Der USA Bären-Thread

http://money.cnn.com/2007/12/10/markets/...cks_2008.fortune/index.htm
By Jon Birger, senior writer
10 Aktien für 2008
(Fortune Magazine) -- We'll say this for the U.S. economy: It can take a punch.

Consider the blows it has absorbed just this year. The worst real estate crash since the Great Depression. Pow! Oil prices up from $50 to $90 a barrel since last January. Bam! A subprime mortgage mess metastasizing into a full-blown credit crisis, with banks swallowing billions in losses and cutting back on loans. Baff!

Yet through all the punishment, the economy has barely flinched. "I'm floored by how resilient it has been," says veteran stock strategist Ed Yardeni of Oak Associates. "Had you told me at the beginning of the year this was going to happen, I doubt I would have been very optimistic."

That's why forecasting 2008 is so difficult. History tells us that oil shocks, real estate crashes, and banking crises are harbingers of downturns. Confidence has already plunged as consumers have been pinched by rising energy prices and falling home values.

October saw another bad omen: a decline in discretionary purchases such as books and electronics. Observes Merrill Lynch economist David Rosenberg: "You have to go back to the 1990-91 recession to find a time that this trend has been so weak heading into the holiday shopping season."

Despite all that, the U.S. economy expanded 3.8% and 4.9% in the second and third quarters, respectively - up from 2.4% and 1.1% during the same periods in 2006. That's right: For all the bad headlines, the American economy appears to be getting stronger.
How can that be? The short answer is globalization. Rapid expansion in the developing world - not just in China and India but in Russia, Brazil, and Turkey, for example - has created new markets for U.S. goods and services, and a weak dollar has made them relatively cheap.

As a result, 44% of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies' revenues comes from abroad, up from 32% in 2001. S&P expects that figure to rise to 50% in 2008. Says Bob Doll, who helps manage some $1.3 trillion as chief investment officer for BlackRock: "The boom in exports is almost as big a positive as housing is a negative."

The bottom line: We think the U.S. economy will slow in 2008 but narrowly miss an outright recession. We expect the overall stock market to bounce around, as it did this year, and deliver anemic single-digit returns. Of course, some stocks will thrive even when the market as a whole is on the ropes. After interviewing dozens of analysts and money managers and poring over reams of Wall Street research, we've identified ten stocks we believe are poised for big gains in 2008.(Details zu finden unter obigem Link)
-Annaly Capital Management
-Berkshire Hathaway
-Dick's Sporting Goods
-Electronic Arts
-Genentech
-General Electric
-Jacobs Engineering
-Merrill Lynch
-Petrobras
-St. Joe und wenn man das detailliert liest ,kann es klingt es ganz überzeugend.....  

und da sieht es magerer aus:
       02.§[RUTH] Ruth's Chris Steak House previously saw 0.5% to 1.5% rise
6:32 AM ET, Dec 20, 2007 - 2 minutes ago

       03.§[RUTH] Ruth's Chris Steak House sees FY EPS 79c to 81c
6:32 AM ET, Dec 20, 2007 - 2 minutes ago

       04.§[RUTH] Ruth's Chris Steak House previous EPS view 92c-95c
6:32 AM ET, Dec 20, 2007 - 2 minutes ago

       06.§[RUTH] Ruth's Chris Steak House FY comp. sales to be flat

Dazu passt auch diese Meldung gut:
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Darden Restaurants Inc (DRI.N: Quote, Profile, Research) shares fell more than 19 percent on Wednesday to their lowest level in more than two years, dragging down other restaurant shares, after being downgraded by analysts following disappointing earnings and a lowered growth target.

Darden, which owns the Olive Garden and Red Lobster chains, cited the weak U.S. dollar, higher costs and fewer customers for the lower-than-expected results.  

Der Economist sieht eine Dollar-Stabilisierung und auch einen Anstieg auf $1,33:1€ bis 2009. Kann, muss aber nicht. Ich persönlich würd' mich freuen, wenn die Taktik des Verbilligens meiner US-Werte und die Hoffnung auf kursbedingt steigende Dividendenerlöse aufgeht. Bislang hab ich diesbezüglich allerdings noch jeden Wert teurer eingekauft, als das jeweils aktuell möglich wäre.

 

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The dollar and the world economy

Dec 19th 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Why the dollar should stabilise next year

The global economy, already beset by financial market turmoil and slowing US growth, is now confronted by the risk that the gradual decline of the US dollar could run out of control. In addition to the weakening outlook for the US, there are fears that central banks could suddenly move to dump their huge dollar reserves or that Middle Eastern countries could abandon their pegs to the dollar. Our baseline scenario is for the dollar to stabilise in 2008 before beginning to appreciate. But a US recession or other factors that could lead to a loss of confidence in the dollar pose major risks to this scenario. A dollar crisis would be very damaging for the global economy, making the expected slowdown much deeper and more protracted.

Dollar decline

 

The financial market turmoil that begun in August has put serious pressure on the US dollar: by end-November the dollar had fallen by some 6% since August against a trade-weighted currency basket tracked by the US Federal Reserve. Dollar weakness is not a new issue: the currency has lost a quarter of its value against a broader range of currencies over the past five years. However, there are fears that, in the current environment, the dollar's decline could turn into a rout.

Much of the reason for the dollar's decline lies in economic fundamentals: notably the large US current-account deficit, which reached 6.2% of GDP in 2006. Dollar weakening has been accelerated partly by the cyclical divergence between the US (where growth is weakening owing to the fallout from the subprime mortgage mess) and the rest of the world (where growth remains robust), and by the associated widening of interest rate differentials following cuts by the US Federal Reserve. The subprime debacle and ensuing turmoil on credit markets have also hit the dollar because uncertainty centres on dollar-denominated assets and confidence in the resilience of the US financial system has been shaken. Net private capital inflows into the US have weakened sharply since August.

Finally, current difficulties have reinforced some investors' worries about the longer-term role of the dollar as a reserve currency in the global economy. Immediate concerns are that central banks and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) sitting on huge piles of dollars, such as China and several oil producers, could dump their dollar assets out of fear of capital losses from dollar depreciation. Similarly, there are concerns that the dollar could be hit if those central banks that currently peg their currencies to the dollar shift to different exchange-rate regimes. One reason for this, particularly for countries in the Middle East and for China, would be to ease inflationary pressures that are building as the US currency weakens.

Road to recovery

 

In our baseline scenario for the global economy, the dollar is likely to stabilise in 2008 before beginning to recover later in the year--we forecast an average rate against the euro falling from US$1.37€1 in 2007 to US$1.46:€1 in 2008, before recovering to US$1.33:€1 in 2009. The US currency is likely to continue to weaken against the yen into the medium term, but this is mainly because the yen will appreciate strongly as Japanese interest rates rise and the carry trade unwinds.

 

The main reason to expect the dollar's fortunes to improve is that by late 2008 the current hysteria on global markets should have abated, and US growth should be beginning to emerge from a period of weakness, allowing for calmer consideration of the relative strengths of the US economy. Robust productivity growth in a global context (even allowing for concerns over weaker US productivity growth in the coming years) and comfortable demographics support the case for a relatively bright long-term outlook and hence provide good grounds for the dollar to strengthen. Once the US's economy's downturn and weaker dollar have reduced the US external imbalance, we expect the currency to appreciate into the longer term.

 

It is likely to be supported in 2008 by interest rate dynamics. We believe that markets exaggerate the case for monetary policy easing in the US next year and the Fed funds rate will still stand at 3.75% at the end of 2008. This would lead to some strengthening pressure for the dollar, as investors readjust their interest rate expectations. The US currency may also be supported against the euro by an interest rate cut by the European Central Bank, although the uncertainty about this is high.

 

Finally, we believe that a large-scale shifting of public foreign reserves out of the dollar is highly unlikely. The investment horizon of these entities tends to be long-term, and, as we have argued, over the longer-term the dollar should appreciate. Even in so far as central banks and SWFs with large US dollar assets are concerned about short-term losses, they will be held back by concerns that any disposal of the currency would trigger even bigger capital losses on their remaining stock of US dollar assets. Moves away from a dollar peg should also have only a limited impact on demand for the dollar—we currently do not expect the Gulf states to re-peg—and even if they did, they would probably move to a basket of currencies dominated by the dollar, mitigating the impact on dollar reserve holdings.

Considerable risks

 

Nevertheless, the risks of the dollar's decline into 2008 turning into a rout are high. Most importantly, there are downside risks to our US growth forecasts, notably from a continuation of the recent financial market turmoil beyond what we currently expect, or from a greater-than-expected impact on consumer demand from the correction in the US housing market. The dollar will also remain exposed for much of 2008 to nervousness among investors about the US current-account deficit and about shifts in central bank and SWF holdings and in exchange rate regimes.

 

These factors could easily lead to a further sharp fall that could see the dollar clear the US$1.60:€1 threshold. Co-ordinated countermeasures by the G7 would probably put a floor under the dollar. Nevertheless, a full-blown dollar crisis, coming on top of the credit crunch and a weakening US economy, would be disastrous for the global economy.

 

A dollar slump would hit financial markets hard, and could force the Fed to raise US interest rates just as the economy was slowing, pushing the US into a protracted recession. At the same time, the euro would bear the brunt of the dollar's weakening: further euro appreciation would substantially reduce growth in Europe (we estimate that a 10% rise of the euro in nominal effective terms would cut growth in th euro zone by a third of a percentage point). The downturn for the global economy already expected as a result of recent financial market turmoil would therefore be much deeper and more protracted.

De-dollarfication

 

Even under our baseline scenario, in which the dollar avoids a sharp slump in the short term, there are substantial risks to the currency in the medium to long term. A period of below-potential domestic demand growth in the US will contribute to a moderate shrinking of the external deficit to around 4% in 2010 followed by a stabilisation in subsequent years, but this will still leave the deficit at a high level. Foreign investors will not accept low returns on their US holdings for ever, particularly as the US becomes a smaller part of the global economy and the supply of financial assets from emerging markets continues to develop, raising investment opportunities outside of the US. The dollar will therefore remain exposed to shifts in sentiment into the medium term.

 

Moreover, given structural shifts in the global economy, an end to the dollar's hegemonic status (as an international means of exchange and reserve currency of choice) may be inevitable in the longer term. This shift could be stable or disorderly—but it could yet occur gradually, and certainly need not imply a slump in the dollar in the short-term.

Nouriel Roubini | Dec 19, 2007

Slowly but surely the overall analysts' consensus is shifting towards a high likelihood of a US recession in 2008; while a few leading analysts are qualifying that prediction by arguing that the recession will be "mild" rather than severe the call is still one of a recession.

First Richard Berner of Morgan Stanley started to talk about a "mild" recession in 2008; then yesterday Bill Gross of Pimco also argued that the US is likely to experience a "mild" recession in 2008.Then today Larry Summers spoke of the high risk of a recession in 2008 and the possible risk that such a recession would be more severe than just mild unless the monetary and fiscal policy response to the current economic slowdown is not more forceful.

Add to the list Alan Greenspan that now believes that the odds of a recession are now about 50%; and Marty Feldstein (professor at Harvard, former CEA Chairman and head of the prestigious NBER) who thinks that a 2008 recession is certainly likely. And add to the list Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch who has effectively made a recession call, as well as Jan Hatzius who is one step short of formally calling for a US recession in 2008.

Also, while the consensus had been arguing until now that the rest of the world would "decouple" from the US the consensus has also recently shifted towards the "recoupling" view. Both Goldman Sachs and now Morgan Stanley are now referring to the 2008 as the "year of recoupling". This is not surprising; the decoupling view was always predicated on the view that the US would experience a soft landing. Now that a hard landing is becoming the more likely scenarios analysts are considering that trade, currency, financial, confidence, common shocks and other channels of interdependence will lead to a significant slowdown of global growth following the expected US hard landing, i.e. "recoupling".

Thus, at this point the debate is less on whether the US will experience a soft landing or hard landing but rather on how hard the landing will be, i.e. whether the coming recession will be "mild" or "severe". That is a radical change of the macro debate relative to a few months ago. The combination of a worsening housing recession, a severe liquidity and credit crunch, oil prices well above $90, a retrenchment of capex by the corporate sector, and a saving-less and debt-burdened US consumers being buffetted by a variety of negative shocks is making the recession as the leading scenario for the US economy.

As Summers pointed out today how severe the downturn will be will depend on how sensible the macro policy response - monetary, fiscal and regulatory - will be. So far it is not clear that US policy makers and other G7 policy makers are fully aware of the significant downward risks to growth. There is still the view among them that this is a soft patch of growth and that growth closer to potential will resume in the second half of 2008. That view increasingly looks like wishful thinking.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/233543  

FTD
Das Kapital
Die Bewertung der US-Broker bleibt obskur

Es wird langsam langweilig: die nächste Riesenabschreibung einer Investmentbank, die nächste Kapitalspritze von einem strategischen Investor, die nächste Erholungsrally der Aktie, da das Schlimmste (diesmal bei Morgan Stanley) jetzt wohl ausgestanden sein muss.

Schwer zu sagen, was die asiatischen Staatsfonds bei westlichen Finanzwerten zu suchen haben. Mitsprache und Fachwissen vielleicht. Wenigstens bei Morgan Stanley wird die China Investment Corporation trotz ihrer Einlage im Wert von 5 Mrd. $ oder 9,9 Prozent der Anteile indes keinen nennenswerten Einfluss auf die Geschäftsführung erlangen - vorgeblich zumindest. Und was die Expertise betrifft, sollten die Chinesen lieber genau überlegen, welche Finanztechniken sie überhaupt lernen wollen.

Oder kann es sein, dass die Staatsfonds nach dem Kursrückgang von Finanzaktien eine attraktive Bewertung wähnen? Dazu sollten sie zunächst wissen, dass US-Firmen ihre Aktien generell nur dann freiwillig hergeben, wenn etwas faul ist [man denke nur an den Blackstone-IPO - A.L.]; deutsche Unternehmen, die in den USA investiert haben, können ein Lied davon singen. Bezüglich der Bewertung von Brokern sind die Chinesen derweil vermutlich noch ein gutes Stück naiver als die westlichen Anleger. Und das will schon etwas heißen.

Gemessen an den Schätzungen für 2008 notieren die Wall-Street-Größen Goldman, Merrill, Morgan Stanley, Lehman und Bear Stearns zwar gerade mal mit dem sieben- bis neunfachen Gewinn. Allerdings suggerieren die Prognosen, dass den Kopfschmerzen von 2007 nicht etwa ein Kater folgt, sondern ein ungehemmter Fortgang der Party, die über die vergangenen Jahre in allen Geschäftssegmenten der Broker gleichzeitig gefeiert wurde.

Und so entspricht der für 2008 geschätzte Gewinn für die fünf Großen an der Wall Street zusammengenommen in etwa dem Niveau des Ergebnisses 2006. Dabei liegt es auf der Hand, dass der Kreditsause und Vermögenspreisinflation über die vergangene Dekade eine Kreditkrise folgt, die länger als ein, zwei Quartale anhält. An Rezession, ausdörrende Märkte oder Mega-Abschreibungen (weit über das Ramschhypothekensegment hinaus) will aber nach wie vor niemand denken. Selbst die Erfahrungen von 2001 und 2002, als der Gewinn der Wall-Street-Titanen um rund zwei Fünftel eingebrochen war, sind längst vergessen. Der Gewinn von 2006, der fast viermal so hoch war wie zehn Jahre zuvor, ist daher ein recht gewagter Anhaltspunkt. Das gilt umso mehr, als die Fed bei einem realen Leitzins von derzeit null kaum noch Munition hat, die nächste Kredit- und Vermögenspreisblase anzuregen.

....  

When the subprime mortgage market began to unravel late in 2006, global bond markets barely flinched. But when two Bear Stearns (BSC) hedge funds collapsed in June, the event sparked a global credit crisis that has yet to ease. New evidence sheds light on how those hedge funds—and their managers—became star players in the subprime bust, the biggest financial disaster in decades. The revelations also show how other players in the mortgage market adopted the Bear funds' tactics, collectively building a financing structure with many of the hallmarks of a pyramid scheme.
On Dec. 19, Barclays (BCS), which lent one Bear fund hundreds of millions, filed a lawsuit alleging fraud over misleading statements about the portfolio's health. Says a Bear spokesman: "We believe that any such lawsuit is unjustified and without merit."

Investigators also are asking why Ralph R. Cioffi, the funds' top manager, moved $2 million of his own $6 million investment in the hedge funds into another fund in early 2007 while simultaneously raising cash for the funds, trying to sell them to Cerberus Capital Management, and telling investors they couldn't redeem their shares until the end of June. People familiar with the situation at Bear stress that Cioffi, who left the firm the week of Dec. 10, was simply investing in a different Bear fund with which he was involved. Cioffi's lawyers did not return e-mails or calls seeking comment.
It's too soon to tell whether authorities will find any wrongdoing. But a BusinessWeek analysis of confidential hedge fund reports and interviews with lawyers, investors, and securities experts reveals just how pivotal a role Cioffi's funds played in the mortgage market's dramatic rise, dizzying peak, and disastrous fall.

The analysis shows Cioffi and his team developed a novel investment product to attract money-market funds—a new class of investor—to the mortgage market. Their innovation, a particularly aggressive form of collateralized debt obligation, or CDO, became the building blocks of the industry's push to keep growing for longer than it otherwise would have. After the market turned, it became clear the Cioffi money machine contributed to much of the $10 billion-plus in writedowns that Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) revealed in November. Fresh evidence also suggests Cioffi's team may have engaged in self-dealing by using the new CDOs to buy assets from the funds, artificially boosting returns. Citi and Bank of America declined to comment.

At the center of it all was the new breed of CDO pioneered by Cioffi and his team to tap into the $2 trillion universe of money-market accounts in which individuals and corporations stash their spare cash. Cioffi's CDOs, initially branded "Klio Funding," were entities that sold commercial paper and other short-term debt to buy higher-yielding, longer-term securities. The Klios were a win-win proposition for money-market funds. They paid a higher interest rate than the usual short-term debt. And investors didn't need to worry about the risky assets the Klios owned because Citigroup had agreed to refund their initial stake plus interest, through what's known as a "liquidity put," if the market soured. Cioffi engineered three such deals in 2004 and 2005, raising $10 billion in all.
What did Citigroup get for guaranteeing the Klios? For one thing, fees. The Klios were also a ready buyer of Citi's own stash of mortgage-backed securities and other debt. Citi probably never imagined it would have to make good on those guarantees because the underlying assets had the highest credit ratings.

Cioffi used the money from each deal to purchase billions in mortgage-backed securities and pieces of other CDOs for his three Klios. He bought many of the assets directly from the two Bear hedge funds he managed. The move also supplied the hedge funds with cash.
A Pyramid Structure

The Klios had another powerful feature: They allowed the Bear funds to lock in longer-term financing. Typically, hedge funds borrow for short periods of time, usually just days or weeks. Under the terms of the Klio deals, Cioffi could use the money for at least a year without having to worry that it would disappear overnight if the market got volatile. He discussed that advantage in an Apr. 25 call with hedge fund investors, boasting that the funding wasn't subject to market fluctuations.

The Klio structure spread rapidly as other hedge funds, CDO managers, and banks, including Barclays, Bank of America, and Société Générale, followed Cioffi's lead. From 2004 through 2007, Wall Street raised some $100 billion through these innovative CDOs, essentially creating a whole new way for the industry to finance risky subprime loans. That success, in turn, inspired copycat products such as structured investment vehicles, which also sold short-term debt. At their peak, in February, 2007, SIV assets hit $300 billion. Barclays declined to comment, but the company announced on Nov. 15 losses from CDO investments that it had been forced to take on its books. A Société Générale spokesman said it has transferred all of its risk to a large, global financial institution. In hindsight, CDOs and SIVs served as a foundation for a pyramid-like structure that Yale University economist Robert J. Shiller says occasionally arises from bull markets. As new investors arrive to the party, they bid up prices, boosting returns for those who got in earlier. The big gains attract more investors, and the cycle continues—as long as the players don't try to take out their money en masse.
The mortgage-market system played out much the same way. The new type of CDO lured a different tier of investors: money-market funds. The flood of fresh money made it even cheaper and easier for buyers to get mortgages. That, in turn, drove up home prices, holding off defaults and foreclosures. The process enriched the people who bought earlier in the boom and triggered more speculation........
Amid the market turmoil earlier this spring, Cioffi hoped the Klios would work their magic once again. In April, as losses at the funds began mounting, Cioffi set up another CDO, High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2007-1, which issued short-term paper and offered investors a money-back guarantee from Bank of America. Cioffi had raised nearly $4 billion by late May, making it the biggest CDO of the year, according to Thomson Financial (TOC).

Just as before, Cioffi used the money to buy assets from the hedge funds, perhaps to prop up the portfolios, which by then were on the brink of collapse. In an April conference call with the hedge funds' investors, Cioffi said the new CDO was part of his plan "to get the funds back on track to generate positive returns." It didn't work. Just weeks after the deal for the CDO closed, the Bear funds imploded, wiping out $1.6 billion of investors' money. (The fund into which Cioffi moved $2 million, Bear Stearns Structured Risk Partners, was up 6.5% as of Nov. 30.)

By autumn the practice of using CDOs to raise cash was dead. Money-market funds had stopped buying the short-term debt, and the credit markets were frozen.That forced Citigroup and Bank of America to make good on their guarantees to investors in Cioffi's CDOs, triggering big losses at the two banks.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/...5000402886_page_2.htm  

 

bilder gehen immer.

und schon mal ein sorry an die palm und handheld user. aber der artikel im link ist dafür umso lesenswerter.

 

www.sgipt.org/politpsy/finanz/schuldp/usa/usa0.htm

HANDELSBLATT, Donnerstag, 20. Dezember 2007, 15:41 Uhr
Subprime-Opfer

Bear Stearns mit dramatischem Einbruch

Die krisengeplagte US-Investmentbank Bear Stearns hat durch Milliardenabschreibungen im vierten Geschäftsquartal tiefrote Zahlen geschrieben. Damit verbuchte das Institut in diesem Zeitraum den ersten Verlust seiner Firmengeschichte, der weitaus höher ausfiel als erwartet. Bereits im Sommer hatte die Subprime-Krise Bear Stearns spektukulär belastet.


HB NEW YORK. Das Institut verlor nach Angaben vom Donnerstag am dritten Quartal netto 854 Mill. Dollar. Damit liefen die Geschäfte deutlich schlechter als an der Wall Street erwartet: Pro Aktie belief sich das Minus auf 6,90 Dollar, Analysten hatten lediglich mit einem Verlust von 1,80 Dollar je Papier gerechnet. Vor einem Jahr hatte Bear Stearns im gleichen Zeitraum noch einen Gewinn von 563 Mill. Dollar eingefahren. Im Zuge der Kreditkrise musste Bear Stearns im vierten Quartal Abschreibungen von 1,9 Mrd. Dollar vornehmen.

Auch im Gesamtjahr schnitt das Institut schlechter ab als von Experten erwartet. In dem am 30. November beendeten Gesamtjahr brach der Gewinn um fast 90 Prozent auf 233 Mill. Dollar ein. Im Vorjahr hatte die Investmentbank noch 2,1 Mrd. Dollar verdient. Die Aktie verlor vorbörslich rund 1,5 Prozent auf 89,20 Dollar.

Das Top-Management verzichtet angesichts des Misserfolgs in diesem Jahr auf seine Bonuszahlungen. Bear Stearns ist unter den Investmentbanken von der Kreditkrise mit am stärksten betroffen. Im Sommer waren zwei Hedge-Fonds der Bank spektakulär... [Auslassung für Mod].  

aktuell über 26 % im Minus (Chart oben ist 20 min. verzögert).

Bisherige Info:

"MBIA discloses $8.14 billion in CDO squared exposure"

 

30,6 Blns CDO-Exposure, Autsch
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/...2016880920071220?rpc=44

Credit Default Swaps auf MBIA +100bps nochmal Autsch
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/...2015840620071220?rpc=44  

Der Bondversicherer MBI (MBIA) hat offenbar arglistig verschwiegen, mit 8,14 Mrd. in komplexen Derivaten aus dem US-Hypo-Markt (CDO squares) investiert zu sein.

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MBIA shares slump 26% on concern over CDO squared exposure
By Alistair Barr
Last update: 10:21 a.m. EST Dec. 20, 2007

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- MBIA Inc. (MBI) shares slumped more than 26% on Thursday morning after the bond insurer disclosed $8.14 billion of exposure to complex credit products known as CDO squareds. About 85% of the collateralized debt obligations in question are other CDOs, with most of the rest being residential mortgage-backed securities, MBIA reported on its Web site. More than half of the underlying loans in the vehicles were originated in 2006 and 2007, the insurer also noted. Those are years of particularly lax underwriting standards in the mortgage industry. "We are shocked that management withheld this information for as long as it did," Zen Zerbe, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, wrote in a note to clients on Thursday. "MBIA simply did not disclose arguably the riskiest parts of its CDO portfolio to investors." MBIA shares were recently down 25% at $20.33. The stock had fallen further earlier in the day.

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Business Week, December 20, 2007
Munis: How Safe?

Bond insurers who back municipal bonds are on shakier ground. Here's what that might mean for your portfolio

by Ben Steverman

Municipal bonds are supposed to be a safe, boring investment for the risk-averse, but the credit crisis has shaken up even this quiet corner of the fixed-income market.

Rising concerns about bond insurers — also known as financial guaranty firms — have called into question a key layer of protection for many municipal bonds. That has spooked investors, who wonder if the munis they assumed were ultra-low-risk are still safe.

Bond experts say the vast majority of muni investments are still secure. However, individual investors should scrutinize their holdings carefully. Also, worries about bond insurance may complicate life for institutional investors and for government bodies that issue the bonds.

Insurers Undermined by Subprime Debt

On Dec. 19 ratings agency Standard & Poor's raised questions about the creditworthiness of six firms that insure bonds and other financial instruments. The credit rating of ACA Financial Group (ACAH) was downgraded to junk status, while S&P raised red flags about credit problems at other firms such as large insurers Ambac (ABK) and MBIA (MBI). (S&P, like BusinessWeek, is a unit of the The McGraw-Hill Companies (MHP).) On Dec. 14 another ratings agency, Moody's (MCO), had issued similar warnings.

It was insurance on risky debt that got these financial guaranty firms into trouble. A particular problem spot: securities backed by subprime mortgages.

Despite their ventures into this riskier arena, the companies still play an important role in the quieter municipal bond market: About half of muni bonds carry guaranty insurance, with the firms promising to back up the bonds if they default. While that protection remains in place, at least on paper, most muni investors no longer trust it. Even before the most recent news, many bonds were being traded as if they didn't have insurance at all.

[Wenn MBI eine 8,14 Mrd.-Position in hochriskanten Derivaten verschweigt, dürfte das Vertrauen künftig noch weiter schwinden - A.L.]

Experts say that questions about insurance make it far more important for investors to assess the underlying creditworthiness of the issuer, whether that is a state, a city, or another body.

Default Risk Is Still Slim

The good news? For the vast majority of these bonds, the chance of default is still "minuscule," says municipal fund manager Charlie Hill of T. Rowe Price (TROW). In fact, the record of muni bonds is so good that many have questioned whether insurance is necessary in the first place. The credit quality of bond issuers is much higher than that of the bond insurers.

For most investors, says Matt Fabian of Municipal Market Advisors, the lack of insurance "doesn't affect your ability to get repaid." This should be reassuring to most individual investors, who are mainly interested in the income muni bonds provide, not in trading them.

There is a reason to worry, however, if you invested in the rare, riskier parts of the muni bond market, like hospitals. Insurance did make bonds from those issuers more attractive. Thus, experts say, investors should closely scrutinize their holdings and make sure the underlying bonds are secure.

Much of the worry about bond insurers isn't new. The market had been expecting ratings agencies to act for months, so the impact of the moves had already affected the prices of many riskier bonds, Hill says.

Opportunities in Volatility

For those looking to load up on more muni bonds, the turmoil might present buying opportunities. Some high-quality bonds are available at lower-than-normal prices and higher-than-normal yields. "If you are a municipal investor, now might not be a terrible time to step up your investments," says Lawrence Jones, a fixed-income mutual fund analyst at Morningstar (MORN). Muni bonds are increasingly competitive with ultrasafe Treasury bonds, with the added benefit that muni bonds often offer tax advantages, Jones says.

"Volatility [in the muni market] creates an opportunity for individuals," Fabian says. However, "it makes it harder for institutions to invest."

Insurance simplified the muni market for hedge funds and other institutions, giving investors a quick way to categorize the risk from the thousands of cities, states, and other bodies that issue the bonds. With that no longer a sure thing, they may retreat from the space. It's not clear yet whether the bond insurance will ever play a key role in the market again. If the market loses confidence in insurance, the extra cost of its protection may seem increasingly unnecessary. If that's so, governments with riskier credit may see their borrowing costs increase somewhat.

Despite the trouble in the usually serene muni market, it's clear that muni bond investors will feel only a small amount of pain. That's the advantage of investing in a relatively risk-free investment, though these days, even the safest holdings are feeling the effects of the credit market's malaise.

Steverman is a reporter for BusinessWeek's Investing channel.

---

Der Autor Steverman lässt in seinem gegen Ende recht beschwichtigend klingenden Artikel leider unerwähnt, dass die Muni-Bonds von Orange County 1994 nach der Pleite dieses County (Teil von Kalifornien) wertlos wurden. In dem Jahr verlor der durchschnittliche US-Fond, der in Munis investierte, allein deshalb 6,7 % (nach Zinsen).

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4155/is_20041213/ai_n12571874

Mit anderen Worten: Wenn die Muni-Bond-Versicherer überflüssig wären, hätten sie gar nicht erst das Licht der Welt erblickt...  

CDOs sind collateral debt obligations - jener Schund, der die IKB und SachsenLB an den Rand des Abgrunds gebracht hat. "CDO squares" sind noch eine Nummer fauler, denn es handelt sich um "CDOs auf CDOs" - sozusagen Scheiße im Quadrat.

Dass MBI - der weltweit größte Bond-Versicherer - mit 85 % von 8,1 Mrd. in diesem Ultra-Schund investiert ist (was bislang verschwiegen wurde), ließ die Aktie heute um bislang 26 % abstürzen. Kommen Ratings-Downgrades, dürfte sich bald herausstellen, dass die "Bond-Versicherung" von MBI ähnlich unsolide ist wie das gesamte Subprime-Konzept. Ein weiterer Sargnagel im maroden Derivate-Kartenhaus...

MBIA, the world's largest bond insurer, also is vulnerable to $8.1 billion of CDOs backed by high-grade collateral, 85 percent of which are risky bonds known as CDOs of CDOs, or CDO squared. (Reuters)  

Jim Cramer Blog
Fed, Banking Hinges on MBI
By Jim Cramer
Street.com
12/20/2007 11:05 AM EST


So, Fed, how do you feel about the prospect that $100 billion in residential mortgage backed instruments that you thought were AAA-quality because of insurance are now worth a fraction of that, given the defaults we are seeing?

So Fed, what do you think of the fact that the bulwark that protects Washington Mutual (WM) and Citigroup (C) and Countrywide (CFC) from the reaper -- insurance -- is about to unravel?

Or are you too busy, Fed? Are you too busy, Andy Lacker, worried about the price of a Big Mac and fries and thinking that you can get that price of food down without creating a housing depression that could destroy the current banking system because there is no net interest margin that allows them to rebuild book value?

Are you too focused on the dollar, Fed people, that you don't realize that the monoline insurers often insure each other, so if MBIA (MBI) loses, they all lose and the banks will then have to mark their inventory down to realistic numbers, which will cause immediate capital shortages?

Do you, Bill Poole, know how the monolines work and how the residential mortgage-backed securities tranche system works and how the insurance is the linchpin that is about to be pulled?

Do you, New York Fed, with all of your nifty $20 billion auctions, realize that there are another 20 of these that need to be done and if you just lower the discount window to 50 basis points below the fed funds rate, you can forestall all of what is about to happen to banking?

Or are you too busy thinking that you can drive the price of gasoline down with higher interest rates?

I am aghast that this is happening, this fast-motion unraveling in the name of caution.

If MBIA doesn't get rescued by year-end, we will see an extraordinary moment where we will have to fast-forward the selling of a lot of great American institutions to the Chinese and Arabs. It might be our only choice.

Because the Fed is worried about the price of grain.

Random musings: CIT (CIT) selling the good to fund the bad? That's the way it looks to me! Twenty-five percent of CIT's business is student loans -- look at Sallie Mae -- and/or mortgages. All bad!

At the time of publication, Cramer was long Citigroup.

---

Wenn's nach Cramer geht, soll die Fed also die Zinsen weiter deutlich senken, insbesondere den Diskontsatz, und den Dollar zur Rettung des US-Bankensystems den Bach hinunterrauschen lassen.  

Die Antwort, warum bei MBI das überfällige Rating-Downgrade ausbleibt, liefert Cramer in meinem letzten Posting.

Kurzantwort: Die Folgen wären für US-Banken verheerend.  

Nur eine kleine Anmerkung am Rande zur Charttechnik.
Der langfristige Uptrend seit dem 2001-Recession-Low steht beim SPX gerade bei ca. 1425
(ich habe immernoch kein Chartprogramm...finde WISO Börse2000 einfach nimmer und habe all mein Geld bis auf die Miete in Puts gesteckt... arrrghh...).
Dorthin werden wir uns wohl auch nun bewegen.

Dieser Uptrend ist/war ja von enormer Wichtigkeit und an ihm ist der Gesamtmarkt bereits mehrfach deutlich nach oben abgeprallt, zuletzt August und November. Die FED hat hier bereits diverse Male die Marke durch extreme verbale und Zinsaktionen verteidigt.

Doch nur -es scheint die Dynamik nachzulassen.
Grund hier: [u.A.] Der von mir weiter oben gepostete Vertrauensmangel in die FED. Es ist nur zu offensichtlich, dass sie versucht mit viel Worten und wenig(er) Taten viel zu erreichen.

Sprich einfach gesagt: Sie reißt das Maul zu weit auf. Und das versteckt sie nicht gerade subtil. Die Anleger kommen ihr scheinbar doch langsam auf die Schliche.

Wie auch immer.
Wir sollten uns im Vorfeld darüber Gedanken machen, was anstehen könnte.
Denn Tatsache ist: in den letzten Jahrzehnten Börsengeschichte ist IMMER bei Erreichen kritischer Marken eine Reaktion von Seiten der FED gekommen.
Wie zufällig wurde das mit anderen Erklärungen gekoppelt und begründet.

Entweder hat Berni bei Erreichen der 1425 einen richtigen Kracher in petto, oder es wird kritisch.
Eigentlich WIRD er etwas unternehmen, er muss.
Oder glaubt ihr, er "kapituliert" und greift erst auf tieferem Niveau durch?

Fakt1: Wie wir ja bereits des öfteren festgestellt haben: Berni und alle Boardmitglieder sind dovish. Die Falken haben im Endeffekt nicht wirklich viel zu vermelden und sind eher so etwas wie ein Alibi. Bei der Festlegung der Discount-Rate haben nur die dovishen Boardmitglieder Abstimmungsrecht.

Fakt2: In der letzten Recession waren die ersten (ich glaube 5) Zinssenkungen um 50 Basispunkte. Hier könnte Berni noch Spielraum haben. Dollar gibt auch wieder (theoretisch) Spielraum.

Fakt3: Downgrades für Produkte, Banken und Versicherungen lassen sich nicht mehr länger verzögern.

Fakt4: Es hat sich ein gigantischer Downgradeberg angestaut!

Fakt5: Sollten sie alle innerhalb kurzer Zeit kommen: Minicrash.

Meine (spontane, unüberlgte) Ansicht:
Der Downgradeberg wird/könnte/muss eigentlich sehr bald auf uns einbrechen.
Erste größere Pleiten könnten daraus unmittelbar resultieren.

Hier könnte Berni strategisch die bislang nicht erfolgten und z.T. eingepreisten Zinssenkungen überraschend nachholen und einen Reversalday aus dem Crashday machen. So etwas hatten wir auch in der vergangenen Rezession, Greeny hats vorgemacht. Ich meine da waren innerhalb von 2 Wochen mal zwei außerplanmäßige Zinssenkungen um jeweils 50 Basispunkte, als der Kurseinbruch sich zum Crash auszudehnen drohte.
Bitte um Meinungen, nicht nur Bewertungen (auch wenn ich gerade keine Zeit zum Antworten haben werde, ich lese es!!)


 

ist ja wohl doch noch etwas mehr!   MBIA (MBI) said it has exposure to $30.6 billion of collateralized debt obligations it insures, including a large exposure to risky bonds known as CDO squared, sending its stocks plummeting 22 percent in early trading on Thursday.
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/...2016880920071220?rpc=44
   MBIA said in a statement released on its Web site on Wednesday that it has exposure to $30.6 billion of total CDOs net par that it insures. MBIA, the world's largest bond insurer, also is vulnerable to $8.1 billion of CDOs backed by high-grade collateral, 85 percent of which are risky bonds known as CDOs of CDOs, or CDO squared.

   "We are shocked that management withheld this information for as long as it did," said a report from Morgan Stanley, referring to the CDO-squared exposure.

   "This new disclosure completely changes our view of MBIA being a 'more conservative underwriter' relative to Ambac," said the Morgan Stanley report, which was co-written by analysts Ken Zerbe and Yoana Koleva.

Now let's see if the rating agencies react. Will they find yet another lame excuse to avoid a downgrade of MBIA? The question at hand is not whether MBIA is "AAA" or "AA" but whether or not MBIA is complete junk.

Another question is, if MBIA can withhold information like this for so long, who else is doing it?
....
ACA was delisted before the S&P reacted. That is how far they are behind the curve and already we can see the ratings agencies are way behind the curve again. I will once again repeat my statement: It's Time To Break Up The Credit Rating Cartel. They no longer serve any legitimate purpose.http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/  

ist aber nicht direkt vergleichbar, da die Spirale sich immer schneller dreht und eine finanz und bankenkrise leider keine internetkrise ist sondern fundamentaler

Das Geld der verganenen Jahre wird ja schliesslich immer noch geschuldet+zinsen Berni hat die summe weiter vergrössert tendenz steigend und steigend. die geldbubble ist nun ausgebubbelt.

berni kann ja eigentlich auch nix weiter machen ausser bremsen und zusehen, aber jetzt ist der bremshebel abgebrochen und da kann er nur noch split/mrd streuen bevor die karre an die wand fährt. wer will denn dieses im keller der fed produzierte split noch haben? (bzw zentralbanken allgemein)

in der ersten januar woche gehts ja normalerweise nochmal rauf, aber was ist 2007/08 denn normal? villeicht kann ich dann endlich meine freundin überzeugen sich von ihrem fond anteil zu trennen, aber sie hat leider so wenig ahnung und der nette herr kaiser von der xy- gesellschaft hat doch gesagt: alles wird gut.

also wenn ihr mich fragt, ich informier mich u.a. hier: stockday.aktienmarkt.net/docs/gold_magazine1207.pdf

sehr ausführlich und sowohl charttechnisch als auch fundamental hinterlegt - lesenswert.

@alter_schwede: die anleger werden hinter seine schliche kommen, auch wenn sie schon soooo offensichlich ist.

 

ja berni senk nochmal die zinsen bevor es weiter runter geht - entwerte dein geld weiter es ist eh nicht mehr zu retten,

aber bis zur wahl wirst du doch noch durchhalten mit ein paar mrd dollars, oder?

 

PS: ich bin immer noch kein antiamerikaner nur analyst im rahmen meiner möglichkeiten und für die vielen postings von den vielen usern möchte ich mich hier auch mal bedanken.

danke.

schade das die linealfraktion es nicht versteht.

 

 

Die 8,14 Mrd. bei MBI beziehen sich auf die "CDOs auf CDOs" (squared CDOs), die einen entsprechenden Teil der insgesamt 30 Mrd. in CDOs ausmachen. Die Quadratscheiße ist aber doppelt riskant.  

"eingestanden" ? ;-)  

Einfach unglaublich, aber die Fed-Boyz scheinen es mittlerweile kapiert zu haben, dass man z.B. bei Vergabe einer 300 Tausend Dollar Hypothek einfach mal die Bonität des Kreditnehmers überprüft, loooool.

Fed verschärft Regeln für Hypotheken-Kredite

Entsprechende Vorschläge, die den Markt für zweitklassige Hypothekenkredite strenger regulieren würden, verabschiedete das Direktorium der US-Notenbank einstimmig. Danach soll es Finanzinstituten künftig verboten sein, Kredite zu vergeben, ohne zu berücksichtigen, ob der Darlehensnehmer diese überhaupt zurückzahlen kann. "Unser Ziel ist es, eine verantwortungsvolle Hypothekenkreditvergabe zu fördern, zum Wohle der Verbraucher und der Wirtschaft", sagte Fed-Chef Ben Bernanke.

Außerdem wird von kreditgebenden Instituten künftig verlangt, dass sie die Angaben ihrer Kunden über die Einkommens- und Vermögensverhältnisse überprüfen. Darüber hinaus fordert die Fed, dass Kunden ihre Kredite künftig ohne Entschädigung vorzeitig zurückzahlen dürfen. Vorfälligkeitsentschädigungen sind nur noch unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen möglich. Die US-Notenbank übt in den USA teilweise aufsichtsrechtliche Funktionen über Banken aus. Daher haben ihre Vorschläge Gewicht.

http://www.ftd.de/boersen_maerkte/immobilien/...20Kredite/294549.html  

The global credit crunch claimed another victim today as Friends Provident suspended withdrawals from its £1.2bn property fund, prompting fears that billions of pounds held in unit trusts are now under threat.

The insurance group said that investors in the fund, numbering in total 118,000 people, will not be able to access their money for up to six months. It blamed the suspension on a "general sharp decline" in the commercial property market "brought about by the credit crunch".

The fund invests in office blocks and retail developments and usually holds a cash 'buffer' of around 10-15% of total assets to meet demands for withdrawals. But it said this morning that the cash buffer had fallen to 5% following a wave of redemptions, giving the company little choice but to suspend the fund.

Spokesman Jim Murdoch said the only alternative would have been a "firesale" of the fund's property investments which would be against the interests of policyholders.

Fears are now growing of a domino effect among other property funds as investors seek to withdraw their cash. The UK's biggest property fund, run by Norwich Union, revealed last week that its cash buffer has fallen to 7.5% but said this morning that trading is continuing as normal and that it is meeting requests for redemptions.
Around £15bn is invested in property unit trusts, with much of the money pouring in during 2006. Billions more are invested through pension funds held by millions of company employees.

The credit crunch has raised borrowing costs, making many debt-financed property deals no longer attractive. Fears are also growing that financial institutions hit by the credit crunch will axe employee numbers, reducing tenant demand in the crucial City office market in which most of the UK's property funds are invested. A downturn in consumer spending growth is also making retail shopping developments less attractive to investors........
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/dec/20/...iness.housingmarket  

18:00 (MEZ)
Ort: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Land: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika

Veröffentlichung des Philadelphia Fed Indices (Philadelphia Fed Survey) für Dezember 2007

Der Philly Fed Index notiert im Dezember bei -5,7. Erwartet wurde er im Bereich 6,0 bis 7,0. Im Monat zuvor hatte er noch bei 8,2 gestanden.  

Goldman Sachs, fresh from reporting a 22% rise in profits, has turned its attention to doing some damage to its rivals, notably Barclays.

Goldman analysts have downgraded Barclays from neutral to sell and added it to their conviction sell list, with a three month price target of 482p.

They say: " As we head into the first half of 2008, we believe Barclays will continue to suffer as the current credit concerns widen into other asset classes outside subprime. We see two impacts from this: first, estimates remain too high, and second, returns are forecast to fall as Barclays is unlikely to be able to utilise its capital as efficiently as before.

"We expect negative headlines on write-downs and underlying earnings trends across the sector to continue to weigh on Barclays and cause the market to reassess earnings expectations for Barclays Capital.....As a result, we forecast flat earnings for the group as a whole, helped by the rest of the group growing 9%

http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/markets/2007/12/..._fresh_from_repor.html  

Goldman Sachs auf die eigene "Conviction-Sell"-Liste setzen.

Wie Du mir, Sodomie.  

Wie kürzlich schon gepostet stehen z.Z. rund 90.000 municipal bonds ("munis") zur Rating-Überprüfung an - auf Anweisung der Generalstaatsanwaltschaften von Ohio und New York! Derzeit weisen diese noch durchgängig AAA- oder AA-Ratings auf, d.h. sie gelten als extrem sicher. Auf Grund dieser Ratings konnten sich Gebietskörperschaften und kommunale Einrichtungen in der Vergangenheit am Bondsmarkt sehr kostengünstig refinanzieren. Warum wurden aber dann auf fast 90 % dieser "risikolosen" Bonds Kreditausfallversicherungen abgeschlossen? Weil die Regelungen mit den Bond-Emis dies vorsehen/-sahen. Für beide Seiten ein sehr lukratives Geschäft nach der Devise: Besorgst du mir ein Spitzenrating, besorge ich dir über die Bondversicherung schöne Gewinne.

SECURITY CAPITAL ASSURANCE (SCA) - XL CAPITAL ASSURANCE (XLCA) - XL FINANCIAL ASSURANCE (XLFA)

Im August 2006 wurde das auf Bermuda ansässige Unternehmen SCA als Holding der ebenfalls dort ansässigen Gesellschaften XLCA (financial guarantee insurance) und XLFA (financial guarantee reinsurance) an die Börse gebracht. Auf der Website von SCA werden XLCA und XLFA als "subsidiaries" bezeichnet. XLCA bezeichnet jedoch SCA als "subsidiary".

Es gibt starke Verdachtsmomente, dass hinter diesen Firmen Goldman Sachs steht.