Der USA Bären-Thread
It's Different This Time, I Swear
by Charles Zentay
"There is always something different," former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan said with regard to market turmoil, "something that does not look like all the previous ones. There is never anything identical, and it is always a puzzlement."1
This time, however, the current Chairman Ben Bernanke has a plan. Bernanke, a long-time student of the Great Depression, believes that the cause of the Depression was that the Fed first overlent and then underlent, whipsawing the economy into catastrophe. The solution to prevent a future crisis is to flood the banking system with liquidity during times of instability, which is what Bernanke has begun to do to contain the fallout from the subprime mess. However, if Greenspan's statement is correct, there is never anything identical, and Bernanke might not have the situation as under control as he'd like to think.
According to Bernanke:
During the Depression years and for many decades afterward, economists disagreed sharply on the sources of the economic and financial collapse of the 1930s. In contrast, during the past twenty years or so economic historians have come to a broad consensus about the causes of the Depression...Deflation, like inflation, tends to be closely linked to changes in the national money supply, defined as the sum of currency and bank deposits outstanding, and such was the case in the Depression. Like real output and prices, the U.S. money supply fell about one-third between 1929 and 1933, rising in subsequent years as output and prices rose...
The Federal Reserve had the power at least to ameliorate the problems of the banks. For example, the Fed could have been more aggressive in lending cash to banks (taking their loans and other investments as collateral), or it could have simply put more cash in circulation. Either action would have made it easier for banks to obtain the cash necessary to pay off depositors, which might have stopped bank runs before they resulted in bank closings and failures... In the end, Fed officials decided not to intervene in the banking crisis, contributing once again to the precipitous fall in the money supply.2
Fast forward to 2007. In the summer of 2007, the beginnings of panic were setting in. Fear was spreading that subprime defaults would lead to a larger scale credit crunch. Banks and investors were selling assets whenever they could and prices were in decline for debt and stocks. Worse, volatility was spiking and liquidity was drying up. In other words, those who were desperate to sell were finding there were no buyers on the other end of the trade.
As a result, the Fed took action, along the lines of what Bernanke had outlined. In an emergency session, the Fed cut the discount rate by 50 basis points and lent lots of cash to banks. In addition, the Fed made several statements indicating they would take certain riskier assets from the banks as collateral. The immediate result was that fears subsided, markets calmed, and liquidity and trading returned to the system. At least for the time being.
Pundits have pointed to the origin of the 2007 panic as subprime defaults and their spread into other financial instruments. However, the cause may in fact be something much broader and in fact much simpler. For nearly the last twenty years, the amount of credit and money supply in the United States of America has grown tremendously. All this excess liquidity has inflated assets prices to a point where they require further injections of liquidity to sustain their high prices.
U.S. Money Supply
Source: Wikipedia
In 1960, the amount of M2 Money Supply in the U.S. was $298.2 billion. By 1980, it was $1,482.7. By 2000, $4,671.5. By July of 2007, it was $7,269.3.3 Since 2000, M2 Money Supply has been growing by 5% and 10% each year, much faster than GDP and population growth. Meanwhile, since 1987 (when Greenspan became head of the Fed), Total Credit Market Debt has grown from $13 trillion to $40 trillion and now accounts for over 300% of GDP. According to market analyst Marc Faber, "Non-farm corporate liabilities stood at 44% of National Income in 1946, compared to 101% at the end of 2001, total mortgage debt was 23% compared to 93%, security credit 3% versus 10%, state and local government debt 7% versus 17%, and total credit market debt 192% versus 359%."4
What caused all this excess liquidity? According to U.S. Congressman Ron Paul, the Fed "relentlessly lowered interest rates [in the 1990s and beyond] whenever growth slowed. Interest rates should be set by the free market, with the availability of savings determining the cost of borrowing money. In a healthy market economy, more savings equals lower interest rates. When savings rates are low, capital dries up and the cost of borrowing increases. However, when the Fed sets interest rates artificially low, the cost of borrowing becomes cheap. Individuals incur greater amounts of debt, while businesses overextend themselves and grow without real gains in productivity. The bubble bursts quickly once the credit dries up and the bills cannot be paid."5
Purple Arrows show the lowering of rates to avoid downturns
Yellow Arrow shows the trend towards lower rates over the 1990s and beyond
A recent BusinessWeek article summed up the problem with excess credit as follows: "Back in the fall of 2006, hedge fund manager Nandu Narayanan was thunderstruck by a relatively obscure economic metric, the ratio of credit to a country's gross domestic product. Back during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, Malaysia's ratio was an astonishing 220%, or $2.20 in debt for every dollar of economic output. Yet as 2006 drew to a close, the ratio in the U.S. climbed to an eye-popping 370% to 440%, depending upon how it was measured. 'To say that it was well north of anything ever seen in most countries of the world is a fact,' Narayanan says. 'Any rate rise in the U.S. was likely to cause big problems in the credit space.'"6
The growth in money supply and credit also threatens the value of the U.S. dollar. "The dollar loses value as the direct result of the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury increasing the money supply. Inflation, as the late Milton Friedman explained, is always a monetary phenomenon... The result is more dollars, both real and electronic - which means the value of every existing dollar goes down."7
Returning to Bernanke's analysis of the Great Depression, Bernanke notes:
speculators turned their attention to the U.S. dollar, which (given the economic difficulties the United States was experiencing in the fall of 1931) looked to many to be the next currency in line for devaluation. Central banks as well as private investors converted a substantial quantity of dollar assets to gold in September and October of 1931, reducing the Federal Reserve's gold reserves. The speculative attack on the dollar also helped to create a panic in the U.S. banking system. Fearing imminent devaluation of the dollar, many foreign and domestic depositors withdrew their funds from U.S. banks in order to convert them into gold or other assets. The worsening economic situation also made depositors increasingly distrustful of banks as a place to keep their savings... Long-established central banking practice required that the Fed respond both to the speculative attack on the dollar and to the domestic banking panics. However, the Fed decided to ignore the plight of the banking system and to focus only on stopping the loss of gold reserves to protect the dollar. To stabilize the dollar, the Fed once again raised interest rates sharply, on the view that currency speculators would be less willing to liquidate dollar assets if they could earn a higher rate of return on them. The Fed's strategy worked, in that the attack on the dollar subsided and the U.S. commitment to the gold standard was successfully defended, at least for the moment. However, once again the Fed had chosen to tighten monetary policy despite the fact that macroeconomic conditions--including an accelerating decline in output, prices, and the money supply--seemed to demand policy ease.8
So what happens now?
My question is simple.
I understand Bernanke's position that crisis should be avoided by flooding the system with liquidity. But what happens if financial markets begin to lose faith in the dollar just as this extra liquidity is needed? Wouldn't the extra liquidity drive the dollar even lower, thereby threatening the economy with inflation? If the panic were severe enough and therefore the extra liquidity required were excessive enough, could not a run on the dollar ensue? The possible scenario is that the Fed would avoid a bank run at the banking level, but it would cause a run at the currency level, which could potentially have results that were as disastrous - if not more so.
I am not forecasting a run on the dollar. I am simply bringing up what I believe to be a crucial policy question.
The Fed historically and today has dual directives that can be diametrically opposed to each other under certain circumstances. In the 1920s and 1930s, as Bernanke pointed out, "Long-established central banking practice required that the Fed respond both to the speculative attack on the dollar and to the domestic banking panics. However, the Fed decided to ignore the plight of the banking system and to focus only on stopping the loss of gold reserves to protect the dollar." Today, the Fed's dual directives are to keep the economy growing and to contain inflation.
Under the scenario I have outlined - a liquidity crunch accompanied by a falling dollar - you have a dilemma that is not easily solved because the Fed's claimed policies would be contradictory to each other. On the one hand, Bernanke would be flooding the markets with liquidity. On the other hand, the Fed would have to ensure against a falling dollar and inflation by reducing liquidity.
According to the New York Fed, "A stable level of prices is most conducive to maximum sustained output and employment. Also, stable prices encourage saving and, indirectly, capital formation because it prevents the erosion of asset values by unanticipated inflation. Inflation causes many distortions in the market... Inflation is sustained by excess money and credit in the economy... The Fed has to maintain an appropriate pace for the growth of money and credit -- one that will produce sustainable economic growth and price stability."9
Thomas Hoenig, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, talked about the lessons the Fed had learned from the massive inflation of the 1970s. "The first lesson is: do not let the inflation process get started. I think it is clear from the U.S. experience and in other countries as well, that once inflation starts to increase, it can easily get out of control. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that inflation is persistent and very difficult and costly to reverse once started. The experience of the past three decades also highlights the costs to the economy of letting inflation get out of hand and the benefits of lower inflation. We experienced major recessions in 1974-75 and 1981-82 as restrictive monetary policy attempted to break the inflationary cycle... The implication of this first lesson is that we can never be complacent about inflation, even in the best of times... The final lesson that I would draw from the inflationary experience of the last thirty years is: never lose sight of the long-run objective of price stability. As members of the FOMC have repeatedly stated, the broad objective of macroeconomic policy is to promote maximum sustainable economic growth. The main contribution of monetary policy to this objective is to achieve and maintain price stability."10
So Dr. Bernanke, if the dollar begins to fall as a credit crunch begins, which Fed directive gets more emphasis? Economic growth or price stability? During the 1930s, the Fed supported the dollar and price stability. That didn't seem to work. Should we try the other method this time? Of course, that would mean throwing out all the hard-learned lessons of the 1970s.
Or may, just maybe, the Fed shouldn't be focused on how to solve the consequences that ensue once overlending has occurred, but rather how to stop overlending from happening in the first place!
If the Fed did that, it would be different, I swear.
1 Alan Greenspan as quoted in "Maestro" by Bob Woodward
2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/...03022/default.htm
3 http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/fedstl/m2sl+1
4 http://www.ameinfo.com/16541.html
5 http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul354.html
6 http://www.businessweek.com/
7 Ron Paul: http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul354.html
8 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/...03022/default.htm
9 http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/fed/monpol.html
10 http://www.kc.frb.org/SpeechBio/hoenig49.htm
Charles Zentay
thinkinvest.blogspot.com
@Barbarossa:
Dann werde ich meine Strategie mal weiter posten. Nicht um den Guru zu spielen, sondern um Anregungen zum Mitdenken zu geben. Bislang ist die 1987/1998-Strategie ja voll (und zwar 100%) aufgegangen, mal sehen was draus wird. Nach dieser Strategie sollten wir übrigens die letzte gute Gelegenheit zum Shorten am Freitag gesehen haben. Von nun an geht es nur noch abwärts, und zwar von Tag zu Tag mehr!
Du erinnerst Dich, dass mein in letzter Zeit einträglichster, vor rund zwei Wochen im PTT-Thread mal wieder ausnahmsweise öffentlich geposteter Trade ein "Long" auf den Australdollar war (gegen Euro). Der Australdollar stürzte am Tag des großen Ausverkaufs vor zwei Wochen zusammen mit dem Neuseeland-Dollar extrem ab. Es gab in zwei Tagen Verluste von 15 bis 20 % (zum Euro). Zum Yen waren die Verluste noch größer. In der Lage Aussis zu kaufen entsprach einer "soften Longposition" im Aktienmarkt, da klar war, dass sich der Aussi bei einem Aktienanstieg wieder deutlich erholen würde. Das geschah dann auch. Der Aussi kam von 1,7450 auf bis jetzt 1,6550 zurück. Den Mut, Aktien long zu kaufen, hatte ich an dem Tag nicht. Der Aussi aber war ein guter - und sicherer - Ersatz. Denn Australien geht es nach wie vor gut, und die Zinsen auf den Australdollar betragen 6,5 % - was allein schon mittelfristig kursstützend wirkt (Shorts auf der anderen Seite des Trades zahlen dann die Zeche).
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/...404%2D8056%2D418DDA9F0330%7D
Das ist der größte jährliche Rückgang seit 20 Jahren.
Vor 20 Jahren war übrigens 1987 - Grüße an Metropolis (# 5202)
Home prices fall record 3.2% nationally
Values down in 15 of 20 major cities, Case-Shiller finds
By Rex Nutting, MarketWatch
Last Update: 10:35 AM ET Aug 28, 2007
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- U.S. home prices fell at a faster rate in the second quarter, down 3.2% compared with the same period in 2006, Standard & Poor's reported Tuesday.
It marked the largest year-over-year decline ever recorded in the 20-year history of the Case-Shiller home price index. A year ago, home prices were rising at a 7.5% pace nationally.
"The pullback in the U.S. residential real-estate market is showing no signs of slowing down," said Robert Shiller, chief economist at MacroMarkets LLC, which computes the price index for S&P. In an interview with MarketWatch, Shiller noted that the figures were for activity ending in June -- well before the more recent blowup in the mortgage markets.
Falling prices make it more difficult for homeowners to tap their home equity or refinance their mortgages. Millions of homeowners who took out adjustable-rate loans in 2005 and 2006 face sharply higher mortgage payments this year and next, with foreclosures having already soared as a result of payment resets.
"This slow-burn downswing probably has a long way to go," wrote Charles Dumas, an economist for London's Lombard Street Research. "The backlog of unsold homes has reached a level at which buyers are likely to get nasty, insisting on deep price cuts. As repossessed homes come on the market over the next 18 months, downward pressure on home prices and whole neighbourhoods will intensify."
"We are fast approaching the rate of price decline seen at the end of the 1990-91 recession, and the odds strongly favor blowing past this mark in coming months," wrote Joshua Shapiro, chief economist for MFR Inc. "With supply overhang growing and mortgage financing tougher to obtain, home prices are going to soften considerably further in the quarters ahead."
Meanwhile, prices fell by 3.5% in the past year in 20 major cities as tracked by the index and by 4.1% in 10 major cities through June. It's the largest year-over-year decline in the 10-city gauge since July 1991. Read the full report from S&P.
In a separate report, the Conference Board said consumer confidence fell at the fastest rate in two years in August.
Pockets of strength in sea of weakness
Prices fell in 15 of the 20 cities in June compared with a year earlier, with the largest price declines concentrated in the industrial Midwest and in the once-bubbly markets along the coasts and in the desert West. Some metro areas in the Northwest and Southeast are still seeing prices rise, however.
Home prices have plunged 11% in Detroit, Mich., in the past year, followed by 7.7% in Tampa, Fla., and 7.3% in San Diego, Calif. On the other hand, prices have risen 7.9%
in the Seattle metro region, with prices up 6.8% in Charlotte, N.C. The annual growth rate slowed in 17 of 20 cities in June.
One bright spot could be Boston, which was the first metro area to show falling prices. Since the first of the year, the year-over-year decline in Boston has improved from a 5.5% decline in January to a 3.9% decline in June (toller Grund zum Feiern ;-)) - A.L.). Shiller said more data would be needed before he could say that Boston's real-estate market has turned.
The Case-Shiller index, which tracks multiple sales of the same homes, is considered by many observers to be the best gauge of national and metro real-estate values.
On Thursday, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight will report its national home price index. As of the first quarter, the OFHEO index showed prices were up 4.3% in the past year. The OFHEO index has never been negative on a year-over-year basis.
Like Case-Shiller, the OFHEO index tracks multiple sales of the same homes. However, OFHEO does not include homes with nonconforming mortgages, such as those with jumbo mortgages for more than $417,000.
Here are the 20 cities covered by the Case-Shiller index, ranked from worst to best:
Detroit, down 11%: Tampa, Fla., down 7.7%; San Diego, down 7.3%; Washington, down 7%; Phoenix, down 6.6%; Las Vegas, down 5.1%; Miami, down 4.8%; Los Angeles, down 4.1%; San Francisco, down 4%; Minneapolis, down 3.8%; Boston, down 3.7%; Cleveland, down 3.6%; New York, down 3.4%; Denver, down 1%; Chicago, down 0.7%; Atlanta, up 1.6%; Dallas, up 1.6%; Portland, Ore., up 4.5%; Charlotte, N.C., up 6.8%; and Seattle, up 7.9%.
Rex Nutting is Washington bureau chief of MarketWatch.
Gruß BRB
Also ok, da dein Posting mindestens 1x gut analysiert wurde (nicht von mir) interessiert es schonmal 2 Leute und ich poste weiter. Aber nun lassen wir es bitte gut sein, es wird mir peinlich.
Zunächst einmal ist der Bernanke-Put innerhalb von 7 Tagen fast verpufft. Die Nachrichten sind jetzt einfach zu schlecht geworden, als dass eine symbolische Zinssenkung noch etwas dagegen ausrichten könnte. Die letzte Rally entpuppt sich immer mehr als Bullenfalle. Das bedeutet, dass sich diejenigen, die sich jetzt die Finger verbrannt haben (und heute ausgestoppt wurden) sich zukünftige Käufe zweimal überlegen werden, insbesondere auch dann, wenn Bernanke die Diskont-Zinsen nochmals senken sollte (!!!), weil dann wieder eine Bullenfalle zu vermuten ist. Eine Zinsrally im Falle einer Senkung steht deshalb auf tönernen Füssen, falls sie überhaupt nennenswert stattfinden sollte.
Sollten die Verbraucher-Zinsen gesenkt werden (was m.E. aufgrund der Inflationsdaten und des FED-Protokolls (die FED setzt auf die Selbstheilung des Marktes) nur im Falle eines Crashs statttfindet - das nur nebenbei), dann wäre ein 25-Basispunkte-Schritt ziemlich sinnlos, weil zu klein. Eher ist mit 50 Punkten zu rechnen. Die Auswirkungen auf den Markt ist schwer abzuschätzen. Da zur Zeit eine Zinssenkung eingepreist ist, ist jedoch auch hier nicht mit einer exzessiven Rally zu rechnen.
Im Gegenteil, sollte der Markt bis Mitte September stabil bleiben wird die FED nichts tun (siehe Protokoll) und damit einen Crash auslösen. Sollte der Markt vorher aufgrund negativer Konjunkturdaten crashen wird die FED die Zinsen um mindestens 50 Punkte senken.
Ein Crash - also ein Kurssturz um ca. 20% innerhalb weniger Tage - ist damit so gut wie unvermeidlich.
Du galubst an einen Kursverfall und nun siehst du auch ein Kursverfall, gehste jetzt Short? Müsstest du ja nach deiner Logik ;)
Aber vieleicht ahnen alle irgendwie, daß große Ereignisse ihre Schatten vorauswerfen.
Die Welt wird nicht untergehen, aber vieleicht die perversen Auswüchse des Ultra-Turbo Kapitalismus, wie Hedge-Fond Manager die 500 Mio Boni in 2006 bekamen und einen niedrigeren Steuersatz als eine Putzfrau haben. Und zu wünschen wäre es uns allen.
Na, vieleicht beruhigen sich die Märkte ja jetzt ein wenig - ich glaube es allerdings nicht.
nasdaq heute mit über 2% im minus. der dji ebenfalls.
der dax wird morgen brav nachziehen.
das fed protokoll gefällt anscheinend nicht ;)
Optionen
| Boardmail an "TurboLuke" |
Wertpapier: S&P 500 |
Nur der Dax verschläft mal wieder alles - getaxt auf 7370. Nun ja, vielleicht weckt ihn ja der Ferne Osten morgen unsanft auf.
Ups, schon wieder ne blumige Analyse. Sorry, Bereuhnix, da mußt du durch.
Aber dies ist nicht die einzige Beobachtung, die auf weiteren Verfall der US-Aktienmärkte hin deutet. U.a. folgende Subindizes haben an den z.T. stark fallenden MAs im Bereich zwischen 50 und 25 und abflachenden wesentlich höheren MAs wieder nach unten gedreht: $BKX - $XBD - $TRAN - $UTIL - $RLX - $DJECOM - $DJR. Schau dir auch mal die Charts von $CPMKTB und $CPMKTE - und insbesondere deren Ratiochart mit MA 25 - an!
für den fall, dass du das posten n diesem thread einstellst, werde ich dich als einer der ätesten poster in ariva verfolgen wie einer der typen in den bilderrahmen von hogwarths ;O)
dieser thread ist einer der fundiertesten in diesem forum...meine meinung...und Al:postingmanagement würde ich an postern unter 100 tage festmachen... :D
vg und gue n8 ,
DY
stark short
-------------------------------------------------
Man muss traden was man sieht, nicht was man glaubt!
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| Boardmail an "DerYeti" |
Wertpapier: S&P 500 |
Dazu ein paar Gedanken:
- Laut FED-Protokoll vertraut sie auf die Selbstheilungskräfte des Marktes. Das heißt im Klartext: Zinssenkung nur dann, wenn es UNBEDINGT NOTWENDIG wird. Das könnte m.E. sein: Crash oder Rezession (wobei beides zusammenhängt, weil die Amis beim Konsumieren immer auf ihren Depotstand schauen)
- Andererseits haben die Bären Angst, dass die FED die Zinsen aus heiterem Himmel senkt. Das halte ich für sehr unwahrscheinlich, denn zur Zeit gibt die Datenlage das nicht her. Die FED sieht es nicht als ihre Aufgabe an, Spekulanten vor Verlusten zu bewahren, sondern die Wirtschaft am Laufen zu halten. Die Diskontsenkung und die Geldspritzen sind mit diesem Ziel zu begründen, eine Zinssenkung aber erst, wenn eine Rezession BEGINNT. Also wird auch keine Senkung "auf Verdacht" erfolgen, denn die Inflationsgefahr ist für solche Spielchen zu hoch. (Ähnlich wie die Feuerwehr immer erst dann kommt, wenn es brennt.)
Als Bär kann man sich also zur Zeit halbwegs sicher fühlen. Stoppkurse sollte man aber weit setzen, weil eine Bearmarket-Rally nie auszuschließen ist.
Es bleibt schwierig...
Der entscheidende Absatz in dem Fortune-Artikel von Peter Eavis (aus Deinem Link) ist:
The Fed says that it made the exemption in the public interest, because it allows Citibank to get liquidity to the brokerage in "the most rapid and cost-effective manner possible." So, how serious is this rule-bending? Very. One of the central tenets of banking regulation is that banks with federally insured deposits should never be over-exposed to brokerage subsidiaries; indeed, for decades financial institutions were legally required to keep the two units completely separate. This move by the Fed eats away at the principle.
Es sieht so aus, als würde die Fed am Diskontfenster die Reparaturarbeiten leisten wollen, die sonst nur mit einer Senkung des Leitzinzes zu erreichen sind. Dies deckt sich mit dem, was der Autor in # 5201 schreibt (und was Greenspan ja auch immer betonte - dass er nämlich die Märkte notfalls "in Liquidität ersäufen will"). Der Trick mit dem Diskontfenster, kombiniert mit der Aufweichung der obigen Prinzipien, erlaubt das nun indirekt. Das ist fatal und ist nichts anderes als ein nachträglicher Freibrief an Banken wie Citigroup und Bank of America, die mit ihren dubiosen Brokerage-Geschäften Schiffbruch erlitten haben. Ein "government bail-out" also. Hier wird das Geld der amerikanischen Sparguthaben (FDIC insurance) auf's Spiel gesetzt, um "im öffentlichen Interesse" verzockte Großbanken zu retten.
Fortune-Autor Peter Eavis war übrigens früher bei Street.com/Realmoney. Ihm verdanke ich, dass ich im Jahr 2000 rechtzeitig aus Aktien ausgestiegen bin, was mir der Blessuren der Jahre 2000 - 2003 ersparte. Wer nun auf ihn hört, erspart sich die potenziellen Blessuren der Jahre 2008 - 2010.
Zittat das dem letzten Absatz:
Don't forget: The Federal Reserve is in crisis management at the moment. However, it doesn't want to show any signs of panic. That means no rushed cuts in interest rates. It also means that it wants banks to quickly take the big charges that will inevitably come from holding toxic debt securities. And it will do all it can behind the scenes to work with the banks to help them get through this upheaval. But waiving one of the most important banking regulations can only add nervousness to the market. And that's what the Fed did Monday in these disturbing letters to the nation's two largest banks.