WMIH + Cooper Info
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6028.msg75412#msg75412
WMB 307B Assets,WMB fsb 46B Assets as per FDIC
Zitat noname:
Assets and liabilities of WMB and WMB fsb as per FDIC.One is aquired using financial assistance and one is not.
WMB
https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/confirmation_outside.asp?inCert1=32633
Inactive as of: September 25, 2008
Closing history: Merged with Financial Assistance into
Acquiring institution: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
WMB fsb
https://www3.fdic.gov/idasp/...asp?inCert1=33891&AsOf=MostCurrent
Inactive as of: September 25, 2008
Closing history: Merged without Assistance into
Acquiring institution: JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Click on Generate Report at the bottom of the page to see Assets and Liabilities reports.
There is an equity capital of 24B in WMB and 29B at WMB fsb as per FDIC.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat lottosorteo:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-09/...-biggest-u-s-ipo
First Data Corp., the payments company with investors led by KKR & Co., plans to seek at least $2.5 billion in what would be the biggest U.S. initial public offering this year, according to people with knowledge of the matter.
The stock could start trading by the end of this month, according to the people, one of whom described it as an acceleration of earlier plans. The price and timing are subject to change depending on stock-market volatility and how investors react to a pending roadshow, the people said. First Data filed in July to sell stock, without specifying a fundraising target or timing.
First Data is KKR’s biggest equity bet ever: Eight years ago the buyout firm took the payment company private for $29.8 billion, including debt and fees. The planned stock sale would leap past other U.S. IPOs this year, such as Tallgrass Energy GP LP’s $1.38 billion offering and Fitbit Inc.’s $841 million, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Spokesmen for First Data and KKR declined to comment.
First Data runs a debit-card network, processes bank-card transactions and provides data analytics and other services to merchants. Proceeds from the IPO will be used to repay debt.
The company selected Citigroup Inc., Morgan Stanley and Bank of America Corp. to manage the offering, according to a regulatory filing last month. KKR will help underwrite the deal. Barclays Plc and Credit Suisse Group AG also are among the 15 underwriters managing the offering.
Something to do with us?
I do not recall what was important to happen in September? Does someone recall?
---------------------
ZItat deekshant:
Is it possible that First Data merges with WMIH first and then moves forward with an IPO. Will this not create an awesome venture capable of utilizing NOLs in a few years and ensure KKR's recovery of 29.8billion invested. KKR controls the leash at both ends
"According to the article, KKR expects to sell $2.5 billion dollars worth of shares to the public. Given the fact that KKR paid $29.8 billion dollars to acquire First Data in 2007, it is assumed that the IPO will only represent a small portion of the total company.
First Data is a payment processing company, managing 1.7 trillion dollars in payments, or 74 billion transactions (according to 2014 figures). Last year, First Data collected revenues of $11.2 billion and recorded operating profit of $1.4 billion.
While First Data still recorded a net loss for 2014, the loss was primarily due to $1.74 billion in interest expense from KKR's leveraged buyout."
http://seekingalpha.com/article/...point-for-private-equity-investors
KKR-Backed First Data to Provide Infrastructure for ApplePay
Since buying First Data in 2007 for $29.8 billion, including debt and fees, KKR’s original investment has lost about 20 percent in
value. KKR was ready to divest part of the business when Frank Bisignano CEO of First Data, persuaded them to wait. This month, as
Apple Inc. unveiled new iPhones featuring digital credit cards, his effort paid off: First Data will provide encryption technology for
the transaction system, called Apple Pay, a deal that could attract new clients and help turn around a seven-year-old losing bet by
KKR & Co. “This guy is the real deal,” said Scott Nuttall, KKR’s chief of asset management and capital markets. “He gets hard stuff
done fast, to a level that I have never seen.”
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-09-16/...ple-deal-at-first-data
"Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch have committed to provide debt financing for the transaction subject to customary terms and conditions, and are acting as financial advisors to KKR. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP is acting as legal advisor to KKR."
http://www.insidearm.com/daily/...-buy-first-data-in-29-billion-deal/
Exhibit 24.8 Financing Tranches for the First Data Corporation buyout
Financing Tranche Dollar Amount(Billions) Percentage of Transaction Financing Parameters Source of Funding
Senior Bank Loans $13 49.24% 7 Year Term Loan at Libor +2.75% 7-Bank Consortion lead by
$2 7.58% Revolving Credit at Libor + 2.75% Credit Suisse and Citigroup
Total Bank Loans $15 56.82%
Junk Bond/Mezzanine Debt$3.75 14.20% Senior Unsecured at 10.75% Ins. Co. and CDO Funds
$2.75 10.42% Senior Pay-in-Kind Unsecured CDO funds
$2.50 9.47% Subordinated Unsecured Mezzanine Debt Funds
Total Junk Bond Financing $9 34.09%
Equity $2.40 27.27% Collects the benefits of any Capital KKR
Gains and Residual Cash Flows
Total $26.4 100%
https://books.google.co.in/...%20citigroup%20first%20data&f=false
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=8349.msg117955#msg117955
Zitat Nightdaytrader 9:
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep1715.html
Remarks by FDIC Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg To the FDIC Banking Research Conference; Arlington, VA
September 17, 2015
Good afternoon. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today. Thank you to Jack Reidhill, Haluk Unal and their colleagues on the organizing committee for putting this program together and extending the invitation to speak. This is the 15th Annual Research Conference at the FDIC, which speaks to the enduring success of the partnership between our Center for Financial Research and the Journal of Financial Services Research. It seems that the conference program is stronger every year, and I know our economists feel that this year is no exception. We thank all of you for your participation.
I also want to take a moment to thank those in the audience who have been affiliated with the Center for Financial Research over the years. I know that several of you have been Visiting Scholars or Fellows at the Center, and many more have participated in the Center's Seminar Series and conferences and have co-authored papers with FDIC economists. This type of engagement with the scholarly community is critical to our Center's role as a leading source of forward-looking research on banking and the financial markets in which banks operate. We greatly value the relationships that sustain the Center's research program, so thank you for supporting it. We look forward to strengthening and expanding these relationships as we go forward.
I would like to take the opportunity today to speak to you about the progress the FDIC has made in developing a framework under the Dodd-Frank Act for the orderly failure of a large, complex, systemically important financial institution while avoiding the taxpayer bailouts and the market breakdowns that took place during the recent financial crisis. In my view, the progress has been impressive and somewhat underappreciated.
Broadly speaking, prior to the recent financial crisis, the major jurisdictions around the world did not envision that these globally active, systemically important financial institutions—termed G-SIFIs or SIFIs—could fail. As a result, little thought was devoted to their resolution and there were no public authorities beyond bankruptcy for handling the failure of one of these firms. G-SIFIs, although large and complex, were considered well-diversified with operations spanning global markets, putting them, it was thought, at a low risk of failure. It was assumed that G-SIFIs had ready sources of liquidity and, should problems arise, that they would be able to raise large amounts of equity or debt.
In hindsight, those proved to be mistaken assumptions. After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, market liquidity dried up and the capital markets were unwilling to provide additional capital to other financial firms whose viability appeared uncertain. The ensuing disruptions triggered the worst financial crisis since the Depression and contributed to the most severe recession since World War II. More than 8 million people lost jobs, more than 9 million homes went into foreclosure, GDP declined more than 4 percent, and virtually the entire net income of the banking industry for two years was wiped out despite unprecedented government intervention in support of the industry.
Looking back, it is clear that the major countries of the world were unprepared for the challenges they faced. Lacking the necessary authorities to manage the orderly failure of a large, complex financial institution, policymakers were forced to choose between two bad options: taxpayer bailouts or financial collapse.
In the United States it was clear that our resolution authorities had not kept pace with changes in our financial system. While long-established, specialized, public resolution regimes existed for particular types of financial institutions—such as banks and broker dealers—no agency had the authority to manage the orderly resolution of a large, complex financial institution, even if the failure of that institution could significantly destabilize the financial system and severely impact the economy. Rather, the only option available for the resolution of such an institution was a bankruptcy process that lacked the tools essential for facilitating the orderly unwind of a financial firm of the size, complexity, and international reach of the largest, most complex financial institutions.
The Dodd-Frank Act passed by Congress in 2010 addressed these critical gaps in authority. The Act established a framework designed to ensure that policymakers and taxpayers would not be put in the same position as in the fall of 2008. As I indicated, it is this framework and the progress we have made implementing it that I want to focus on today.
Bankruptcy is the statutory first option under the framework. The largest bank holding companies and designated non-bank financial companies are required to prepare resolution plans, also referred to as "living wills," under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act. These living wills must demonstrate that the firm could be resolved under bankruptcy without severe adverse consequences for the financial system or the U.S. economy. As a backstop, for circumstances in which an orderly bankruptcy process might not be possible, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Orderly Liquidation Authority. This public resolution authority allows the FDIC to manage the orderly failure of the firm.
This framework helps to ensure that financial markets and the broader economy can weather the failure of a SIFI; that shareholders, creditors, and culpable management of the firm will be held accountable without cost to taxpayers; and that such an institution can be wound down and liquidated in an orderly way.
Strengthening Bankruptcy
Continued...
The Living Will Process
In regard to living wills, the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are charged with reviewing and assessing each firm's plan. If a plan does not demonstrate the firm's resolvability, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve may jointly determine that it is not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company under the Bankruptcy Code and issue a notice of deficiencies. The notice must identify the deficiencies of the plan and provide the firm with the opportunity to remedy them. Ultimately, if a firm fails to submit a plan that demonstrates its resolvability in bankruptcy, the agencies may jointly impose requirements or restrictions on the firm or its subsidiaries, including more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements. The agencies may also restrict the firm's growth, activities, or operations.
If, after two years, the firm still fails to submit an acceptable plan, the agencies may order a firm to divest certain assets or operations to facilitate an orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code.
The FDIC and the Federal Reserve have taken a number of important steps to ensure that the objectives of the living will requirement are being met. Following the review of the initial plans submitted by the largest U.S. bank holding companies and foreign banking organizations with U.S. operations in 2012, the agencies provided additional guidance to the firms in March 2013 regarding their plans. Included in the guidance were instructions to provide more detailed information on, and analysis of, obstacles to resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, five issues were to be addressed: funding and liquidity, global cooperation, operations and interconnectedness, counterparty risk, and multiple competing insolvencies.
In August of last year, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board delivered individual letters to the largest financial firms regarding their second resolution plan submissions. In the letters, the agencies jointly identified common shortcomings of the plans, including the use of assumptions the agencies regarded as unrealistic or inadequately supported. Further, the agencies found that the firms failed to make, or even identify, the kinds of changes in firm structure and practices that would be necessary to enhance the prospects for orderly failure under bankruptcy. As a result, the agencies directed the firms to demonstrate in their 2015 plans that they are making significant progress to address all the shortcomings identified in the letters. Among the actions being required to improve resolvability in bankruptcy are:
establishing a rational and less complex legal structure that would take into account the best alignment of legal entities and business lines;
developing a holding company structure that supports resolvability;
amending qualified financial contracts to address the risk of counterparty actions;
demonstrating that shared services, which support critical operations and core business lines—such as information technology services—would continue throughout the resolution process; and
demonstrating that operational capabilities—such as providing information on a timely basis—necessary for resolution purposes are in place.
The letters also noted that, given the important objective to provide transparency on firm resolvability to the public, the agencies will work with the firms to enhance the transparency of future plans.
The letters are part of a broader effort to provide more direct feedback to firms about the agencies' expectations and the need for immediate structural changes. As noted in the letters, failure by firms to make significant progress with respect to the identified shortcomings and to become more resolvable in bankruptcy may result in determinations by the agencies that plans are not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code as provided for under the Dodd-Frank Act. The 2015 plans were submitted on July 1 and are now under review by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.
The Issue of Interconnectedness
The actions the firms are being required to take focus in particular on reducing the interconnectedness between legal entities within the firms.
In order to understand why reducing this internal interconnectedness is being stressed, it is important to recognize how the largest, most complex financial firms are organized and what would happen if one were to fail. These firms are extremely complex with hundreds, if not thousands, of legal entities, which operate on a business line—not legal-entity—basis. While business lines stretch across multiple legal entities, foreign and domestic, failure occurs on a legal-entity basis. The inability to resolve one legal entity without causing knock-on effects that may propel the failure of other legal entities within the firm makes the orderly resolution of one of these firms extremely problematic.
To improve resolvability, firms must show how their legal entities can be separated from their parent company and their affiliates, that the default or failure of one entity will not trigger the default or failure of other entities, and that critical operations will continue to function in resolution. To do this, firms must undertake three distinct, but related, efforts. First, they must map their material legal entities to their business lines. Next, they must address cross-guarantees and potential cross-defaults that spread risk and tie disparate legal entities and operations together. Finally, they must take steps to ensure that the information technology and other services essential to the functioning of their material legal entities would continue under their resolution strategies. Ensuring that firms can disentangle their business lines and services into separate legal entities so that critical operations can be maintained during resolution will better enable firms to be split apart and liquidated in resolution.
By addressing these shortcomings, firms will increase the available options for resolution in bankruptcy. Actions that promote separability of material entities will lessen the problem of knock-on effects created by interconnectedness, potentially allowing a firm to place its troubled entity into bankruptcy, or its existing resolution regime. Such an outcome would increase the likelihood that failure would be orderly, minimizing any potential instability for the financial system as a whole, a problem that greatly influenced policymakers' responses in 2008.
The Orderly Liquidation Authority—A Backstop to Bankruptcy
While we regard reducing interconnectedness, as well as other changes required under the living will process, as essential to facilitating an orderly resolution under bankruptcy, we cannot rule out that in the future policymakers may face a situation in which resolution in bankruptcy would result in severe economic distress. Given the challenges and the uncertainty surrounding any particular failure scenario, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Orderly Liquidation Authority, which is effectively a public-sector bankruptcy process for institutions whose resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code would pose systemic concerns. This authority is only triggered after recommendations by the appropriate federal agencies and a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President.
The Orderly Liquidation Authority is the mechanism for ensuring that policymakers will not be faced with the same poor choices they faced in 2008. Its tools are intended to enable the FDIC to carry out the process of winding down and liquidating the firm, while ensuring that shareholders, creditors, and culpable management are held accountable and taxpayers do not bear losses. The Orderly Liquidation Authority provides the FDIC several authorities—not all of which are available under bankruptcy—that are broadly similar to those the FDIC has to resolve banks. They include the authority to establish a bridge financial company, to stay the termination of certain financial contracts, to provide temporary liquidity that may not otherwise be available, to convert debt to equity, and to coordinate with domestic and foreign authorities in advance of a resolution to better address any cross-border impediments. The ability to plan and the availability of a large team of professionals experienced in financial institution resolution are additional advantages the FDIC can bring to bear. In the years since enactment of Dodd-Frank, the FDIC has made significant progress in developing the operational capabilities to carry out a resolution if needed. I'd now like to discuss these capabilities in more detail.
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat Nightdaytrader 9:
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep1715.html
continued...
Bridge Financial Company
The concept of using a bridge financial company in the resolution of a large, complex financial institution builds off the FDIC's experience using bridge banks to resolve certain failed banks. Congress granted the FDIC authority to establish a bridge bank as a resolution method during the financial crisis of the 1980s. That authority provides the FDIC with a temporary vehicle to take over and maintain critical services for the customers of a failed bank until a permanent resolution can be achieved. Similarly, Congress granted the FDIC the authority to establish a bridge financial company for a SIFI, including setting the terms and conditions governing its management and operations, under the Orderly Liquidation Authority.
Given the challenges presented in the resolution of a large, complex financial company—especially as these companies are currently organized and operated—the FDIC initially focused its efforts on developing a resolution strategy termed the single point of entry. That strategy would place the top-tier parent company of the firm into receivership while establishing a temporary bridge financial company to hold and manage its critical operating subsidiaries while the process of breaking up and winding down the operations of the firm is carried out. Assets of the top-tier parent company would be transferred from the receivership to the bridge financial company, as bank assets are transferred to a bridge bank in certain bank failures. Liabilities of the top-tier parent company would be left in the receivership to cover the losses and expenses from the firm's failure and to capitalize the subsidiaries through the liquidation process. In this way, the firm's critical subsidiaries, which perform operations and provide services that affect the broader financial system and ultimately the economy, would be stabilized to facilitate liquidation through the wind-down of the firm.
This process would avoid the disruption that would otherwise accompany the firm's sudden collapse. The exact path through resolution will vary depending on the particular failure scenario, but we would expect some business lines or subsidiaries (such as broker-dealers) to quickly shrink and wind down and for others to be sold off. This strategy helps ensure there is sufficient time and liquidity for customers to transition to new service providers. It also enables the wind down and sale of discrete businesses and asset portfolios to occur in an orderly way. The resolution process would end with the termination of the bridge financial company. An explicit objective is to ensure that no systemically significant entity emerges from this process.
To operate the bridge financial company, the FDIC would appoint a new board of directors and senior management who would be charged with managing the wind-down of the firm in a way that minimizes systemic disruption. In addition to being an essential tool to preserve financial stability, the bridge institution is also an important means for ensuring accountability for stakeholders of the failed firm. Shareholders would be wiped out, creditors would take losses, and culpable management would be replaced. As you know, such accountability is essential to minimizing moral hazard and promoting market discipline.
Liquidity and Capital
From the outset, the bridge financial company would have a strong balance sheet because the unsecured debt obligations of the failed firm would be left as claims in the receivership, while all the assets would be transferred to the bridge company. As a well-capitalized entity, the FDIC expects the bridge financial company and its subsidiaries to be in a position to borrow from customary sources in private markets to meet its liquidity needs. However, if such funding is not immediately available, the law provides the Orderly Liquidation Fund: a dedicated, back-up source of liquidity—not capital—to be used, if necessary, in the initial stage of resolution until private funding can be accessed.
The Orderly Liquidation Fund would only be used when private-sector funding is unavailable, and there are a number of important limitations on its use. For example, the statute limits the amount that can be borrowed and requires that any Orderly Liquidation Fund borrowing must be repaid from recoveries on the assets of the failed firm. If that should prove insufficient, assessments would be levied on the largest financial companies. Under the law, taxpayers cannot bear losses. Instead, losses are first borne by the failed company through its shareholders and its creditors, and, if necessary, by assessments on the financial industry.
As I indicated earlier, the firm's debt will provide the means to capitalize the bridge institution and its material entities. During the operation of the bridge financial company, losses would be calculated and apportioned among the claims of the former shareholders and unsecured creditors. Sufficient debt at the parent company that can be converted into equity to absorb losses in the failed firm will allow for the recapitalization of any critical subsidiaries until such time as they can be wound down and liquidated. In the event losses exceed the bridge financial company's ability to recapitalize a material subsidiary, the subsidiary would be placed into a separate receivership under bankruptcy, its appropriate resolution regime, or the Orderly Liquidation Authority, exposing creditors of those subsidiaries to loss.
The Federal Reserve has been working to develop a long-term debt requirement for the largest, most complex U.S. banking firms to maintain a minimum amount of long-term unsecured debt outstanding at the holding company level. Most major U.S. firms currently have substantial amounts of unsecured debt at the holding company. A rulemaking by the Federal Reserve Board would ensure that a minimum amount of long-term debt would be maintained by these firms. While minimum capital requirements are designed to cover losses in a firm on an open institution basis, in resolution the expectation is that equity will be gone, as has been the experience with past bank failures. Thus, the long-term debt requirement is intended to provide capital resources from private creditors for the wind-down and liquidation of a firm without cost to taxpayers. Such a requirement will enable authorities to implement a resolution strategy that provides for the continuity of a firm's critical operations during the resolution process, minimizing the risk of runs and fire sales that threaten financial stability.
At the international level, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve have been working through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board to finalize an international proposal to establish a minimum total loss absorbing capacity requirement for global, systemically important banks. There is now broad international agreement on the need for a minimum standard to provide loss-absorbing capacity in the event of a failure of a large, complex financial institution.
Qualified Financial Contracts
Another major impediment to the orderly resolution of a financial firm that emerged during the crisis of 2008 was the inability of the bankruptcy process to stay the early termination of certain financial contracts, commonly referred to as "qualified financial contracts," or "QFCs." In the case of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, parties to such contracts—which included derivatives contracts valued in the trillions of dollars—were able to exercise early termination rights, resulting in the disorderly termination of the contracts and the fire sale of underlying assets. The Orderly Liquidation Authority provides the FDIC with the ability to impose a temporary stay on QFCs, preventing parties from terminating their contracts immediately upon a firm being placed into an FDIC receivership. Though this stay helps address risks posed by such contracts written under U.S. law, questions remain regarding contracts not subject to U.S. law, leaving legal uncertainty for cross-border contracts. Currently, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a stay for these contracts.
In developing a resolution strategy, therefore, the United States and other jurisdictions facing this same problem needed to find a solution to avoid the early termination of contracts written under foreign laws. In November of last year, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) issued a protocol that ends the automatic termination of covered derivative contracts in the event of a bankruptcy or public resolution of a systemic financial institution.
Eighteen of the largest global financial institutions, which collectively represent a majority of the swaps market, voluntarily agreed to adhere to the protocol.
The Federal Reserve is expected to engage in rulemaking to codify compliance with the protocol. These efforts are essential to avoid gaming and to provide a level playing field for those institutions included in the rulemaking. The rulemaking and the adoption of the protocol will reduce the legal uncertainty regarding the termination of derivative contracts in the context of cross-border resolutions. Importantly, these efforts improve resolution under both the Orderly Liquidation Authority and bankruptcy by helping to address some of the cross-border uncertainty and contagion risks in both regimes.
Cross-Border Coordination
Since passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, other major jurisdictions have followed the United States in enacting systemic resolution authorities that are comparable to those provided in the Dodd-Frank Act. Pursuant to provisions of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, the FDIC has worked closely with all the major financial jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland, and Japan as well as European entities including the new Single Resolution Board and Single Supervisory Mechanism. This cooperation is essential to identifying issues and to addressing obstacles to cross-border resolution.
The bilateral relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is of particular importance in cross-border resolution. Of the 30 global, systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) identified by international policymakers, four are headquartered in the United Kingdom and eight are headquartered in the United States. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the reported foreign activities of the eight U.S. G-SIFIs are conducted in the United Kingdom. As a result, the U.S. relationship with the United Kingdom on cross-border resolution is a particular priority.
As an indication of the priority the senior officials of the two jurisdictions attach to this working relationship, in October of last year the FDIC hosted a meeting of the heads of the Treasuries, central banks, and leading financial regulatory bodies of the United States and United Kingdom. This event's high-level discussion furthered understanding among the principals in regard to key challenges to the successful resolution of U.S. and U.K. G-SIFIs, and how the two jurisdictions would cooperate in the event of a cross-border resolution. The event built upon prior bilateral work between authorities in our two countries, which, since late 2012, has included the publication of a joint paper on G-SIFI resolution and participation in detailed simulation exercises among our respective staffs.
Last year, the European Parliament established a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the resolution of financial institutions in Europe. The SRM creates a centralized resolution authority framework for the 19 Eurozone Member States, and many of its authorities mirror those of the FDIC under the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The FDIC is actively engaging with the new Single Resolution Board, which oversees the SRM, to be of assistance in its set up and to discuss cooperation and resolution planning for G-SIFIs with assets and operations in the United States and the Eurozone. The FDIC and the European Commission have established a joint Working Group to focus on both resolution and deposit insurance issues. In addition, the FDIC participates in the Crisis Management Groups for G-SIFIs with significant assets and operations in the United States. Deepening our cross-border relationships with the key foreign jurisdictions will be an ongoing priority for the FDIC's work on systemic resolution.
Public Portions of Living Wills
I would also like to talk briefly about the public portions of the latest round of living wills that were submitted in July. Public and market understanding of the process for improving the resolvability of G-SIFIs is important for a number of reasons, including allowing for the development of realistic market expectations about how the resolution of a G-SIFI might proceed.
As I mentioned earlier, in August of last year we told the firms that we expected them to improve the transparency of their plans. In the past year the agencies provided guidance to the firms requiring that the public plans include more detailed information in a number of areas. These areas include a discussion of the strategy for resolving each material entity in a manner that mitigates systemic risk, a high-level description of what the firm would look like following resolution, and a description of the steps that each firm is taking to improve its ability to be resolved in an orderly manner in bankruptcy. In addition, the agencies notified the firms that public plans should include more detail on each material entity, such as the type of business conducted, interconnectedness among entities, and a general indication of capital and funding sources.
As a result, this year's public plans provide substantially more information. Improving the transparency of resolution plans will be an ongoing priority of the living will process.
Conclusion
While there is still much work to do, if there is one point I would like to conclude with today it is that there has been a transformational change in the United States and internationally since the financial crisis in regard to the resolution of systemically important financial institutions that perhaps has been underappreciated.
Prior to the crisis, the major jurisdictions of the world, including the United States, lacked the basic statutory authorities to address this issue. No solutions were available to address the critical resolution challenges of capital, liquidity, derivative contracts, maintenance of critical operations, and cross-border cooperation. No authorities were available to require firms to make essential changes in their organizational structures and operations to address major impediments to resolution prior to a failure.
In the United States, all of those issues have been or are in the process of being addressed. The living wills are an important new tool to require institutions to address the deep interconnectedness within their own organizational structures that is a central impediment to orderly resolution under bankruptcy as well as under the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The stay on the automatic termination of derivative contracts, whether written under U.S. or foreign law, in the event of an insolvency proceeding in bankruptcy or under the Orderly Liquidation Authority is a major step forward. The ability to convert unsecured debt to equity to facilitate an orderly failure in bankruptcy or under the Orderly Liquidation Authority addresses another essential issue.
The fact that the senior financial officials of the world's two leading financial jurisdictions, the United States and the United Kingdom, met in October to discuss how they would cooperate in the event of a cross-border failure of a systemic financial institution underscores the high priority that is being placed on this issue. The establishment by the European Union of a new Single Resolution Mechanism for Europe, to complement the Single Supervisory Mechanism, will add a major new piece to the international infrastructure for cross-border resolution. I think it is fair to say that all of the major jurisdictions of the world are focused on this issue.
In the United States, the statutory mandate for the FDIC is clear: Use the living will process to bring about real-time changes in the structure and operations of firms to facilitate orderly resolution under bankruptcy. And, if necessary, be prepared to use the powers available under the Orderly Liquidation Authority to manage the orderly failure of a firm.
And to be clear, if the FDIC had to use the Orderly Liquidation Authority, it would result in the following consequences for the firm: shareholders would lose their investments, unsecured creditors would suffer losses in accordance with the losses of the firm, culpable management would be replaced, and the firm would be wound down and liquidated in an orderly manner at no cost to taxpayers.
One other thing that is also clear is that without these authorities, we would be back in the same position as 2008, with the same set of bad choices.
I would suggest that there has been no greater or more important regulatory challenge in the aftermath of the financial crisis than developing the capability for the orderly failure of a systemically important financial institution. While there is still a lot of work to do, looking at where we were and where we are today, in my view the progress has been impressive.
Thank you.
Last Updated 9/17/2015communications@fdic.gov
--------------------------------------------------
ZItatende
MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=8405.msg118935#msg118935
Zitat jaysenese:
Please use this thread to update the group: if you hold WMIH shares in a margin account, how is your broker handling the shares? Are you seeing 'margin buying power' available now? Are you seeing the ability to make a withdrawal against the WMIH shares now? What is the brokerage requiring as 'maintenance' for WMIH share, and how much will they loan against it?
We may not see any changes until later this week.
SCHWAB: As of today, Sunday, September 27, there has been no change to my WMIH position in my margin account at Schwab.
--------------------
Zitat Uncle_Bo:
Merrill has a >$10 rule for marginable stocks, anything less is not
--------------------
Zitat Porkchopranch:
I'll let you know about IB (Interactive Brokers) on Mon. They normally margin stuff very quickly. They offer up to 6X leverage. So if you have $200k worth of WMIH, you'll get $1.2MM of fresh buying power. I know I'll be using some of that new buying power to pick up a few more shares.
--------------------
ZItat astockinvestor:
I just received an alert from ETrade:
Mon Sep 28 07:14:00 2015 Special Margin Maintenance Requirement Increase
The margin maintenance requirement for your holding shown below has been increased. This may have the effect of decreasing the purchasing power you have available for trading. It may also put your account at risk of a house call if your equity falls below the minimum requirement.
Holding: WMIH (WMIH CORP COM)
New Requirement: 100%
Old Requirement: 25%
--------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
Schwab agrees: Not marginable (yet), 100% Maintenance Requirement.
--------------------
Zitat Porkchopranch:
IB: WMIH now 6.53X Leverage.
--------------------
Zitat vitellom:
I wonder why the change??
This info is from ETrade's website: $2.00 - $2.99/Share $1.50/Share $1.50/Share
The way I read this is, the amount above $1.50 'should be' available for Margin Purchases.
September 28, 2015 10:46 AM ET
Help Center: View and understand margin maintenance requirements
Help Center > Trade with E*TRADE Securities > Trade on margin > View and understand margin maintenance requirements
The following list shows the different kinds of securities and positions you can hold on margin in your account and the initial and maintenance requirements for each.
Legend: ◾MV: Market Value of the stock
◾Out of the Money: The condition of an option when the underlying stock's current market price is below the strike price in the case of a call, or above the strike price in the case of a put.
◾Marginable Securities: Includes most listed and NASDAQ stocks and securities.
Type of Security Initial Margin Req.
(Minimum $2,000 equity) Margin Maintenance Req.
(Minimum $2,000 equity)
Long Stocks and Warrants:Below $2.00/Share
100% market value
100% market value
$2.00 - $2.99/Share $1.50/Share $1.50/Share
Over $3.00/Share The greater of 50% or
special margin requirement The greater of 25% or
special margin requirement
Long Leveraged ETFs The greater of 50% or
special margin requirement The greater of 25% times the leverage multiple or
special margin requirement
Short Leveraged ETFs The greater of 50% or
special margin requirement The greater of 30% times the leverage multiple or
special margin requirement
IPOs (Where E*TRADE Securities participates in the offering) 100% market value 100% market value for 30 days
--------------------
Zitat Simonizer:
Can you expound? I assume you are able to margin the stock based upon your response. Does this mean for every $1 of WMIH you own you can use your margin buying power to buy $6.53 of stock? What is the maintenance requirement? TD Ameritrade doesnt have the stock marginable yet but if it is you must maintain $2.00 per share and can margin the rest.
--------------------
Zitat Porkchopranch zu Simonizer:
Basically what it means is for every dollar I put up, I can buy $6.5 worth of WMIH. Or to reverse it, roughly 15% maintenance margin.
--------------------
Zitat Devalzadvok8:
Astock,
Re: E*Trade:
"Holding: WMIH (WMIH CORP COM)
New Requirement: 100%
Old Requirement: 25%"
Got same message. Could it be, somehow, that ETrade had been told that WMIH Corp was going to 'go away' and ETrade did not want to get caught using it for margin when it might not exist in the near future? A merger/acquisition would not allow an 'automatic' transfer of margin t a 'new' issue, would it?
--------------------
Zitat Simonize:
As of this morning WMIH still not marginable at TD Ameritrade.
--------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
Schwab says stocks below $3.00 in price are not marginable there.
--------------------
Zitat vitellom:
ETrade website states : Margin Requirements for stocks $2.00 -$2.99 is $1.50/share.
Yet it also says (for some reason) WMIH is NOT Marginable???
What's up with the 'special exclusion'? Hope to find out soon.
--------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat deekshant:
For me, today is a significant day against all odds. And, I base it on month end closing in combination with Nasdaq listing, which should bring out a PR. If not, then, we are dead till the end of the year.
Here are a few to connect the dots between WMIH and First Data
1) I believe both have the same SIC code and are registered in Delaware
2) Both are controlled by KKR
3) Citi is invested in both of them
4) One square, Paytm are all trying to generate funds and launch an ipo this fall. First Data initiation through merger keeps them ahead.
5) If Paypal, Paytm, First Square and First Data are put at equal footing then what can give First Data a competitive edge. I believe NOLs
6) First Data is laden with debt. So, not very appealing from ipo perspective. This is their weakness which I believe forces them to look for alternative financing (part loan & part equity). Also, interest expense is likely to go higher when fed rate increases
7) Why no leak because First Data is private
( Why end of today because WMIH is a shell that doesn’t need any big planning and we start out fresh for the 4th quarter
9) Timing is interesting because we just got listed on Nasdaq and First Data wants to go public.
10) What is the benefit of listing on Nasdaq: Investors want comfort while looking to finance through pref.
I have very little to go by, but, have not been able to identify any other prospective target where there are commonalities that give rise to this speculation. I know I am all alone on this, but, worth a try. WMIH price is just going to drift more or less at where we are right now with no volume otherwise. I am not expecting a jump in price or volume, but, only hoping that a PR gets released end of today
--------------------
Zitat gator:
WMIH is a publicly traded holding company. Any company we buy would become a sub that is not publicly traded. Or, if a company like First Data wants to go public through WMIH, wouldn't they need to merge with us and then the resulting company would assume the First Data name and we would change tickers, correct? I don't know how this scenario would effect our NOLs.
--------------------
Zitat deekshant:
Gator, my take is a layman's perspective. I could be all wrong as it needs a lot of cross checking. But, if a possibility exists, then, I am saying that WMIH will acquire First Data through a merger and the terms within would essentially we focussed on alternative financing and NOLs. Everything else is secondary as the purpose of going public through an IPO has been met
Zitatende
--------------------------------------------------
MfG.L:)
Zitat CSNY:
In my opinion the listing was a pricing mechanism for WMIH common, which is now legitimized.
---------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
I think you're right-on here. I don't get the sense that there is any 'market making' going on now. When I think of Market Makers I think of firms that maintain some sort of inventory of WMIH shares that they use to maintain an orderly market while still making a profit on the spread between bid and ask. The NASDAQ trading now seems to be all individual orders: I don't get the sense that anyone is stepping in to prevent a stock price drop, or a stock price rise, by selling or buying their own shares to accomodate the market.
CANT 1.93 x 3.36
CRTC 1.93 x 3.36
NITE 1.93 x 3.36
MAXM 1.93 x 3.36
--------------------
Zitat Mr_Simpson:
Jay you nailed it... the big MMs are all sitting waiting for some event to happen. I will say that by end of October at most we will have some news.
3Q just ended and the flow of events lead us to the next one which is M&A announcement.
---------------------
Zitat Inthemoney:
I would be more inclined to think an announcement would be more like first of the year 2016 versus 4th quarter 2015. Book keeping, tax ramifications, holidays......if you are right...it better happen quick.
--------------------
Zitat azcowboy:
... hmmmm' ... I was thinking prior to the end of the close of this year for a number of reasons' ...
one' is that I don't believe that WMIH-Corp, in its present state, will be filing a 12/31/2015 10-K' ... (there have been inconsistency's that would need to be amended, explained, and addressed')
second' is going back to the ... "2013' vegetable thread" ... the R-45 has been consistent in recognizing the potential for Capital Loss' ... (a pure number five years future) ... so' ... if an actionable event took place before years end' ... there could be a possible tax' advantage allowed for year 2015' ... (The Capital Loss Tax Advantage expires March of 2017' ~ 17 1/2 months ? )
third' is a separate review of the JPMorgan 12/31/2014 10-K release and then JPMorgans 06/30/2015 10-Q release' ... what the K' said ... and ... what the Q' didn't have to'
fourth' then there is the LT' and it's putting the brakes on the 2nd quarter distributions' ... just shy of piercing the 50m dollar threshold
there are other reasons of course' but that is how I have been thinking' ...
anyhew'
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat Mr_Simpson:
What new features make SPACs worth reconsidering?
Since the late summer of 2010, the SPAC vehicle has reemerged with new features, including smaller sponsor promotes (reduced from 20-25% to 10-15%), much lower maximum redemption thresholds (reduced from 70-80% to 12% or less), and longer windows to get a deal done (extended from 18 to 36 months). While hedge funds will still be attracted to SPACs for the ability to sell the warrant and lock-in gains, the most difficult obstacles to executing a business combination have been removed, which should make it a more palatable vehicle for potential sponsors and management teams.
What’s next?
Many had written off the SPAC vehicle due to the large number of liquidations witnessed in 2008, 2009 and 2010 as SPACs that had succeeded in raising money before the market shut down could not succeed in consummating a business combination. With the new NYSE Amex and NASDAQ rules no longer requiring the super-majority vote and new features that remove the hurdles to completing a business combination, the SPAC is proving to be a more attractive vehicle for promoters to raise money in the public markets for business combinations.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
First Data - 2.5BN IPO - KKR
Zitat deekshant:
(einiges an Daten/Infos vorausgegangen...)
I was truly hoping First Data will kick in. Well, I hope we hear news by Sept 30. I know its in my dreams
Update:
28 SEP 2015
First Data Strengthens Digital Wallet Leadership with Support of Samsung Pay
First Data Corporation, a global leader in commerce-enabling technology and solutions, continues to build its digital wallet leadership as it supports Samsung Pay, now available for in-store use in the United States.
https://www.firstdata.com/en_us/about-first-data/...ess-releases.html
---------------------
Zitat igroup222:
Looks like the WMIH acquisition target is not going to be First Data Corp…
Listing on NYSE, symbol FDC - initial share float of 160m targeting a raise of 3B, initial market cap in the 16-18B range, plus debt (21-23B) for an EV of 37-41B
http://www.wsj.com/articles/...e-up-to-3-68-billion-in-ipo-1443698195
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/business/...illion-in-ipo.html?_r=0
http://fortune.com/2015/10/01/...unveils-plans-for-years-largest-ipo/
I did not see an actual “date” for the IPO listed, but some blogs have state mid October as a target…
So, I wonder where we are at now??
--------------------
Zitat deekshant:
With this news, I am clueless as to whats going to become of WMIH. One wild thought that came to mind just to prove a point was KKR raises 3 billion from FDC with about 185 million shares. Then, goes on to merge with WMIH by giving X additional shares to FDC shareholders. This way they reduce liability to 18 billion as against 21 billion and further the cause of alternative financing through WMIH in part equity and part loan. I am not counting on it, but, sharing a wild thought that has no basis I believe. Don't even know if such a plausibility exists where WMIH becomes a parent to the sub with consolidated financial reporting for tax purposes leveraging NOLs
Being creative at best
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...p?topic=8482.msg120047#msg120047No one should assume that Reorganized WMI will be an attractive target
Zitat eighty:
Supplement to Equity Committee's Proposed Letter in Support of Confirmation of the Seventh Amended Joint Plan"
http://docslide.us/documents/...f-the-seventh-amended-joint-plan.html
"No one should assume that Reorganized WMI will be an attractive target for acquisition or merger with third parties. "
Q: Are plans in place for Reorganized WMI to be acquired or merge with another entity shortly after emergence? A: To our knowledge, no such plans have been made, could not be made, and no discussions have occurred with any third-parties. Any merger or acquisition of Reorganized WMI would be the responsibility of the new Board of Directors. No one should assume that Reorganized WMI will be an attractive target for acquisition or merger with third parties.
Zitatende
-----------------------------------------
MfG.L:)
http://www.ariva.de/forum/...-Corp-News-461347?page=2270#jumppos56762
--------------------------------------------------
Teil 2:
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=8523.msg121587#msg121587
Zitat Plissken:
Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure
"Regulation FD addresses the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other issuers. Regulation FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities—generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information—the issuer must make public disclosure of that information. In this way, Regulation FD aims to promote the full and fair disclosure."
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
Possible, but if so then we should be seeing a like disclosure from the other party.
und zu User CharlienDude
Should take years .......... if ever, but point taken. Taxes attributes: sooner taken the better
--------------------
Zitat thegr8t1:
If you don't mind; could you explain in a little detail what you mean?
1. they needed a public notice
2. they also wanted a date stamp
I'm very interested in your opinion on this. Thanks.
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
I've read a lot of speculation on this 8K .................. my opinion was and still is, it was not required. So, why publish something that was not required? Publish something basically showing an attempt, a failure? Rush to publish it the "day of"? I'll not even speculate as to the what but to me the why is answered, you need it on record and you need it dated and that gives notice to the other party that the clock is ticking.
Most damages are time sensitive so you need public record and to give notice that the clock ticking. Everything beyond that would be 8 Ball but it reads where were close.
--------------------
Zitat myadad:
As much as I would like to believe the 8K was issued to get the other side back to the table and to enhance our negotiations, I suspect just like every other time when our company issues some news, the 8K means just what it says. We tried to put a deal together and failed and in the process spent (wasted) a lot of money. I believe in the process of negotiating with the other company, we disclosed a lot of material information about WMIH and our finances to lots of people including attorneys and possibly analysts working for the other company. When we were not able to consummate the deal, these people who we had confided in had information that would possible give them an advantage in trading our stock. To level the playing field, it was imperative we issue the 8K immediately to let everyone know there was a big expense that would show up in November when we issued the 10K. Without that, the people in the know could have shorted the stock for a month while we retail would have been left in the dark. As it is, the stock went down from the $2.58 to the low $2.40's on the news of the 8K but at least everyone knows why and a small group didn't have the knowledge before all of us got it. Sometimes, the simple answer is the most logical.
--------------------
Zitat warcton:
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regfd.htm
Regulation FD addresses the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other issuers. Regulation FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities—generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information—the issuer must make public disclosure of that information. In this way, Regulation FD aims to promote the full and fair disclosure.
IF information about the acquisition was leaked they had up to 24 hours to file the 8k.
Since we are "out of the know" we don't know the true intent of the 8k, so all we can do is speculate.
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
The 8K mentioned we were dealing with another public company, where's the other? Nobody has found it.
I've read FD and find it a circular argument. Since the deal was not disclosed and we are supposedly looking into 100's of possible deals then who's to say that this is the one that fell through? Full and fair disclosure? "What we have here is a failure to communicate" ................... this 8K creates more questions than answers, questions that have already changes the PPS.
--------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
Maybe they received an unfavorable IRS Private Ruling?
Maybe the potential of zero-interest rates, or even negative USA interest rates, made the deal unworkable?
--------------------
Zitat Karmatt:
So let's think about why this deal failed:
1. Money
Another bidder was higher.
We were not able to secure the necessary financing. (unlikely)
2. Counterparty Risk
The selling company chose not to do the deal with WMIH.
Just an example: Wells Fargo and WMIH bid for the same assets. GE is unsure if WMIH is capable of making it work. So they
choose WFC over WMIH.
3. Another deal came up.
--------------------
Zitat xfidfed1:
Agreed…Just a WAG, but in the event there are significant non-WMB assets to be returned to the WMILT, which some here perceive would play an important role in WMIH’s future growth (including the selection of an acquisition candidate), might the 8K have also served as a public notice/warning to the FDIC-R, if in fact the FDIC-R is dragging its feet in facilitating any tentatively agreed-upon return of such assets ?
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
8K said this was another public company but ...............
--------------------
Zitat ron_66271:
"an operating division of a public company"
WMIH owns the equity in WMIIC. Therefore WMIIC is a division of a public company.
Now about those WMIIC assets ?? ........
-------------------
Zitat Karmatt, SillyWabbit, CSNY:
Buying yourself! Because LOGIC!
You can't buy something you already own ...
WMIIC is a subsidiary, not a division. In my opinion, WMIIC wasn't the target.
--------------------
Zitat ron_66271:
The assets are owned by WMILT. WMIH owns the equity in WMIIC [the business license] that gives WMIH the status to operate the WMILT assets after the purchase.
We have not seen a corresponding 8K now have we?
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
When we were not able to consummate the deal, these people who we had confided in had information that would possible give them an advantage in trading our stock. To level the playing field, it was imperative we issue the 8K immediately to let everyone know there was a big expense that would show up in November when we issued the 10K. Without that, the people in the know could have shorted the stock for a month while we retail would have been left in the dark.
__________________________________________________
Quote from: metalhead on Today at 02:46:57 PM
Bravo, my man. That explanation is internally consistent, requires no further validation, isn't contingent upon any "theories" floating about, provides sufficient cause for the release and hasty timing thereof, and raises no further questions. In my mind, you just posited what is by far the most fitting explanation.
That said, I'd still like to know who our target was, specifics of the failed deal, etc. But as far as the 8K itself, I believe we have an answer.
__________________________________________________
BS ............... That would have us covering IT'er with an 8K that tanked the stock ................... love that level playing field.
---------------------
Zitat ron_66271:
WMILT = WMIIC[assets]
WMIH = WMIIC[equity]
WMIH[equity] <= WMILT[assets]
--------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
Because it's a slow day, I love 8 Ball, need to hone my skills at Six degrees of separation, or just need to rattle the pedestal of a lesser deity I'll toss one out.
Within the P&A JPM's only optional purchase was MSR of which they picked up about 600B dollars worth. Also the P&A has a put-back option where within the timeframe the purchaser has the ability to put-back. JPM has had 7 premium years of record low rates to go about cherry picking loans so you could extract from that what remains is "bruised".
8 Ball: JPM was looking to put-back these loans and receive a refund of money they yet to pay, kinda sounds JPMorganish. Our people were interested but at some reduced amount and / or they wanted payment of the MSR's value of "picked" loans. When the deal failed to materialize our people put out the 8K notice to start the clock ticking on damages
--------------------
Zitat ron_66271:
IMO, the deal is back ON because Kareem is GONE.
Motion to Reopen WMI Abandonment of WMB for Just Cause did not happen.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
Zitat kenwalker:
___________________________________________
Quote from: dmac4_2 on Yesterday at 04:07:47 PM
I think JPM only had 6 months after the purchase to put back loans to the FDIC IIRC so I think put back option expired years ago.
___________________________________________
I don't think so because I don't think JPMorganish ever paid so I guess they could say they never bought. That's the thing: think of a home closing where it lasted 6+ years and you can start to see all the areas of grey.
(g) Reversals. In the event that the Receiver purchases an Asset (and assumes the
Related Liability) that it is not required to purchase puruant to this Section 3.4, the Assuming
Ban shall repurchase such Asset (and assume such Related Liability) from the Receiver at a
price computed so as to achieve the same economic result as would apply if the Receiver had
never purhased such Asset pursuant to this Section 3.4
.............. at any rate it was a 8 Ball as to the "what" I feel confident as to the "why". Notice / date stamped, anything else is BS that circles back around to them ( BOD ) doing something like covering IT or tanking the stock as a motivate. That don't wash with me as I give more credit to them than that.
---------------------
Zitat govinsider:
_____________________________________
Quote from: kenwalker on Yesterday at 03:18:34 PM
Because it's a slow day, I love 8 Ball, need to hone my skills at Six degrees of separation, or just need to rattle the pedestal of a lesser deity I'll toss one out.
Within the P&A JPM's only optional purchase was MSR of which they picked up about 600B dollars worth. Also the P&A has a put-back option where within the timeframe the purchaser has the ability to put-back. JPM has had 7 premium years of record low rates to go about cherry picking loans so you could extract from that what remains is "bruised".
8 Ball: JPM was looking to put-back these loans and receive a refund of money they yet to pay, kinda sounds JPMorganish. Our people were interested but at some reduced amount and / or they wanted payment of the MSR's value of "picked" loans. When the deal failed to materialize our people put out the 8K notice to start the clock ticking on damages.
________________________________________
that pretty damn good ken...couple the fact that the FDIC/FEDS put the squeeze on JPigs size and stature (collateral requirements to a Reserve Bank), sounds like the real high-stakes hardball is under way....how fitting, during World Series and all...
---------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
Come on Gov .................. I'd be the most surprised if this was even close. I was at one time tossing aside the BS speculation about the 8K, while rattling the chain of a select few. I'm enough out on a limb to say ( notice / date stamped = damages ) that I outta be promoted to Branch Manager.
I think we agree that post 9/25/14 was just the start and so now ................... it's started. What do you think about that slap down of Kareem and friends?
---------------------
ZItat doo_dilettante:
Very interesting thoughts of you in this thread, Ken!
One can smell the BS in this 8K. Just look at all this new momentum stock companies (Twitter, Netflix, Tesla, Facebook, etc.) - they post information with more important content on public message systems than the information contained in this 8K. If they had named the other party it would have been a different ball game.
---------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
hier der Chart:
MfG.L:)
Angehängte Grafik:
01.gif
01.gif
Optionen
| Boardmail an "ranger100" |
Wertpapier: Mr. Cooper Group Inc. |
interessant das zum schluß das Volumen etwas zu nahm (23K / 26K)
"durfte" aber nicht gehandelt werden...
MfG.L:)
Angehängte Grafik:
03.png (verkleinert auf 93%)
03.png (verkleinert auf 93%)
Optionen
| Boardmail an "pyramid" |
Wertpapier: Mr. Cooper Group Inc. |