einer deflationären Krise vorzubeugen. Einige der vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen laufen auf eine Abwertung der Währung hinaus.
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» Hier lesen Sie mehr zum Thema Anlagestrategie ...
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Hier ergibt sich ein weiterer Bezug zum Chart. Es fällt auf, dass der Kurseinbruch in der aktuellen Dekade wesentlich geringer ausfiel als der in den Dreißigern. Dies liegt an der rund 60-prozentigen Abwertung des Dollars gegen den Euro seit dem Jahr 2000, die den Kurseinbruch noch größer macht.
punktförmigen Märkten") rumreitet, hat es nötig.
Ich komm aus der empirischen, mathematischen
(Ökonometrie) und der BWL-Richtung.
Daneben hab ich ne Lehre,
einen Beruf und noch ein anderes Studium.
Was Du lernst, ist systematisches, modellhaftes
teleologisches Denken und das hat mir im Berufsleben
immer geholfen. Mir ist - ehrlich gesagt - fast alles hier
am Board oder auch bei Wallstreetonline zu
unsystematisch und ohne theoretisches Fundament.
Aber irgendwie brauch ich für mein sehr grosses Depot
Denkanstässe und Anregungen. Banker haben auch im
Anlagegeschäft nur begrenzte Einsichten. Ich bin wieder
- nach 1998 bis 2001 - zum Investor geworden.
Kurzfristige und kleinkarierte Anstösse interessieren
mich kaum. Ich versuche zu abstrahieren.
Grüsse
B.
Der Smart Investor vom Samstag geht mit ähnlichen Überlegungen von folgendem Szenarium aus: 1. Low April 2007, 2. Low Oktober 2007, 3. Low Mai 2008. Kursziel im Dax: 5000 Punkte, d.h -30%, zu erreichen im 2. oder 3. Low. Die Rezession in den USA sei unter den bekannten Umständen "unvermeidbar".
M.E. ist das Kursziel allerdings nur dann erreichbar, wenn sich die Iran-Krise bald zuspitzt und der Ölpreis ist Zuge dessen locker 100$ durchbricht.
Die Materie Wirtschaft ist leider so komplex und nicht mal im Ansatz richtig verstanden, dass dir ein "theoretisches Fundament" wohl bei deinen Anlageentscheidungen auch nicht weiterhelfen würde. Denn
1) Die Indikatoren sind kaum fundiert konstruiert und oftmals widersprüchlich
2) 6,5 Mrd Markteilnehmer scheren sich oft eine Dreck um Fundamendals
Nicht umsonst ist bislang noch kein VWLer mit seinem Wissen an der Börse (richtig) reich geworden ;-)
Der andere Ausweg, die Chartanlyse ("die Abstimmung mit den Füßen wird schon richtig sein") ist sicher auch nicht akzeptabel, zumindest für keinen mündigen, unabhängig denkenden Menschen.
Was bleibt? Eigene Meinung bilden und aus Fehlern lernen, lernen, lernen. Wir helfen dir dabei ;-)
mit (vereinfacht):
- weltwirtschaftlicher Analyse,
- branchen-und regionalbezogener Sektoralanalyse,
- Fundamentalanalyse
- gepaart mit techn. Analyse
- und Krisenmanagement.
Nur 1998 bis 2000 hab ich das einmal durchbrochen.
Allerdings bin auch ich nicht gegen Irrtümer und
Fehlentscheidungen gefeit.
Dabei schlaf ich jedoch sehr gut.
Grüsse
B.
;o)
By Michael Tsang, Daniel Hauck and Nick Baker
April 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy is slowing. Mortgage defaults are rising. And stocks are the cheapest in 20 years, a ``buy'' signal for some of the world's biggest money managers.
BlackRock Inc., Fisher Investments Inc. and Schroders Plc, which manage about $1.4 trillion, say stocks are inexpensive relative to bonds. Profit of companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, the benchmark for American equity, is growing faster than shares, and represents a yield of 6.53 percent compared with 4.65 percent for 10-year U.S. Treasury notes.
The gap -- the widest since 1986, according to data compiled by Bloomberg -- is encouraging investors because earnings forecasts indicate the U.S. will keep growing, while bond yields show confidence that inflation will stay in check.
``I'm on the wildly optimistic side of things,'' said Kenneth Fisher, who oversees about $38 billion as chairman of Fisher Investments in Woodside, California. ``The economy is stronger than people think it is.''
Fisher's optimism held through the first quarter even as stocks posted the biggest weekly drop since 2003 in the period ended March 2. They retreated as much as 5.9 percent from the S&P 500's six-year high on Feb. 20.
As many as 2.4 million Americans may lose their homes because of the collapse of subprime lenders and foreclosures, Mike Calhoun, president of the Center for Responsible Lending, a Durham, North Carolina-based nonprofit group, testified to Congress last week.
Lennar Corp., the biggest U.S. homebuilder, reported a 73 percent drop in first quarter profit and said it couldn't give a full-year forecast, two months after predicting this year would be as good or better than 2006. New Century Financial Corp., the second-biggest subprime lender, disclosed a criminal probe.
Earnings Outlook
The S&P 500 withstood a 1.1 percent decline last week to eke out a 0.2 percent gain for the quarter. The index has now advanced in seven of the last eight quarters.
Stocks in Europe and Asia also rose for a third straight quarter. The Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index added 2.5 percent, while the Morgan Stanley Capital International Asia-Pacific Index advanced 2.9 percent.
Companies in the S&P 500 were forecast to earn $92.76 per ``share'' of the index as of March 30, providing an earnings yield of 6.53 percent, analyst estimates compiled by Bloomberg show. That would be the highest since 1991 when compared with yields based on reported net income.
The 1.88 percentage-point advantage stocks yield over Treasuries is the biggest since at least 1986. The more stocks yield in profit compared with the interest on bonds, the cheaper shares become on a relative basis. This measure was cited by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1997 and is commonly known as the Fed model.
`Stay Invested'
Analysts have underestimated profit growth for S&P 500 members in 13 of the last 15 quarters, data compiled by Thomson Financial showed as of March 23.
``The valuation disparity is big enough that you want to make that relative bet,'' said Robert Doll, who oversees $1.1 trillion as chief investment officer at BlackRock in Plainsboro, New Jersey. ``Our view is `stay invested' because the bull market is not over, because the economic cycle is not over.''
Some investors say the gap isn't enough to keep stocks rising in the face of increasing mortgage defaults, falling consumer confidence and slowing economic growth.
``The issues that we face for the consumer through the housing sector are real, and are going to drag on economic activity for some time,'' said Wendell Perkins, who helps oversee $1.6 billion at Johnson Asset Management in Racine, Wisconsin. ``You could easily end up with a negative year'' for stocks. His $152 million JohnsonFamily Large Cap Value Fund has beaten the S&P 500 for seven straight years.
Surging Defaults
Global markets tumbled Feb. 27 after Greenspan said the U.S. may slip into recession this year. Since then, a meltdown in the subprime mortgage market for loans to borrowers with poor credit histories heightened concern the housing slowdown will spill over to the broader economy and drag down stock prices.
More than 30 lenders have halted operations, gone bankrupt or sought buyers in the past 12 months as defaults on subprime loans surged. Delinquencies on the loans reached a four-year high in the fourth quarter, the Mortgage Bankers Association said.
Concern about foreclosures pushed the Conference Board's index of consumer confidence last month down from a five-year high, while a private report showed home prices declined in January for the first time in at least six years.
Recession Concern
Economists at Morgan Stanley, Nomura Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc reduced their first-quarter U.S. economic growth forecasts last week after a report on durable goods orders raised concern a decline in business spending was deepening. Morgan Stanley cut its estimate to 1.6 percent from 2 percent.
The economy grew at an annual 2.5 percent pace in the fourth quarter, the government said in its final revision last week.
Johnson Asset's Perkins agreed with Greenspan's estimate that there is about a one-in-three chance of a U.S. recession this year. Stock indexes may fall at least 10 percent if that happened, Perkins said.
For BlackRock's Doll, valuations are attractive enough to help keep the rally in U.S. stocks from derailing. Doll cited the Fed model as one such measure.
Doll is also confident a slowdown caused by the housing slump will give the Fed more incentive to spur economic growth by cutting borrowing costs. He forecasts the S&P 500 will climb to 1549 by year end, implying a 9.2 percent gain in 2007.
`Inevitable March'
The S&P 500 had the biggest weekly jump in four years, rising 3.5 percent, after investors interpreted the Fed's statement on March 21 to mean the central bank's policy makers abandoned their bias toward raising U.S. borrowing costs.
The Fed dropped a reference to the potential for ``additional firming'' in interest rates, language repeated since it ceased two years of increases in August. Last week, Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke clarified the central bank's position by saying that while inflation remains his main concern, ``a little more flexibility might be desirable'' in monetary policy.
Traders expect about a 60 percent likelihood the Fed will cut its benchmark rate by a quarter-point to 5 percent in August, according to fed funds futures. The central bank has left its overnight lending rate at 5.25 percent since August.
According to the median forecast of 73 economists Bloomberg surveyed from March 1 to March 7, the Fed will cut its rate to 5 percent in the fourth quarter.
``The phrase I've been using is that `the Fed has been and will continue to be on an inevitable march to lower their target rate,''' BlackRock's Doll said.
More Bullish
Jim Paulsen at Wells Capital Management is more bullish, saying stocks will advance even without rate cuts by the Fed.
He credits the cheap valuations of shares for helping spur the latest rebound. The same reason has kept almost all retreats during the four-year rally from reaching 10 percent, he said.
The only such ``correction'' took place between Nov. 27, 2002, and March 11, 2003. The S&P 500's 15 percent decline during that span coincided with the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on March 19 that year.
A week before the bull market began in October 2002, shares of companies in the S&P 500 traded at 26.5 times reported profit. Now, the price-earnings ratio, or the inverse of the earnings yield, stands at 17.1 times.
``Earnings have chronically grown faster than stock prices,'' said Paulsen, who oversees $175 billion as Wells Capital's chief investment strategist in Minneapolis. ``That is certainly contributing to the oddity of no big corrections.''
He expects the S&P 500 may reach at least 1600 this year, which represents a 13 percent gain for 2007.
Drop in Yields
Russ Koesterich, at Barclays Global Investors in San Francisco, which has $1.7 trillion in assets, says the Fed model overstates the value of stocks when bond yields are as low as they are now. The lower yields go, the higher the implied value of stocks, even though equities may not be worth more when the economy slows, he said.
While stocks are the cheapest versus bonds since at least 1986, yields on 10-year Treasuries are 1.56 percentage points lower than the monthly 6.21 percent average in the past 20 years.
The S&P 500 would have to climb to 1791.21 to be fairly valued relative to bonds, or a 26 percent increase from last week's closing price of 1420.86, based on the Fed model. For the index to equal its all-time closing high of 1527.46 in March 2000, it needs to rise 7.5 percent.
``There are limitations to the Fed model when interest rates are this low,'' said Koesterich, who views stocks as neither overly cheap nor expensive relative to earnings. ``Basically what happens is you start to come up with some absurd valuations.''
`A Little Hysterical'
Koesterich says a gain of 10 percent to 12 percent for the S&P 500 this year will hinge on the Fed cutting rates and the housing slowdown remaining ``pretty much limited to subprime.''
For AIM Investments' Fritz Meyer, concerns about the housing market are overblown. He sided with Bernanke's assertion that the economy will continue to ``expand at a moderate pace'' and defaults and delinquencies among subprime borrowers won't stanch demand for mortgages to more qualified home buyers.
Concern about subprime ``got a little hysterical,'' said Meyer, the Denver-based senior investment officer at AIM, which oversees $149 billion. ``Stocks can and should do pretty well, absent the economy slipping closer to recession, which I don't expect.''
Fed officials forecast in February growth of 2.5 percent to 3 percent this year and 2.75 percent to 3 percent in 2008.
More Incentive
The widening gap between what companies yield in earnings and the cost of borrowing gives buyout funds, which have an estimated $1.6 trillion to spend, more incentive to take companies private, according to Schroders' Alan Brown.
That will help turn any sell-off into a buying opportunity, as mergers and acquisitions help shore up demand, he said.
About $593 billion in takeovers involving U.S. companies have been announced this year, 44 percent more than the $411 billion of deals announced during the same period last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
``As long as earnings yields are staying well north of financing costs, there's an absolute wall of private-equity money looking to get employed if stock prices start retracing,'' said Brown, who oversees $229 billion as Schroders' head of investments in London. ``Even if the negative story comes more to the fore, it should give one some encouragement.''
To contact the reporter on this story: Michael Tsang in New York at mtsang1@bloomberg.net ; Daniel Hauck in New York at dhauck1@bloomberg.net
Optionen
| Boardmail an "skunk.works" |
Wertpapier: S&P 500 |
wie sieht es dann erst im Subprime-Bereich aus?
Klar ist das jetzt schon eine Überreaktion der Kreditinstitute, aber die war zu erwarten. Das ganze wird zu weiter fallenden Hauspreisen führen, die wiederum zu steigenden Zwangsversteigerungen führen.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/realestate/01cov.html
Optionen
| Boardmail an "obgicou" |
Wertpapier: S&P 500 |
problems with mortgages that have limited income documentation
http://today.reuters.com/news/...RIDST_0_M-TBANK-OUTLOOK-UPDATE-1.XML
Optionen
| Boardmail an "obgicou" |
Wertpapier: S&P 500 |
Die Bauausgaben nahmen um 0,3% per Februar zu. Erwartet war ein Rückgang um 0,6%. Darüber hinaus wurde der Vormonatswert von -0,8% auf -0,5% revidiert. Im Jahresvergleich stellte sich ein Rückgang um 2,4% ein. Die private Bautätigkeit im Bereich Wohnimmobilien ging im Jahresvergleich um 15,1% zurück. Öffentliche Bautätigkeit nimmt derzeit markant zu. Im Jahresvergleich ergab sich ein Anstieg um 10,4%. …."Food for thought!"
Während bei Gloomberg die "Cheap - Stocks - Posaunen" geblasen werden, sehen anderweitig die Bewertungen wie folgt aus:
Valuations Revisited
Long-time readers will recognize some of the following arguments from various studies I've presented in recent years, but I believe that it is important for investors to understand how profoundly incorrect and potentially dangerous it is to accept the incessant argument that stocks are cheap on a "forward operating earnings basis." As AQR's Cliff Asness has previously noted, the belief that the current “price to forward operating earnings” multiple is reasonable is based on an apples-to-oranges comparison. It is the trailing P/E on reported net earnings that has a historical average of about 15, not the forward P/E on estimated operating earnings (which Asness estimates as having a historical norm closer to 11).
Even that average for the trailing P/E is itself biased upward because earnings typically collapse during recessions, driving P/E ratios to extreme levels during those periods. Those get added into the average, and results in a “historical norm” of 15. If you correct for those spikes, the historical average P/E for the S&P 500 is even lower.
To correct for the uninformative spike in P/E ratios during recessions, we can make the assumption that a given earnings level, once achieved, is likely to be achieved again even if the economy encounters temporary weakness. While that's not necessarily a reasonable assumption for an individual stock, it is much more reasonable for a diversified index like the S&P 500. Forming price/earnings ratios on the basis of the peak level of earnings-to-date (what I call the price/peak earnings ratio), we get a much better behaved measure of valuations that is more reliably correlated with subsequent long-term returns. Note that the word “peak” doesn't imply that earnings are about to decline – only that the P/E calculation uses the highest level of earnings achieved to-date.
On that basis, the current price/peak earnings ratio is about 17.5, well above the historical average of 14 for the price/peak earnings ratio.
But we're just getting warmed up. If we look closely at S&P 500 earnings, we find that we can draw a 6% growth trendline connecting earnings peaks from economic cycle to economic cycle as far back as we care to look. So even though earnings sometimes grow rapidly from the trough of a recession to the peak of an economic expansion, at rates sometimes exceeding 20% annually, we also find that the peak-to-peak growth rate has been very well contained historically at just 6%.
Unfortunately, if we a) calculate the S&P 500 price earnings ratio based on those “trendline” earnings or b) look at periods where actual earnings were within 10-20% of that trendline connecting historical earnings peaks, we find that the average S&P 500 price/earnings ratio drops to just 10.
Currently, S&P 500 earnings are again at that trendline. In fact, given the unusual spike in profit margins, they have actually moved slightly (but not significantly) above that line. On that basis, the current price/earnings ratio, normalized for the position of earnings at present, is about 75% above its historical norm (alternatively, the historical norm would be about 40% below current levels).
That's not, by the way, the level at which we would observe deep undervaluation. The extreme 1974 and 1982 troughs, for example, occurred at price/peak earnings ratios of 7 and price/trendline earnings of about 6. Given the current multiple of 17.5 times those trendline earnings, I am certainly not suggesting any probability of the market moving to such levels. But to rule out a decline of 30-40% on the S&P 500 would be to rule out a move to valuations that have historically been standard, normal, commonplace.
Interestingly, that same extent of overvaluation is also implied by a completely different approach (see the market comments of September 12, 2005 The S&P 500 as a Stream of Payments and March 21, 2005 Don't Discount Discounted Dividends). In the discounted payments study, I asked:
“Suppose we look back over history, and at each date, add up all the dividends the S&P 500 actually delivered over the subsequent years, discounted at a long-term rate of return of 10%. We could literally check whether investors got what they paid for.Of course, the more recent the date, the more we'd have to project some future dividends. But that's not a terribly difficult matter. As it turns out, the average dividend growth rate since 1900 has been about 5%, the average since 1940 has been 6%, and the highest growth rate for any 30-year period has been 6.4%. We also know that S&P 500 earnings growth has displayed a very, very durable 6% growth rate measured from peak-to-peak across economic cycles. So assuming anything between 6% to 7% long-term dividend growth will give us a very robust series of likely future dividends.”
You can refer to the original studies for further details, including the impact of repurchases and alternative assumptions. For our current purposes, the following chart presents the analysis of the S&P 500 using this methodology, from 1900 to the present.
Essentially, that green line is a fairly robust estimate of where the S&P 500 would have to trade in order for stocks to be priced to deliver long-term returns of 10% annually. When the actual S&P 500 (blue line) is above that green line, we don't have to conclude that the market is “overvalued” – just that it's a good likelihood that stocks are priced to deliver long-term returns of far less than 10% annually from those levels.
Where is that green line today? 850 – about 40% below current levels.
Again, that doesn't imply that stocks have to actually suffer a decline of that magnitude. Nor do we need such a decline in order to justify an unhedged investment stance. It's just that investors should not expect the S&P 500 to reliably deliver long-term returns of 10% annually or better until it does. You'll note that there are also points in history when the S&P 500 traded substantially below that 10% valuation line. Those were points where stocks were priced to deliver long-term returns reliably above 10% annually, and in fact, they did exactly that.
Presently, we're not anywhere close to such a situation. Food for thought.
Market Climate
No change in the Market Climate for stocks, bonds or precious metals here. As of last week, the Market Climate for stocks was characterized by unfavorable valuations, still moderately constructive price trends, but also a combination of overvalued, overbought, and overbullish conditions that has historically been associated with S&P 500 returns below Treasury bill yields. The Strategic Growth Fund remains fully hedged against the impact of market fluctuations at present.
In bonds, the Market Climate was characterized by unfavorable valuations and relatively neutral market action. The Strategic Total Return Fund had a duration of about 2 years, mostly in Treasury inflation protected securities, with a position of just over 20% of assets in precious metals shares, where the Market Climate remains favorable on our measures.
wmc070402.gif (verkleinert auf 99%)
Auch die Schwäche im US-Bankenindex (BKX, Chart in # 1313) lässt nichts Gutes ahnen.
Die Börsen steigen trotzdem. Aber nicht, weil sich die Fundamentals verbessert haben, sondern weil die (US-)Bullen standhaft die Realität leugnen - und weil sie in der Masse stark sind: Wenn viele Dummköpfe dieselbe Idee haben, kann sie zeitweilig Macht gewinnen - ich respektiere dies, indem ich nicht investiert an der Außenlinie warte.
Mitursache für die Anstiege sind freilich die vielen Shorts, vor allem auf den Indizes. Es ist "fundamental so klar", dass es "bergab gehen muss", dass inzwischen hinreichend viele Bären positioniert sind, um eben dies (vorerst noch) zu verhindern.
Bulls a Study in Persistence
Rev Shark
Street.com Contributor
4/2/2007 4:26 PM EDT
§
The bulls continue to push the market around as they please. They took advantage of the low volume this afternoon and took us back up to the highs we hit at the open this morning.
An inflationary ISM prices-paid number, continued defaults in the mortgage market and even some hawkish comments from a Fed member weren't enough to discourage the bulls.
Volume was light, but breadth was solid, with banks being the big drag and some weak action in chips. Banks look very ugly, but the market decided to ignore that fact today. Just about all other major sectors finished in the green.
Technically, the bigger picture remains problematic, but there is no disputing the persistent buying that doesn't seem to be drying up. As long as there are folks willing to jump in on the slightest weakness, the bears are going to be very frustrated...
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Es sind MM´s die mit der Masse spielen wie sie wollen.
Wenn es kein Revirement im internationalen Devisensystem gibt, geht das Spielchen nach dem nächsten Crash wieder los.
damit es ganz international wird,scheint aber auch nicht mehr zu wissen