Der USA Bären-Thread

Banks Still Expanding
By Tony Crescenzi
street.com Contributor
1/7/2008 3:49 PM EST

The Federal Reserve's most recent data on bank credit, which measures the total amount of money extended by commercial banks via loans, leases and securities purchases, continues to expand at a fast pace.

The expansion is being spurred, in part, by the movement of structured investment vehicles onto the balance sheets of banks and by continued re-intermediation of credit formerly raised in the capital markets. This shows that the credit crunch is not playing out in the banking system in the very negative way that is often perceived.

In the week ended Dec. 26, bank credit increased a solid $30.4 billion to $9.26 trillion following an increase of $64.4 billion the previous week. The gains put the annualized increase since the end of July at about 18%, roughly double the pace of the past five years.

Strong gains continue to be posted in commercial & industrial loans, which have increased at a 34% pace since the end of July, and in real estate loans, which have increased at a 12% pace since the end of July. The gain in real estate loans likely reflects the decline in securitized loans, which result in banks holding mortgages for longer.

This is old-style banking, but it should be seen as a positive that banks are willingly boosting their balance sheets. Banks almost certainly are endeavoring to grow their market share again following years of losing business to both the capital markets and to non-bank entities.

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2-Tage-Charts des US-Banken-Index BKX. Der heutige Anstieg könnte natürlich auch nur eine techn. Erholung nach dem langen Ausverkauf der letzten Wochen sein.  

Harvard-Ökonom sieht US-Rezession bei mehr als 50%
Datum 07.01.2008 - Uhrzeit 22:09 (© BörseGo AG 2007, Autor: Stanzl Jochen, Redakteur, © GodmodeTrader - http://www.godmode-trader.de/)

Cambridge (BoerseGo.de) - Die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Rezession in den USA ist gemäß dem bekannten Harvard Universitätsvolkswirt Martin Feldstein nach dem jüngsten Arbeitsmarktbericht zu Dezember auf mehr als 50 Prozent gestiegen. So geht daraus ein Anstieg der Arbeitslosenrate von 4,7 Prozent im November auf ein 2-Jahreshoch von 5 Prozent hervor. Die 18.000 neu geschaffenen Stellen entsprechen dem schwächsten Beschäftigungszuwachs seit August 2003. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Rezession liege nun bei etwas mehr als 50 Prozent.

Die Zunahme der Arbeitslosigkeit gehe zu Lasten des privaten Konsums und die Konsumenten werden angesichts der geringer gewordenen Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten nervöser in die Zukunft blicken. Aus einer erwarteten Ausgabendrosselung der Konsumenten sei für das Wirtschaftswachstum in 2008 mit Einbußen zu rechnen.

Die US-Notenbank müsse die Zinsen daher weiter senken. Eine Senkung um einen halben Prozentpunkt sei in der aktuellen Phase keine schlechte Sache. Zinssenkungen alleine seien aber nicht ausreichend, um die Wirtschaft wieder in Gang zu bringen. Der Kongress sei aufgefordert die Steuern zu senken, um den Konsum wieder anzukurbeln und das Vertrauen unter den Konsumenten wiederherzustellen.

"Ich bin mir nicht sicher, dass die aktuellen Leitzinssenkungen die gleichen Wirkungen entfalten wie dies in der Vergangenheit der Fall gewesen ist, zumal die Probleme ausgeufert sind und sich der Vertrauensverlust auf den Finanzsektor und das Bankenkapital erstreckt. Zudem sind die Baubeginne eingebrochen und die Vermögensvorräte der Haushalte niedrig. Jener Prozess sei durch durch das geringer gewordene Beschäftigungswachstum und damit verbundener verminderter Einkommenszuwächse in Beschleunigung begriffen. Grundsätzlich sind wir uns jedoch noch nicht im völlig klaren, ob die Wirtschaft tatsächlich vor einem Schrumpfungsprozess steht", führte Feldstein weiter aus.  

in Ergänzung zu meinem letzten Posting. Der US-Bankenindex BKX ist jetzt in etwa wieder auf dem Stand von Mai 2003 bzw. Sommer 1998 (blaue Linie). Am Ende des Bärenmarktes 2001-2003 fiel er bis 60 (aktuell: 84). Im Herbst 1998, am Höhepunkt der Rußland/LTCM-Krise, ging's bis 55 runter.

Über's Jahr hat der BKX fast ein Drittel seines Wertes eingebüßt. 33 % Jahresverlust hat durchaus schon "Bärenmarkt-Kaliber, wenngleich der BKX noch weiter bis auf die rote Linie, knapp unter 80, fallen könnte (...und wer weiß, vielleicht auch NOCH deutlich tiefer). Bei einer Interim-Zinssenkung der Fed geht's sofort nach oben. Die Fed "macht" daher den Chart.  

warum? s&p, dow und nasdaq sind an markanten widerständen jeweils 2x abgeprallt. die indizes befinden sich alle am unteren bollinger band, nasdaq ist mit low heute daran abgeprallt. es ist möglich dass es bis benny's rede leicht hoch geht. man sollte die passiven börsenteilnehmer (gehrt's frösche), die am seitenrand warten und drauf lauern long zu gehen, nicht vergessen...
im dax bin ich seit heute morgen wieder long dabei (telekom), schorts halte ich noch bei siemens, thyssen und dt.börse.
wir sind erst nach benny's rede wirklich schlauer in welche richtung es geht  

bei 86 oder 87??
mfg nf

Er sieht keine Fortsetzung eines Bullenmarktes bzw. meldet er da sehr, sehr starke Zweifel an. Die US-Börsen sind für ihn momentan oversold, daher steht ein temporärer Rebound für ihn hier in der kommenden Woche bevor. Faber betonte allerdings, dass für ihn die kurzzeitige Rally bis maximal in die Range von 1480-1550 Punkten beim S&P laufen könnte, den Raum darüber sieht er als gedeckelt an.
Einzeltitel bzw. Sektoren hat er explizit nicht empfohlen, dass Interview bewegte sich dann auch mehr hin zu der Rolle der Fed als Druckerei-Unternehmen, dass die Performance der US-Stocks in Gold-Terms mies war, Emerging Markets, usw.  

No Helicopter Drop For Failed Banks The question at hand is: Can the Fed provide capital to GSEs or failed banks? Anyone who thinks so is wrong.

The Fed can only provide liquidity, not capital, to failing institutions. That is not only my opinion, that is the opinion of the Fed as well. Let's start by taking a look at Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) and continuing further with a close look at liquidity itself.

Can the Fed Provide Capital to the GSEs?

On January 17th 2007, William Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gave a speech on the topic GSEs: Where Do We Stand?


Financial firms throughout the economy ought to have an intense interest in reforming the GSEs. One reason is simply that banks and other financial firms, and many nonfinancial firms, hold large amounts of GSE obligations and GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.

I believe that many risk managers simply accept that GSEs are effectively backstopped by the Federal Reserve and the federal government without ever thinking through how such implicit guarantees would actually work in a crisis. The view seems to be that someone, somehow, would do what is necessary in a crisis. Good risk management requires that the “someone” be identified and the “somehow” be specified.

I have emphasized before that if you are thinking about the Federal Reserve as the “someone,” you should understand that the Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital.

As for the “somehow,” I urge you to be sure you understand the extent of the president’s powers to provide emergency aid, the likely speed of congressional action and the possibility that political disputes would slow resolution of the situation.

At present, there is no process and no one knows what would happen if a GSE is unable to meet its obligations. .....

Sound risk management practices require that GSE managements base decisions on market values, or estimates as close to market as financial theory and practice permit. The reason is simple: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursue policies that inherently expose the firms to an extreme asset/liability duration mismatch. They hold long-term mortgages and mortgage-backed securities financed by short-term liabilities. Given this strategy, they must engage in extensive operations in derivatives markets to create synthetically a duration match on the two sides of the balance sheet. These operations expose the firm to a huge amount of risk unless the positions are measured at market value. ....

For those who believe that a GSE crisis is unthinkable in the future, I suggest a course in economic history.
Key GSE Points

Size and leverage of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is enormous.
The Fed does not want to be responsible for a blowup at either company.
Both pursue policies that inherently expose the firms to an extreme asset/liability duration mismatch.
Both hold long-term mortgages and mortgage-backed securities financed by short-term liabilities forcing them to synthetically create a duration match via massive amounts of derivatives.
The stocks act as if there is implicit government guarantees. There are no such guarantees.
The lack of market discipline is striking.
The Fed can provide liquidity not capital.
A crisis is not unthinkable. Those that think so need a course in economic history.
Federal Reserve Emergency Powers

In the Panel on Government Sponsored Enterprises, Poole spoke on the Emergency Powers of the Fed.

I am acutely aware that should there be a market crisis, the Federal Reserve will have the responsibility to manage the problem. Just as many market participants apparently believe that GSE obligations have the implicit backing of the federal government, they may also believe that the Federal Reserve has all the powers necessary to manage a crisis. The Fed’s successful efforts to handle the stock market crash in 1987, the near-insolvency of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the financial effects of the 9/11 tragedy all justifiably increase market confidence in the Federal Reserve. In the interest of a full understanding of the Federal Reserve’s powers in the event of a crisis in the market for GSE obligations, I’ll outline the Fed’s powers as provided by the Federal Reserve Act.
....
The Federal Reserve has ample power to deal with a liquidity problem, by making collateralized loans as authorized by the Federal Reserve Act.

The Fed does not have power to deal with a solvency problem. Should a solvency problem arise with any of the GSEs, the solution will have to be found elsewhere than through the Federal Reserve.
The Fed Can Provide Liquidity NOT Capital

Three Key Sentences made by a Fed Governor

The Fed can provide liquidity support but not capital
The Fed does not have power to deal with a solvency problem.
Should a solvency problem arise with any of the GSEs, the solution will have to be found elsewhere than through the Federal Reserve.
The Fed cannot provide capital to Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), Citigroup (C), Washington Mutual (WM), JPMorgan (JPM) or anyone else. For all this talk of "helicopter drops", Poole seems to be calling Bernanke's Bluff.

I have pointed out many times before that the Fed has no authority to do "a drop" and would not do so even if they could. It is obvious the Fed is going to slash interest rates, but that action addresses liquidity and confidence. It does not do a thing for solvency issues.

The crisis we are in now is a solvency crisis, not a liquidity crisis. There are no bigger bubble to be blown that will provide jobs and allow consumers to pay debts.

Is 1929 a walk in the park compared to today?

Several people have asked me to comment on Crisis may make 1929 look a 'walk in the park'.

As central banks continue to splash their cash over the system, so far to little effect, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard argues that things risk spiralling out of their control

Twenty billion dollars here, $20bn there, and a lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates for Christmas. Buckets of liquidity are being splashed over the North Atlantic banking system, so far with meagre or fleeting effects.

Quietly, insiders are perusing an obscure paper by Fed staffers David Small and Jim Clouse. It explores what can be done under the Federal Reserve Act when all else fails.

Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become "unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit". A vote by five governors can - in "exigent circumstances" - authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk. This clause has not been evoked since the Slump.
A Little Acid Test for Fed "Liquidity"

There are several errors in that story that warrant further discussion. Let's start with the idea that $20 billion here $20 billion there amounts to some mammoth increase in liquidity.

Proof that these liquidity ideas are way overdone can be found in John Hussman's article A Little Acid Test for Fed "Liquidity".

If you track all those daily and weekly rollovers and figure out the total quantity of Fed repos outstanding at any given time, you'll find that the Fed has only injected $18 billion in “liquidity” since March.



If investors think the Fed buying up a few billion of Treasury and agency debt means a hill of beans, they might do well to remember that the U.S. government is running up annual deficits in the hundreds of billions. In fact, the U.S. Treasury will float tens of billions of new debt in December alone (most of which will be sopped up by foreigners, who have increased their holdings of Treasuries by well over $200 billion in the past year). This will be mixed in with refinancings.

So it's difficult to understand why investors would get all excited about the Fed temporarily buying up a few billion in government securities, when we've got a Federal government that's simultaneously and permanently issuing and then constantly rolling over many, many times that amount. It‘s an escape into dreamland to believe that Fed actions have any chance at all of providing more “liquidity” when the Federal government's deficits suck up in a matter of weeks every bit of liquidity that the Fed has provided in a year. These Fed actions are nothing but marginal tinkering around the edges of the global financial system.
The above chart is strike one for anyone that thinks the Fed is providing massive amounts of liquidity to the system.

ECB Christmas Give Away?

Was the "lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates" that much of a Christmas gift?

I confess. This number was so huge that at first I thought it meant something. Subsequent digging has changed my mind. Please consider Vanishing Act - Are the Fed and the ECB Misleading Investors about "Liquidity"?

Contrary to the impressions they attempt to create, neither the Fed nor the ECB have "injected" material amounts of "liquidity" into the international banking system in recent months.

ECB Liquidity – “Now you see it, now you don't!”

Last week, the market shot higher on reports that the European Central Bank was injecting 348.6 billion euro (the equivalent of US$500 billion) of liquidity into the European banking system. The truth is that the ECB actually drained liquidity last week. The ECB data is a little less transparent than the Fed's but they also do their rollovers less frequently (typically one “main refinancing” each week and a few other fine-tuning transactions).

Again, if you want to track these, here's a link to the source data. About half-way down the page is a link to a data file of historical ECB operations (note that the amounts reported are in thousands of euro).

Let me start by thanking Bill Hester, who did the careful (and I'm sure unpleasant) job of sorting through all of the transactions and tying out one refinancing with the next. The following chart summarizes how the ECB has operated in recent months:



Despite the apparently enormous amount of last week's 348.6 billion euro “main refinancing,” the fact is that it was a rollover of existing repos, not a “new injection” of funds. What's more interesting is what didn't get reported.

At the beginning of the week, the ECB had 488.5 billion euro in net liquidity outstanding. By the end of the week, the ECB had 485.5 billion euro outstanding.

So here's the blunt truth: the ECB drained 3 billion euro of liquidity last week!

The story reported and repeated ad nauseum on the financial channels was that the ECB “injected” the equivalent of US$500 billion of “liquidity” into the international financial system last week.
That is strike two for anyone who thinks the Fed and the ECB have been injecting massive amounts of liquidity.

Section 13 (3) Is Much Ado About Nothing

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard writes: "Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become "unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit". A vote by five governors can - in "exigent circumstances" - authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk."

The document from which the above paragraph comes is called The Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized under the Federal Reserve Act. Here are some additional details about those emergency lending statutes:

Reserve bank ... "Hackley (1973) has interpreted this provision as indicating: ... it seems clear that it was the intent of Congress that loans should be made only to creditworthy borrowers; in other words, the Reserve Bank should be satisfied that a loan under this authority would be repaid in due course, either by the borrower or by resort to security or the endorsement of a third party."

Under this interpretation, this restriction in section 13(3) could significantly curtail the potential effectiveness of using loans to IPCs to stimulate aggregate demand. In an environment of a sluggish economy and elevated credit risk premiums, lending only to only creditworthy IPCs or accepting only relatively high-quality collateral leaves may limit the scope to lower risk premiums. But, even if the Federal Reserve could take more credit risk onto its balance sheet, any social benefits from the Federal Reserve doing so would need to be balanced against the potentially substantial drawbacks associated with placing the Federal Reserve squarely in the process of allocating credit among private sector borrowers.

Once again, the Fed's ability to do something is dramatically overstated. For starters, it should be clear we are talking about liquidity not capital. Secondarily, it is clear that that liquidity is for credit worthy borrowers only.

Excitement over Section 13 (3) is much ado over nothing just as this excitement over liquidity drops by the Fed and ECB via repo actions is much ado over nothing.

Providing Stimulus When Rates are Zero

Most of the ideas bandied about how to combat deflation are purely academic. Furthermore, those ideas ignore consequences and have not been tested in real world applications. Right now however, I am more interested in what the Fed cannot do, simply because such discussion refutes widely held beliefs about what people think the Fed can do.

Here is a document from the Federal Reserve about Monetary Policy When the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate is Zero.

The Federal Reserve could also provide stimulus to aggregate demand either by purchasing U.S. agency or private-sector debt (Section 6) or by extending loans in which such debt was used as collateral (Section 7). In both types of operations, the Federal Reserve Act limits the actions of the Federal Reserve.

For example, there is no express authority for the Federal Reserve to purchase corporate bonds or equities. And in making loans, the Federal Reserve seems to be restricted in taking onto its balance sheet the credit risk of private-sector nondepository entities.

Restrictions in the Federal Reserve Act all but rule out "money rains" by the Federal Reserve.
No Helicopter Drop By The Fed

The key point above is there is no grounds for a "helicopter drop" by the Fed. Furthermore, the Fed would not take such action even if they could. The Fed is a private business, it would not give away free money even if it could, just as Pizza Hut is not going to give away free pizzas to everyone for a year.

It is amazing the powers people attribute to the Fed. Close examination shows those powers are nothing but a smoke and mirrors Ponzi scheme that blows bigger bubble after bigger bubble, crisis after crisis.

The Fed has indeed wrecked the economy by its serial bubble blowing activity. However, the Fed is powerless to "fix" it, because the only "fix" the Fed has is the very same Ponzi scheme of repetitive bubble blowing that wrecked it. The only legitimate long term fix is to abolish the Fed and let the free market cure the problem over time. Further attempts by the Fed or Congress to "fix" things will only make matters worse.

All Ponzi schemes eventually implode, and this Ponzi scheme of repetitive bubble blowing is imploding now. History shows that once confidence is lost in the Ponzi scheme by either the lenders or borrowers, it is all over. Well guess what: It's all over. Those expecting a "helicopter drop" of capital from the Fed to fix this mess will be sadly mistaken.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
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Zum letzten Abschnitt folgender Link:

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Ponzi
 

 

RSI unter 30 war bis jetzt immer ein Kauf, wie Dein Chart verrät.

Aktuell: unter 30...

Zumindest für eine techn. Erholung sollte das gut sein.  

Zwar rekrutieren sich die Neubären eher aus dem neutralen Lager, dennoch...
Interessant ist, dass es schon lange nicht mehr so wenige Neutrale gab.

 

 

 

Ford F-series truck

People in other countries have trouble understanding this peculiar fact about America. In other places, you have to pay people to drive trucks. Here, we actually like driving them. Lots of them.

In fact, the best-selling passenger vehicle in America isn't a car. It's a pickup. As it has been for more than a decade, the top selling passenger vehicle is the Ford F-series truck.

There are a few things besides mere consumer preference that work in the F-series' favor. For one thing, its sales numbers include a significant number that are sold for actual professional users.

The other is that the F-series badge goes on a wide range of trucks from the basic F-150 to the big, burly Super Duty truck shown here.

If General Motor's pickups didn't get split between two nameplates - Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra - GM would actually carry away the "Top-selling vehicle" bragging rights.

 

hier gehts weiter: http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/autos/0712/...f_best_cars//3.html

 

 

 

http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/07/pf/saving/toptips/...ion=money_latest
sicher reichlich vereinfacht,so dass alle es verstehen ggg
1. Know the terms

The back of the envelope calculation that some economists make to determine a recession is two back-to-back quarters of negative GDP growth. But we went right to the source - the folks who are the recession referees.

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, a recession is a broad-based economic decline that lasts more than a few months. This decline should be visible in the GDP (this is the value of goods and services the U.S. produces in a given year) income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.
2. Get the indicators

Declaring a recession is like looking in a rearview mirror. It can take 6-18 months to declare a recession. Whether or not we actually do have a recession is still being debated. But if the economy took a nosedive now we may not even know we're in a recession until July at best.

As a consumer, there are a few indicators you can use. First, is the economy producing jobs? We got news just last week that it's not. If you know people who are losing their jobs and can't find another one, it's a sign of economic slowdown.

If prices aren't rising that fast, it may be another sign of a recession says Hugh Johnson of Illington Advisors. The Fed's trend of lowering rates is also a sign that policymakers are worried about economic weakness.

Take a look at the personal savings rate that comes out from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. If people are saving more, it generally means they're worried about the economy says Ken Mayland of Clearview Economics.

And finally, you have to look at catalysts. The recessions of 2001, 1990 and 1981 were preceded by bubbles - real estate bubbles, tech stock bubbles - inflation bubbles. This time, the concern is a housing bubble. A recession may be the economy's way of relieving this excess.
3. Look at the bigger picture

Here's the good news. Recessions have become shorter and milder since 1981 when the recession lasted 16 months. The recessions in 1990 and 2001 lasted about eight months and there were relatively small declines in the economy. Economists say that's because the Fed has been more proactive in preventing problems. And given the recent spate of Fed cuts, there is some reassurance out there.
4. Stay ahead of the game

The number one thing you want to do is to raise your profile at work. Make sure your boss knows your value. Make it a point to work on the best and most high-profile projects. Renew connections. Join sites like Linkedin.com or post your professional profile at Ziggs.com, a professional networking website.

Make sure your emergency fund if you don't have 3-6 months of living expenses tucked away. Lock in your mortgage with a 30-year fixed loan if you can afford to....  

unter dem Titel woran erkennt man eine Rezession ist im folgenden Thread unter Posting 2 ein interessanter Artikel.

http://www.ariva.de/...ender_t237191?search=permanent%20joe%20spender

 

gehört hier zwar nicht rein ,aber ist vielleicht doch interessant oder eher witzig
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/...08010701413.html
....As it turns out, the president sees himself as quite the heroic figure.

"I can predict that the historians will say that George W. Bush recognized the threats of the 21st century, clearly defined them, and had great faith in the capacity of liberty to transform hopelessness to hope, and laid the foundation for peace by making some awfully difficult decisions," Bush told Yonit Levi of Israel's Channel 2 News. Bush held several interviews with Middle Eastern journalists last week in anticipation of his trip to the region, which starts tomorrow.

"When he needed to be tough, he acted strong, and when he needed to have vision he understood the power of freedom to be transformative," Bush said of himself to Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot.

As for the people of the Middle East, Bush told Hisham Bourar of al-Hurra Television: "I would hope that they would say President Bush respects my religion and has great love for the human -- human being, and believes in human dignity."

The Bush record, the president told Nadia Bilbassy-Charters of al-Arabiya Television, is one of liberation -- "liberation, by the way, not only from dictatorship, but from disease around the world, like HIV/AIDS or malaria."...
Bush's self-image contrasts sharply with his image among his fellow Americans. More than 60 percent of Americans disapprove of the job is doing, and a CNN poll in November found that 58 percent of Americans rated Bush either a poor president, a very poor president, or the worst president ever.

und danach folgen die originalen Interviews......  

damit wurde heute auch das INTRADAY ATH von 1980 übertroffen, obwohl der Ölpreis gestern doch etwas deutlicher nachgelassen hat.  

t zu haben scheint - sodass man aktuell 1:1 vom steigenden goldpreis auch als € anleger partizipiert. Das war's aber auch schon mit meiner Jubelei zum ATH.

Zum einen wil ich gelernt habe, dass überschwengliche Gewinne von heute, die Verluste von morgen sind - und zum anderen, weil das beste Zeit von Gold erst kommen wird (oilpeak) - was auch immer mittelfristig vorher noch passieren wird.  

zumindest mal für die nächsten Wochen bzw. Monate.

Ich muss mich mehr um Job & Privatleben kümmern - und werde meine ID irreversibel bei ARIVA löschen.

werde mich FRÜHESTENS (neue ID - aber erkennbar) dann melden, WENN eines der folgenden Ereignisse eintritt:

- Gold steigt auf über 950 USD (900 wäre zu früh)
- Ölpreis steigt auf über 120 USD
- "richtiger" Börsencrash
___________________________________________

Da jedes der 3 Szenarien nur unter sich besonders zuspitzenden Entwicklungen in 2008 passieren wird, noch ein 4.Ereignis, ab wann ich mich wieder neuregistrieren würde:

- wenn meine HP (Thema Ölpeak) fertig würde (sicher nicht vor April). Würde mich dann freuen als erstes von die kristischen Teilnehmer in diesem Bärenthread Comments zu meiner hoffentlich bald realsierten HP zu bekommen.

Danke nochmal an AL & alle hier, werde weiterlesen. Leider fehlt mir ein bisschen die Disziplin, das posten hier in EInklang mit Job & Privatleben zu bringen.

Alles Gute für 2008 !  

Die gestrige Future-Pump-Aktion (# 12862) gab den Bären schon mal einen Vorgeschmack, was das Treffen von Bush mit dem Plunge Protection Team (PPT) am letzten WE für Wirkungen zeitigen kann. Interessanterweise kann man Charttechnik darüber vergessen. Nach deren Regeln wurden wichtige Unterstützungen wie die 200-Tage-Linie im SP-500 bereits bei hohem Volumen durchbrochen. Alle Signale schreien: "Sell" - und das Schulbuch sagt: "Wir fallen weiter". Doch wenn das PPT dazu "Nein" sagt, dann muss an das Schulbuch halt noch das Kapitel "Sondersituationen" rangehängt werden. Das ist besonders fatal für Shorts, die nach obigen Regeln nun volle Kanne nach dem Trendbruch eingestiegen sind.

Boss des PPT ist übrigens US-Finanzminister Paulson, Ex-Goldman-Sachs, und Heli-Benny ist natürlich auch mit dabei, wenn demnächst die Scheine wieder munter flattern.

In britischen Zeitungen wie dem "Telegraph" wird darüber sehr viel freimütiger - und sarkastischer - berichtet als in USA.

---

Telegraph UK
Bush convenes Plunge Protection Team
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Last Updated: 12:05am GMT 08/01/2008

Bears beware. The New Deal of 2008 is in the works. The US Treasury is about to shower households with rebate cheques to head off a full-blown slump, and save the Bush presidency. On Friday, Mr Bush convened the so-called Plunge Protection Team for its first known meeting in the Oval Office. The black arts unit - officially the President's Working Group on Financial Markets - was created after the 1987 crash.

It appears to have powers to support the markets in a crisis with a host of instruments, mostly by through buying futures contracts on the stock indexes (DOW, S&P 500, NASDAQ and Russell) and key credit levers. And it has the mean to fry "short" traders in the hottest of oils.

The team is led by Treasury chief Hank Paulson...

(trifft sich ja prächtig, dass der US-Finanzminister dem PPT vorsteht ;-)) - A.L.)

..., ex-Goldman Sachs, a man with a nose for market psychology, and includes Fed chairman Ben Bernanke [Heli-Benny darf da auch nicht fehlen] and the key exchange regulators.

[Ich könnte mir sogar vorstellen, dass das PPT unter Paulson den Trendbruch sogar absichtlich zuließ, um möglichst viele Shorts als Kanonenfutter einzusammeln - A.L.)

Judging by a well-briefed report in the Washington Post, a mood of deep alarm has taken hold in the upper echelons of the administration. "What everyone's looking at is what is the fastest way to get money out there," said a Bush aide.

Emergency measures are now clearly on the agenda, apparently consisting of a mix of tax cuts for businesses and bungs for consumers. Fiscal action all too appropriate, regrettably.

We face a version of Keynes's "extreme liquidity preference" in the 1930s - banks are hoarding money, and the main credit arteries of the financial system remain blocked after five months.

"In terms of any stimulus package, we're considering all options," said Mr Bush. This should be interesting to watch. The president is not one for half measures. He has already shown in Iraq and on biofuels that he will pursue policies a l'outrance once he gets the bit between his teeth.

The only question is what the president can manage to push through a Democrat Congress.

The Plunge Protection Team - long kept secret [!!] - was last mobilised to calm the markets after 9/11. It then went into hibernation during the long boom.

Mr Paulson reactivated it last year, asking the staff to examine "systemic risk posed by hedge funds and derivatives, and the government's ability to respond to a financial crisis", he said.

It seems he failed to spot the immediate threat from mortgage securities and the implosion of the commercial paper market. But never mind.

The White House certainly has grounds for alarm. The global picture is darkening by the day. The Baltic Dry Index has been falling hard for seven weeks, signalling a downturn in bulk shipments. Singapore's economy contracted 3.2pc in the final quarter of last year, led by a slump in electronics and semiconductors.

The Tokyo bourse kicked off with the worst New Year slide in more than half a century as the Seven Samurai exporters buckled. The Topix is down 24pc from its peak. If Japan and Singapore are stalling, it is a fair bet that China's efforts to tighten credit are starting to bite. Asia is not going to rescue us. On the contrary.

Keep an eye on Japan, still the world's top creditor by far, with $3 trillion in net foreign assets. The Bank of Japan has been the biggest single source of liquidity for the global asset boom over the last five years. An army of investors - Japanese insurers and pension funds, housewives and hedge funds borrowing at near zero rates in Tokyo - have sprayed money across the Antipodes, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, Iceland, Latvia, the US commercial paper market and the City of London.

The Japanese are now bringing the money home, as they always do when the cycle turns. The yen has risen 13pc against the dollar and 12pc against sterling since the summer. We are witnessing the long-feared unwind of the "carry trade", valued by BNP Paribas in all its forms at $1.4 trillion.

The US data is now relentlessly grim. Unemployment jumped from 4.7pc to 5pc - or 7.7m - in December, the biggest one-month rise since the dotcom bust and clear evidence that the housing crunch has spread to the real economy.

"At this point the debate is not about a soft land or hard landing; it is about how hard the hard landing will be," said Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics at New York University.

"Financial losses and defaults are spreading from sub-prime to near-prime and prime mortgages, to commercial real estate loans, to auto loans, credit cards and student loans, and sharply rising default rates on corporate bonds. A severe systemic financial crisis cannot be ruled out. This will be a much worse recession than the mild ones in 1990-91 and 2001," he said.

Sovereign wealth funds stand ready to rescue banks, as they have already rescued Citigroup and UBS. But as Moody's pointed out this week, the estimated $2,500bn in lost wealth from the US house price crash is more than the entire net worth of all the sovereign wealth funds in the world.

Add fresh losses as the property bubbles pop in Britain, Ireland, Australia, Spain, Greece, The Netherlands, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, as they surely must unless central banks opt for inflation (which would annihilate bonds instead, with equal damage), and you can discount $1,500bn in further attrition.

Not even a Bush New Deal can hold back the post-bubble tide that is drawing in across the globe. What it can do is buy time. Fortunately for America - and the world - the US budget deficit is a healthy 1.2pc of GDP ($163bn). Washington has the wherewithal to fund a fiscal blitz.

Britain has no such luxury. Our deficit is 3pc of GDP at the top of the cycle. Gordon Brown has shut the Keynesian door.  

echt schade

http://www.ariva.de/...n_OeL_Peak_t308214?search=Casaubon#jump3873526  

Kann mir, bitte schön, jemand mal sagen, was da eigentlich gespielt wird ?

 

 

Industrieaufträge nehmen überraschend zu

 

der Vollständigkeit halber hier die Stellungnahme von Mish zu dem Artikel von Ambrose Evans-Pritchard ,der hier im Thread auch zu lesen ist
Several people have asked me to comment on Crisis may make 1929 look a 'walk in the park'.
   As central banks continue to splash their cash over the system, so far to little effect, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard argues that things risk spiralling out of their control

   "Twenty billion dollars here, $20bn there, and a lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates for Christmas. Buckets of liquidity are being splashed over the North Atlantic banking system, so far with meagre or fleeting effects.

   Quietly, insiders are perusing an obscure paper by Fed staffers David Small and Jim Clouse. It explores what can be done under the Federal Reserve Act when all else fails.

   Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become "unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit". A vote by five governors can - in "exigent circumstances" - authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk. This clause has not been evoked since the Slump."

A Little Acid Test for Fed "Liquidity"

There are several errors in that story that warrant further discussion. Let's start with the idea that $20 billion here $20 billion there amounts to some mammoth increase in liquidity.

Proof that these liquidity ideas are way overdone can be found in John Hussman's article A Little Acid Test for Fed "Liquidity".http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc071217.htm
The above chart is strike one for anyone that thinks the Fed is providing massive amounts of liquidity to the system.
Was the "lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates" that much of a Christmas gift?

I confess. This number was so huge that at first I thought it meant something. Subsequent digging has changed my mind. http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc071224.htm

Again, if you want to track these, here's a link to the source data. About half-way down the page is a link to a data file of historical ECB operations (note that the amounts reported are in thousands of euro).http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html
That is strike two for anyone who thinks the Fed and the ECB have been injecting massive amounts of liquidity.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard writes: "Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become "unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit". A vote by five governors can - in "exigent circumstances" - authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk."

The document from which the above paragraph comes is called The Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized under the Federal Reserve Act.http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/feds/2004/200440/200440pap.pdf
Once again, the Fed's ability to do something is dramatically overstated. For starters, it should be clear we are talking about liquidity not capital. Secondarily, it is clear that that liquidity is for credit worthy borrowers only.

Excitement over Section 13 (3) is much ado over nothing just as this excitement over liquidity drops by the Fed and ECB via repo actions is much ado over nothing.
Most of the ideas bandied about how to combat deflation are purely academic. Furthermore, those ideas ignore consequences and have not been tested in real world applications. Right now however, I am more interested in what the Fed cannot do, simply because such discussion refutes widely held beliefs about what people think the Fed can do.

Here is a document from the Federal Reserve about Monetary Policy When the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate is Zero.http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200051/200051pap.pdf
The key point above is there is no grounds for a "helicopter drop" by the Fed. Furthermore, the Fed would not take such action even if they could. The Fed is a private business, it would not give away free money even if it could, just as Pizza Hut is not going to give away free pizzas to everyone for a year.

It is amazing the powers people attribute to the Fed. Close examination shows those powers are nothing but a smoke and mirrors Ponzi scheme that blows bigger bubble after bigger bubble, crisis after crisis.

The Fed has indeed wrecked the economy by its serial bubble blowing activity. However, the Fed is powerless to "fix" it, because the only "fix" the Fed has is the very same Ponzi scheme of repetitive bubble blowing that wrecked it. The only legitimate long term fix is to abolish the Fed and let the free market cure the problem over time. Further attempts by the Fed or Congress to "fix" things will only make matters worse.

All Ponzi schemes eventually implode, and this Ponzi scheme of repetitive bubble blowing is imploding now. History shows that once confidence is lost in the Ponzi scheme by either the lenders or borrowers, it is all over. Well guess what: It's all over. Those expecting a "helicopter drop" of capital from the Fed to fix this mess will be sadly mistaken.  

http://seekingalpha.com/article/...r-a-fed-rescue-as-bear-stearns-hit

Arme Moderatorin.  

auch von mir, biomüll! Mach's gut und danke für den Fisch!