Der USA Bären-Thread
was läuft alles falsch; 3 Theorien:
FOCUS New US jobless claims could raise labour market confusion
11.07.07 18:59
WASHINGTON (Thomson Financial) - The new jobless claims number due out Thursday morning is as likely to raise as it is to reduce the confusion about what is going on in the US labour market. The expectation is another 316,000 new first-time claims for unemployment insurance. But Ian Shepherdson of High Frequency Economics says "this is the first week of the annual auto retooling shutdowns and anything could happen". For months now, claims and payroll reports have not behaved the way economists think they should. As San Francisco Fed president Janet Yellen puts it: "Why has the labour market continued to be so strong, even while economic activity has moderated?" Add to that a second question, how much of an inflation threat is the anomaly, and you have the Fed's latest economic conundrum. Is the labour market really as strong as the numbers suggest or is there something wrong with the numbers? The most glaring gap is in housing. Over the past four quarters, real residential investment fell more than 16 pct while residential construction employment fell less than 4 pct. Many economists are leaning toward the "wrong numbers" theory, with several explanations of why the labour market may be weaker than it appears. First, there may be lags by employers in adjusting to new conditions. Yellen calls this a "benign explanation", with big declines in construction employment still to come. Second, some analysts propose an "illegal worker" theory in which the relatively high number of construction workers who are in the US illegally can't file for unemployment insurance when they are laid off. Economist James Hamilton who writes the Econobrowser.com blog, says that while "that claim is undoubtedly true, it's not correct to assume that these workers are not included in the [Labor Department] data." He says the IRS has issued millions of taxpayer identification numbers to people without a Social Security number and "government counts of the number of people working may be more accurate than one might have supposed". Third, and growing more popular, is the "birth/death" theory. The Labor Department's so-called birth/death adjustment tries to estimate how many jobs are created and lost in the continual "birth" and "death" of small businesses that do not appear in the employer surveys. Paul Kasriel at Northern Trust thinks the adjustment creates "phantom" workers, thus inflating the Labor Department's payroll figures. "In the 12 months ended June, the birth/death adjustment accounted for 57.3 pct of the 12-month increase in non-farm payrolls," he says. That is 1.11 million of the 1.98 million total non-seasonally-adjusted payroll increase. Daiwa Securities economist Mike Moran is sceptical because of the methodological problems. "While the effect cannot be isolated, the adjustment is probably not severe enough to lead to misguided assessments of the labour market and the economy," he says. So, should the Fed worry about "high resource utilization", its term for tight labour markets, posing an inflation risk? Economists who think the labour market is weaker than the numbers suggest point out that the low unemployment rate has been accompanied by slowing growth in average hourly earnings. However, HVB economist Harm Bandholz thinks "the reason for the slowdown in hourly earnings is the end of job shifts toward higher paid occupations". This does not change "true" inflation pressure, he says, "in fact, the 'true' labour cost pressure continues to point north." dennis.moore@thomson.com dem/wash/wj
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Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh and Robert Steel, the Treasury's top finance official, said investor losses from subprime-mortgage delinquencies aren't posing any broader risks to the financial system.
``Our overall view is that there are certainly losses, that we might not be at the bottom of this tumult, but they don't appear to be raising, to this point, systemic risk issues,'' Warsh told the House Financial Services Committee today.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/...20601087&sid=aRMUsDmfukMc&refer=home
Marktgerüchte haben die DaimlerChrysler-Aktie auf Talfahrt geschickt: Händler kolportieren, dass der Investor Cerberus Finanzierungsprobleme habe - was die Chrysler-Übernahme gefährden könnte. Der Autobauer dementiert.
Frankfurt am Main - Die Aktien des Autobauers DaimlerChrysler Chart zeigen haben sich heute deutlich verbilligt. Gegen Mittag lag das Papier bei 66,77 Euro mit 2,4 Prozent im Minus. Börsenhändler berichten von Gerüchten, wonach es Probleme bei der Finanzierung der Chrysler-Übernahme durch den Finanzinvestor Cerberus gebe. "Es gibt Gerüchte, dass die Finanzierung nicht steht", sagten mehrere Händler.
Bei Cerberus war zunächst keine Stellungnahme zu erhalten. DaimlerChrysler wies die Spekulationen zurück. Die geplante Abspaltung der US-Tochter verlaufe planmäßig.
"Wir haben keinen Hinweis auf irgendeine Verzögerung zum Abschluss dieser Transaktion", sagte ein Sprecher. Der überdurchschnittliche Rückgang des Aktienkurses könne eine Reaktion auf den starken Wechselkurs des Euro zum Dollar sein. Eine andere Erklärung habe das Unternehmen nicht. Der Deutsche Aktienindex (Dax Chart zeigen) gab bis zum Mittag 1,3 Prozent nach.
DaimlerChrysler will 80 Prozent von Chrysler an den US-Finanzinvestor Cerberus verkaufen. Die Bekanntgabe des Geschäfts im Frühjahr war an der Börse mit Kurssprüngen gefeiert worden. Das schwache Geschäft der US-Tochter hatte den Gesamtkonzern zunehmen belastet. Dem Sprecher zufolge soll der Verkauf im dritten Quartal abgeschlossen werden.
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,493805,00.html
Profit at U.K. subprime lender Kensington drops 66%
By Steve Goldstein
Last Update: 2:36 AM ET Jul 12, 2007
LONDON (MarketWatch) -- Kensington Group (UK:KGN) , the U.K. subprime mortgage lender which has agreed to be bought by Investec (INVP), said first-half profit before tax dropped 66% to 10.1 million pounds, weighed down by a 49.2 million pound hit from changes in values of interest-rate derivatives and cross-currency interest rate swaps. On an adjusted basis, its pretax profit fell 8% to 26.1 million pounds, hurt by increased competition from new and existing lenders, particularly those with access to lower cost funding. More customers are redeeming outside the early redemption charge period which has reduced the value of new business and the amount of income expected from business already written. But it insisted the U.K. market is "very different" from the U.S.
Ein guter Freund von mir (Engländer, der oft in GB ist, aber in Deutschland lebt) kann nicht bestätigten, dass der Hypothekenmarkt in GB "sehr viel anders" sei als in USA. Er meint, auch in GB braue sich ein Subprime-Hypotheken-Fiasko zusammen.
In GB kommt verschärfend hinzu, dass die britische Zentralbank rigoros Zinserhöhungen durchzieht. Der Leitzins stieg kürzlich auf 5,75 %.
Komisch, dass die nicht einmal vom USD profitieren können.
mfg
ath
12.07.2007 - 07:59
Motorola spricht Umsatz-und Gewinnwarnung aus
New York (BoerseGo.de) - Der Technologiekonzern Motorola hat die Prognosen zum zweiten Quartal gesenkt und rechnet nun für jene Periode mit einem operativen Verlust von 2-4 Cents je Aktie und einem Erlös von 8,6-8,7 Milliarden Dollar. Das Ergebnis beinhalte eine Sonderbelastung von 3-4 Cents aus einer Reduzierung der Belegschaft und anderen Sonderposten. Zuvor ging Motorola von einem Erlös von 9,4 Milliarden Dollar aus. Die von Thomson First Call erhobenen durchschnittlichen Analystenschätzungen liegen bei einem Gewinn von 2 Cents und einem Erlös von 9,26 Milliarden Dollar.
Wie das Unternehmen am Mittwoch nach Börsenschluss weiter mitteilte, sind die Revidierungen auf geringere Erlöse aus Mobiltelefonen in Asien und Europa zurückzuführen. Zudem ergeht die Warnung, dass die Mobiltelefonsparte bis mindestens 2008 rote Zahlen schreiben wird.
Die Ergebnisse zum zweiten Quartal werden am 19. Juli bekannt gegeben.
Motorola verbilligten sich nachbörslich um 1,67% auf 17,65 Dollar
(HC)
Eigenartig ist auch diese unablässige Serie von Einmal-Belastungen (one-time charges), die sich über viele Quartale erstrecken...
Street.com - Columnist Conversation
Bob Faulkner
MOT Whiffs
7/11/2007 5:42 PM EDT
MOT pre-announced (again) a big miss in for Q2 a short time ago. A number of sell-side analysts have trimmed numbers and had cautious commentary on the name for the last 6-8 weeks so this really shouldn't shock anyone. If there is a surprise to be had, it has to be the stock spiking inter-day on rumors of Ed Zander's [Zander ist CEO von MOT - A.L.] ouster. Who knows, this may well to out to be the last straw.
Tero Kuittinen
Moving on
7/11/2007 5:52 PM EDT
I think the 25 cent dip for MOT after hours kind of sums up the situation. Yes, the revenue and volume misses were even worse than anticipated by recent downgrades. No, there aren't many who are shocked. I did think Motorola might hit 40 million units on Asian strength, but I suspect investors are getting ready to judge the 2Q as the trough quarter. The rebound speculation is going on, underpinned by the many times MOT has survived these disaster periods previously. The previous major MOT share price resurgence started in 2003... well before hot new RAZR's came out at the end of 2004. So I think people are aware of how often the shares start rebounding before the real turn-around arrives.
Steve Birenberg
re: MOT
7/11/2007 5:58 PM EDT
Tero and Bob, any thoughts on the fact that despite a miss of $700 to $1 billion in sales, EPS aren't suffering that much, now forecast a 2-4 cent loss from operations vs. consensus of 2 cents. I haven't freshened up my MOT spreadsheet in awhile but it seems like negative leverage should be higher. As for the thus far muted after hours decline, I'd say the "Zander out/Icahn back" game is tempering things.
Tero Kuittinen
Yeah, That Is Odd
7/11/2007 6:10 PM EDT
But this is Motorola - they're doing a series of one-time charges spread across several quarters, right? So how you read the books takes Hogwarts calibre wizardry. I suspect they're flushing the channels and trying to bring inventory down so they can engineer a volume rebound that looks impressive for 3Q or 4Q at the latest. Lord knows they got that maneuvre down pat after the events of the past 15 years. I agree on the Zander put - the worse things look, the more likely a CEO switcheroo becomes. And nobody wants to be short on the day Z exits - there will be a ticker tape parade in Chicago.
Schwankungsbreite hat schon was von Topbildung(Trin 0,37!).mM
Frage ist halt nur ob das nun der mögliche letzte Spike wird und
wenn ja wie weit er läuft.
(hängt vermutlich auch an den Q-Zahlen die nächsten Wochen)
INFO: ATH im S&P bei 1553,11
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S&P stuft 562 Hypotheken-Klassen ab
New York (BoerseGo.de) – Die Ratingagentur Standard & Poor`s hat 562 Kategorien von hypothekarisch gesicherten Wertpapieren auf Wohnimmobilien herabgestuft.
Vergangenen Dienstag stellte S&P die Herabstufung von 612 hypothekarisch gesicherten Wertpapieren mit einem Volumen von 7,35 Milliarden Dollar in Aussicht. Davon beschnitt S&P 498 in deren Bonität. Von weiteren 70 zur Abstufung in Betracht gezogenen Kategorien hat die Ratingagentur 64 mit einer geringeren Einstufung bedacht.
Die insgesamt 562 Wertpapier-Herabstufungen umfassen ein Volumen von rund 6,39 Milliarden Dollar bzw 1,13 Prozent sämtlicher gesicherter Pfandverschreibungen im Bereich zweitrangig gesicherter Hypotheken, die im vierten Quartal 2005 und im vierten Quartal 2006 von S&P mit Bonitätseinschätzungen bedacht worden sind.
mfg
ath
http://www.ariva.de/PTT_Woche_28_13_07_07_t296640#jump3421620
Das Schlimmste, was man in diesem Markt machen kann, ist prozyklisch auf Trendfortsetzung zu spekulieren. Der gestrige steile SP-500-Anstieg ging im Wesentlichen auf Charttechniker zurück, die nach dem starken Abverkauf vor 3 Tagen (siehe Chart unten) prozyklische Short-Positionen aufgebaut hatten, da sie mit einem "follow-through" rechneten [das Wort "Triple-Top" im SP-500 machte die Runde]. Gestern mussten sie sich alle in einem gigantischen Short-Squeeze wieder eindecken.
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Haben die Bären bereits das Handtuch geworfen? ;-)
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fast immer bestraft.Deshalb auch mein Hinweis für metro auch mal Gewinne mitzunehmen
und nicht voll auf die große Wende zu spekulieren(gerade im Dax sind 100P nix i.M.).
Schau deshalb auch eher auf die Stundencharts da im Daily die Indikatoren kaum zu gebrauchen sind bei den schnellen Bewegungen.
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Bubble Morphology: Welcome to the 2007 Summer Rally
……….. So here’s my crack at it. Two articles from venerable publications crystallized the following for me this week: It’s the hedge funds, stupid! Last week the NY Times, in true this-time-its-different fashion, wrote that the difference between the hedge funds and the dot.coms of yore is that “Hedge funds make money.”
Yeah, right. Smells like the bubble is morphing, and the MSM is being put to use once again as head corporate cheerleader. Another case in point, this week’s Barron’s led with a story by Michael Santili titled, “Abolutely, Positively, No One’s Safe.” The article talks about how even a company like FedEx, with a market cap of $34 billion, could be taken private in an LBO – at a 20% premium! The money is out there. Forget the “fact” that liquidity is drying up. FedEx has 700 planes and 44,000 trucks that could be used as collateral against which to issue debt. At the moment, it is undeniable that the hedge funds, or LBO-firms – whatever you want to call them – are the current force lifting all market boats.
Given that last week’s offer by Blackstone to take Hilton Hotels private at a 40% premium resulted in a rally of hotel stocks across the board, it is hard to miss the impact that private equity / hedge funds are having. Traders want to make quick profits, so they will increase the intensity in the search for the next potential buyout target, like kids looking for the golden certificates in Willy Wonka bars. Who doesn’t want to hit a jackpot like Hilton? Stocks will fly along with buyouts and rumors of buyouts. The old Wall Street adage “Even turkeys can fly in a hurricane” will be seen in full force.
Like an expert tai-chi move, bulls continue to use the bears own energy and momentum against them, forcing them to cover their shorts and causing the exact opposite of their intended results: big market gains. At 3:45pm ET, the Dow is up 271 points - an even 2% - to a new all time high! With today’s rally, I can hear the little bulls across the country starting to lick their chops: “Hey Martha! This article here in the Times says hedge funds make money! Do you think we should buy some?”
Maybe little bull, but go in with your eyes open. Hedge funds make money the same way vampires stay alive: by sucking the lifeblood from another living entity. But more important is this: the Dow is up around 10% so far this year, but according to both Richard Russell and James Stack, the small investors are so far staying away. They’re skeptical, and rightfully so. To the man on the street, the economy looks weak, it is hard to make ends meet, and every day prices seem to go up a little bit more. Things do not seem to be getting better.
Until today, the market has been no place for the small investor to play. But after today, or certainly after the Dow smashes through 14,000, the timid little bulls that were afraid to get into the market for fear of a meltdown will suddenly be clamoring to get in for fear of a melt up! Forget the fundamentals and the abundant bad news - prices are going up! Summer rally here we come!
So this is how this bubble will likely roll on – at least for a little while.
Private equity can still borrow big to buy big, profitable companies (e.g. FedEx), extract a lot of fat banking & consulting fees from the company’s wealth, pay the fund managers’ and consultants’ salaries, slash jobs, cut services and squeeze even more booty out of the company, then turn around and sell the whole thing out in an IPO. Ca-ching! The fat cat hedge fund managers will cash out into the world of billionaire-ism by selling their shares to the billionaire-wanna-be’s known as the general public, who get their investment tips from the New York Times (newsstand price, $1). Shares thus pass from strong hands to weak as the market quietly tops amidst jubilation and cheer.
Later, after all the money is banked, and the managers have moved on, and the hedge-fund shares are in the toilet, we’ll find that the service at FedEx (or whoever the lucky target companies may be) has mysteriously deteriorated and earnings are down. Not so mysterious, really, when outside managers come in to butcher the company and kill morale. Profits decline and assets – those 700 planes and 44,000 trucks – start getting sold off at pennies on the dollar. Eventually all that remains of the company is a pathetic shell of its former self, the corporate vamps having sucked it dry of its vitality and life, just like the subprime borrowers who today find themselves both homeless and penniless, walking away from their payments on a mortgage under water. That, friends, is when the second great depression begins.
In the mean time, this is the housing bubble strategy all over again, just in a new form: Lend, borrow, buy, extract, sell, repeat. Through the alchemy of finance, the day of reckoning has once again been postponed, though who knows for how long? When things start looking grim again, PTB will have a new strategy to keep things rolling along that keen bubble morphologists will be required to sniff out.
But for now, enjoy the summer rally. Take a dip - the water is fine. Just make sure you don’t get yourself in too deep. The sharks are circling in the distance, and they are getting hungry.
http://bullnotbull.com/archive/morphology-1.html
THE BULL/BEAR WAR RAGES ON! July 13, 2007.
Triple-digit one-day moves by the Dow have become frequent as the troops surge back and forth on the battlefield on Wall Street. One day, or one week, the bears seem to have the upper hand, only to be pushed back by the bulls the following day or following week.
As often happens in wars, the battles intensified once the seasons changed in May and warmer weather arrived. The bears were sure the change in seasonality would put them in control. The bulls were sure that this time is different.
The battle's statistics are interesting. There have now been 12 one day triple-digit moves since mid-May, or one on average of every 3.3 days. Six have been to the upside, and six to the downside. The triple-digit up days totaled 967 points. The triple-digit down days totaled 985 points. The largest move to the downside this year was 416 points on February 27. The largest move to the upside was 283 points on Thursday of this week. There have been strings of three or four days in a row in both directions. The 40 trading days since mid-May have also been evenly divided, with 21 up days and 19 down days.
There have been times when the battle seemed to favor the bears, with the Dow down 410 points from its May peak just two weeks ago, and times like now that favor the bulls. The bulls have come surging back with two weeks of rally that has the Dow 181 points, or 1.3%, above its May peak.
The attacks from both sides have been impressive. Take that, say the bears, throwing the worsening housing slump and slowing economy at the bulls, and the bulls fall back some in a triple-digit decline. Not so fast, say the bulls, coming back with a flurry of mergers and acquisitions that seem to bolster their enthusiasm and bring them back down the battlefield.
Then take this, say the bears, hurling the sub-prime mortgage problems and resulting threat of the failure of Bear Stearns hedge funds at the bulls. It staggers the bulls, another triple-digit blow.
But the bulls sneak back in a nighttime attack. Hah, they say, we'll cover that problem up by loaning more money to the Bear Stearns funds to save them. And that bear attack fizzles out.
However, the bears are able to come right back with an even larger attack, the news that the rating agencies are finally downgrading mortgage-backed securities to reflect the soaring mortgage default rates. The bears are sure that will force hedge funds and other bullish owners of leveraged debt to reveal their large losses. And that wreckage will tumble onto the bullish banks and brokerage houses that made the big loans to hedge funds that financed their leveraged positions.
The bulls come back, saying, No, No, No. We will divert attention away from that problem by focusing on upcoming 2nd quarter earnings which should be good. And they gain ground, with a triple-digit up day.
The bears immediately struck back on Tuesday of this week with the news that the 2nd quarter earnings reporting period was off to a poor start. The first of the major firms reporting, Alcoa, Sears Holdings, and Home Depot all warned their earnings were not going to meet forecasts. And sure enough the bulls staggered backward on Tuesday with a triple-digit decline, accompanied by the bears yelling down the field that the mounting problems can no longer be covered up. It looked like the final blow to the bulls. Meanwhile, the bears have been so sure of winning that short-selling, a bet on the market's downside risk, reached record levels.
On Wednesday, the bears couldn't believe their eyes when the bulls came roaring back up the battle field, rallying around news that U.K. mining company Rio Tinto was acquiring Canadian aluminum producer Alcan for $38 billion, and WalMart earnings had beaten estimates. Their rallying cry was that U.S. investors should be emboldened by that news. It was a sign, they yelled, that worries over consumer spending slowing were a non-issue. And sure enough the market roared back to life, the Dow gaining 76 points on Wednesday, and a whopping 283 points on Thursday.
Observers said much of the buying on Thursday was created by those short-selling bears being forced to the buy side to close out their positions as the rally progressed during the day.
But the bears weren't capitulating. On Friday they launched another attack with news that the bulls were also wrong about consumer spending. The much anticipated retail sales report came out Friday, and revealed that retail sales fell a big 0.9% in June. It was the biggest drop in 2 years, and much worse than Wall Street had forecast. But the bulls had some momentum from Thursday and advanced a bit more, although on very low volume, battle weary participants on both sides standing back from the combat.
Fortunately for both sides, the war recesses on weekends so both sides can rest up and plan their next move. Next week the battle will resume with the eventual winner still in doubt.
Sy Harding is president of Asset Management Research Corp., DeLand, FL, publisher of The Street Smart Report Online at www.streetsmartreport.com
By Chan Akya Hardworking Asian savers will see their central banks post billions in losses in the next few years as investments in US subprime mortgage bonds turn to dust. The central bankers allowed themselves to be led by the nose by Western rating agencies and Wall Street investment banks, but ultimately the Asian banks and governments have only their own policy follies to blame. As usual in Asia, nobody will be held accountable, and one of the greatest robberies of our time will be swept under the carpet. (Jul 13, '07)I have previously written [1] about the impending failure of US mortgage borrowers, whose failure to pay would affect not only the US economy as many of them declare bankruptcy, but also worldwide markets, as the risk has been widely sold to investors in other countries, with the bulk of the losses coming in Asia. Banks lend money to a number of companies but, more importantly, to millions of individuals. As banks themselves borrow money from other investors in the form of deposits and bonds, they would like to sell down some assets. However, anyone buying such assets from banks would be naturally worried about the quality of assets, and hence look to the banks to do two things: first, hold enough of the risk (what is called "skin" in the game) and, second, hire an independent evaluator of these securities. ......bitte selber weiterlesen
WASHINGTON, D.C., July 12, 2007 – Retail food prices at the supermarket increased slightly in the second quarter of 2007, according to the latest American Farm Bureau Federation Marketbasket Survey. The informal survey shows the total cost of 16 basic grocery items in the second quarter of 2007 was $42.95, up about 4 percent or $1.61 from the first quarter of 2007.
Of the 16 items surveyed, 14 increased, one decreased and one stayed the same in average price compared to the 2007 first-quarter survey. Compared to one year ago, the overall cost for the marketbasket items showed an increase of about 8 percent.
Regular whole milk showed the largest quarter-to-quarter price increase, up 34 cents to $3.46 per gallon. Sirloin tip roast increased 27 cents to $3.99 per pound; pork chops increased 22 cents to $3.63 per pound; ground chuck increased 20 cents per pound to $2.85.
Other items that increased in price: whole fryers, up 17 cents to $1.28 per pound; apples, up 15 cents to $1.45 per pound; vegetable oil and bread, both up 9 cents to $2.66 for a 32-oz. bottle and $1.58 for a 20-ounce loaf, respectively; mayonnaise, up 8 cents to $3.43 for a 32-oz. jar; and regular eggs, up 5 cents to $1.56 per dozen. Volunteer shoppers recorded nominal price increases for: cheddar cheese, up 3 cents to $3.72 per pound; flour, up 2 cents to $1.92 for a 5-pound bag; toasted oat cereal and corn oil, up 1 cent each to $2.86 for a 10-oz. box and $2.78 for a 32-oz. bottle, respectively.
Russet potatoes dropped 12 cents to $2.34 for a 5-pound bag. Bacon stayed the same at $3.44 per pound.
“Consumers have no doubt noticed their food dollar stretched a little tighter lately,” said AFBF Economist Jim Sartwelle. “As energy costs have increased, it has become more expensive to process, package, and transport food items for retail sale. In addition, soaring demand overseas for U.S. dairy and meat products has reduced quantities available at home, resulting in retail price increases at the grocery store. ”
As retail grocery prices have gradually increased, the share of the average food dollar that America’s farm and ranch families receive has dropped over time.
“In the mid-1970s, farmers received about one-third of consumer retail food expenditures on average. That figure has decreased steadily over time and is now just 22 percent, according to Agriculture Department statistics,” Sartwelle said.
Using that percentage across-the-board, the farmer’s share of this quarter’s $42.95 marketbasket total would be $9.45.
AFBF, the nation’s largest general farm organization, conducts its informal quarterly marketbasket survey as a tool to reflect retail food price trends. According to USDA statistics, Americans spend just under 10 percent of their disposable income on food annually, the lowest average of any country in the world. A total of 82 volunteer shoppers in 32 states participated in the latest survey, conducted during May.
Sidebar: Tracking Milk and Egg Trends
Although milk and eggs have been included in the AFBF quarterly marketbasket since the survey was initiated in 1989, volunteer shoppers recently began tracking retail prices for different types of these staples.
For the second quarter of 2007, shoppers found the average price for a half-gallon of regular whole milk to be $2.22. The average price for one gallon of regular whole milk was $3.46. Comparing per-quart prices, the retail price for whole milk sold in gallon containers was 28 percent lower compared to half-gallon containers, a typical volume discount long employed by retailers.
The average price for a half-gallon of rBST-free milk was $3.01, 36 percent higher than a half-gallon of regular milk. The average price for a half-gallon of organic milk was $3.65, 64 percent higher than a half-gallon of regular milk.
For the second quarter of 2007, the average price for one dozen regular eggs was $1.56. The average price for “cage-free” eggs was 85 percent higher at $2.89 per dozen.
“Consumer tastes shift with time, and America’s farmers and ranchers have shown a remarkable ability to adapt and produce different foods that meet those preferences,” said AFBF Economist Jim Sartwelle. “Some consumers prefer these specialty products and are willing to pay the higher prices needed to cover the increased costs associated with production practices such as ‘cage-free’ eggs and organic milk,” he said.
Regarding milk, “Opponents of rBST have had limited success at discouraging its use and getting processors and retailers to demand that farmers not use the product,” said Henry I. Miller, a physician and fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. “This trend is largely responsible for the much higher retail prices recorded for so-called ‘rBST-free’ milk,” he said. Miller also noted the retail premium for niche milks goes disproportionately to processors, rather than to farmers. He headed the Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Biotechnology from 1989 to 1993.
-30-
Contacts: Tracy Taylor Grondine
(202) 406-3642
tracyg@fb.org Cyndie Sirekis
(202) 406-3649
cyndies@fb.org
Quelle:
http://www.fb.org/...on=newsroom.newsfocus&year=2007&file=nr0712.html
The BullandBearWise Index aktuell = 32,84
The BullandBearWise Index weights economic and market indicators from 0 (bearish) to 100 (bullish).
http://www.bullandbearwise.com/Default.asp
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Dadurch kommen die im Subprime-Markt tätigen Hedgefonds stärker unter Druck. Die Hedgefonds von Bear Stearns machten Zins-Arbitragegeschäfte, indem sie sich gutes Geld von großen Brokern/Banken liehen (zu 5 % Zinsen) und zu 6 % Zins im Subprime-Markt weiterverliehen (bzw. die Sicherheit der Subprime-Kredite mit Derivaten wie CDS garantierten). Das Ganze mit einem Hebel von 20 ergibt 20 % Jahresperformance - SOFERN Alles gut geht.
Es ging aber eben nicht alles gut, wie der ABX-Chart, der nun unter 50 % fiel, unschwer erkennen lässt. Wegen der Junkbond-Kursverluste - die zuletzt durch Downgrades von S&P und Moody's weiter verschärft wurden - stellt sich jetzt heraus, dass die Hedgefonds das Geld im Subprime-Sektor zu billig verliehen hatten. Laut ABX-Junkbond-Index liegt die Zinsrendite wegen gestiegener Risiko-Aversion bereits bei rund 7,8 % [Chart unten: bei 100 % lag die Bond-Rendite bei 3,89 %].
Verschont werden die Hedgefonds vor allzu aggressiven Rückforderungen nur deshalb, weil die Broker/Banken Angst haben, sonst eine systemische (Schulden-)Krise heraufzubeschwören, die das ganze Finanzsystem bedroht. Dort sitzen mit den Subprime-Bonds nämlich Alle in einem Boot (selbst UBS in der Schweiz und HSBC in GB).
Nichtsdestotrotz erhöhten nach den Bear-Stearns-Schieflagen einige Broker ihre Margin-Hinterlegungsanforderungen, was die beiden Hedgefonds in die Illiquidität getrieben hätte - wenn die "Mutter" Bear Stearns nicht mit 1,6 Milliarden ausgeholfen hätte.
Wenn Hedgefonds durch allzu aggressive Rückforderungen ihrer Gläubiger pleite gehen, besteht auch für die großen Banken/Broker die Gefahr, dass sie ihr Geld (eben jenes, das sie zu 5 % Zins verliehen hatten), nicht zurückbekommen. Daher machen die großen Broker/Banken keinen übertriebenen Druck, um das Überschuldungs-Schiff nicht noch stärker in eine Schieflage zu bringen. Aber aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben. Irgendwann schlägt die Ignoranz in wachsendes "Problembewusstsein" um - z. B. wenn, wie bei UBS, "unerwartet" Miese in den Bilanzen (wg. ihres "Dillon" Hedgefonds) auftauchen.
Die US-Broker/Banken werden versuchen, den Ast, auf dem sie sitzen, vorerst nicht durch forcierte Eintreibung fauler Kredite abzusägen. Sie werden das Problem vertagen, indem sie neue Kreditkonstruktionen kreieren, die "dem System" zunächst weitere Luft geben. Daher wird vorerst scheinbar "nichts geschehen", bis urplötzlich dem Fass der Boden ausgeschlagen wird bzw. die Schuldenlawine ins Rollen kommt. Dann knallt es so heftig, dass der Bärenmarkt von 2000 bis 2003 im Vergleich als Zuckerschlecken durchgeht.
ABX-Junkbond-Chart: nun schon unter 50, was einer Zinsrendite von ca. 7,8 % entspricht
Angehängte Grafik:
screen_00119.jpg (verkleinert auf 92%)
screen_00119.jpg (verkleinert auf 92%)
Feststehen dürfte jedoch, dass diese allseits bekannten Fakten, welche hier aufgezählt werden, sich langsam aber sicher zunehmend in das Bewußtsein der Marktteilnehmer festsetzen dürfte. Die sich verändernden Rahmenbedingungen bzw. auch Risikoaversionen könnten bzw. werden die überbordende, weil bisher leicht zu erhaltende Liquidität, welche sämtliche Asset – Klassen hochgepumpt hat, ein gutes Stück weit eindämmen.
Die Leitzinsen steigen in vielen Ländern wieder an. Bei riskanten Anlagen verlangen Anleger neuerdings wieder, dass sie zur Belohnung höhere Risikoaufschläge erhalten – solche Prämien für waghalsige Anlagen waren infolge der Geldschwemme zuletzt auf einem historisch tiefen Niveau.
Dieser Prozess der Veränderung hin zu festeren monetären Standards wird seine Wirkung erst mittelfristig entfalten und muss kein Grund zur Panik sein.
Aber die große Kreditparty neigt sich nun ihrem Ende zu – und damit enden auch einige Auswüchse im Geschäft von Finanzinvestoren, die zuletzt fast jeden Deal in hohem Maße auf billige Fremdmittel gestützt hatten.
Der Merill Lynch Analyst Richard Bernstein äußert hier z.B. die Meinung, dass die aktuellen Rohstoffpreise um gut zu einem Drittel überzogen sind, weil das „easy money“ die Preise dementsprechend treibt.
Dass die z.Z. noch schwappende Welle der getätigten bzw. noch zu erwartenden Firmenübernahmen, hier speziell durch den Pivate Equity Bereich, ebenfalls mit dem leichten Geld forciert wurde / wird, dürfte mittlerweile klar sein. Problematisch dürfte es jedoch mittelfristig für die übernommenen Firmen werden, wenn diese es nicht mehr schaffen sollten, die ihnen aufgebürdeten Schulden aus ihrem Cash – Flow zu begleichen. Denn ob die wirtschaftliche Bedingungen in 2010 oder 2012 positiv ausschauen werden, ist derartig vom heutigen Tage aus nicht mit Sicherheit prognostizierbar.
Investors, don't get too comfortable. The credit squeeze is slowly tightening
July 14, 2007
Listen carefully and you'll hear it, the squeaking of the faucet.
It's the sound of the liquidity tap twisting shut. It's hard to pick up over the din of the stock market bulls, but it's a sound investors should heed carefully.
Even as Canadian and U.S. stock indexes reached new records this week, this week's headlines were peppered with more stories about the subprime debacle.
Quebecor postponed a junk bond issue because of the turmoil in the bond market. It may have to pay more on the debt than it hoped. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce issued a typically unconvincing denial of rumours that its exposure to subprime debt was almost $3-billion. Investors were assuaged enough to slash 5 per cent off the bank's market capitalization.
The rating agencies finally started - and we stress the word started, because they're not finished - cutting ratings on debt linked to low-grade mortgages. As usual, they're reactive rather than active. As one blogger quipped, the subprime analysts' toolkit consists of a pillow, alarm clock and a rear-view mirror.
Banks are tightening lending practices, meaning fewer loans at higher rates. That translates to less consumer spending (two-thirds of U.S. GDP) as Sears', Home Depot's and Motorola's profit disappointments can attest.
The subprime tap is closing fast. But it's not the only one. Other forms of liquidity are slowly getting scarce. Rates are rising here and elsewhere as the inflation needle starts to move. High food, energy and metals prices are pushing prices higher, and where prices go, interest rates follow.
Central banks, including Canada's, are raising the cost of money. So are investors: U.S. 10-year bond yields have crept to more than 5 per cent from 4.5.
Spreads - the difference between government and corporate yields - have also widened. That little thing called risk is slowly reasserting itself. Investors want to be paid commensurately for accepting it.
That's how a bubble bursts, or at least deflates: After years of a virtuous circle - rising asset prices lead to laxer lending practices leading to yet higher asset prices - homes stop going up in value, or go down. Loans evaporate and the tap turns off. No more lending, no more bubble but lots of damage.
It's not just subprime. Demand from emerging markets goes a long way to explaining the run in commodity prices and stocks, which continued this week. But something else helps them along: cheap money. Merrill Lynch strategist Richard Bernstein thinks listed commodity prices are almost a third higher than the fundamentals of supply and demand warrant. How? Investor speculation, helped along by lots of cheap money.
Leveraged buyouts have made a lot of us richer, yet they more than anything rely on cheap debt to make their deals work. LBO's are just a spread game between the cost of the acquirer's debt and the target company's cash flow. Small increases in borrowing costs can ruin the economics of the deal.
Emerging-market bond spreads, although they've fallen steadily over the past couple of years, are also starting to move up. These markets have provided financing for all sorts of the projects that have made investors a lot of money. Higher capital costs equal fewer projects and lower returns on those that go ahead.
So what to do if the tap is indeed squeaking shut? In short, avoid sectors that have performed so well over the past five or six years.
That includes commodities, obviously, particularly the metals. As Mr. Bernstein says, demand for them is probably going to grow but if speculative money flees the futures markets, prices will fall.
Financial institutions also deserve a wide berth. Companies with lots of debt, particularly lower-rated debt, should be viewed cautiously (there's no shortage of those: the median rating of U.S. company debt, according to Standard & Poor's, is triple-B-minus, down from triple-B-plus a decade ago).
Capital-intensive industries are also a poor bet since they generally fund these expenditures with debt. If inflation is expected to keep going up, bonds are no place to be.
Defensive large caps with good dividend yields and conservative debt levels would offer safe harbour.
There's no need to panic of course. The liquidity taps open slowly and close the same way, barring any massive shocks. Just don't be left high and dry when the money tide recedes.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/...CK14/TPStory/Business
Vom Ende des größten Kreditbooms aller Zeiten 11.07.07
….. Der Anfang vom Ende des größten Kreditbooms aller Zeiten ist eingeläutet. Noch heißt die Begründung für die Turbulenzen in den Nachrichtenagenturen „Subprime Woes“, die Sorge vor vielen, vielen Ausfällen zweitklassiger amerikanischer Hypotheken. In Wirklichkeit ist etwas viel Fundamentaleres am Werk: Das Risiko für Schuldtitel wird neu bewertet. Das schaurige Spiel zwischen Private Equity Firmen, Banken, Hedgefonds und Rate-Agenturen gerät ins Stocken. Das ist dabei die erfreuliche Nachricht.
Aber der Reihe nach: Haben wir uns nicht schon einmal Sorgen um die Subprimes gemacht, völlig überflüssige? Richtig, das war im Februar/März. Damals schwirrte das Wort Subprime schon einmal durch die Handelssäle. Unnötig waren die Sorgen allerdings nicht. Denn schon damals war klar, dass Subprime eine tickende Bombe ist. Erst brechen die ersten überschuldeten Haushalte zusammen, weil sie die Zinsen nicht bedienen können. Dann klappen die kleinen Hypothekenvermittler zusammen, weil die Banken ihnen die Kredite nicht mehr abkaufen. Kredite, die aufgrund der schwachen Zahlungsfähigkeit der Schuldner eigentlich nie hätten vergeben werden dürfen – die aber bereitwillig gewährt worden sind, weil die Investmentbanken sich um das Zeug rissen, genau wie die Investoren, Hedgefonds, Pensionsfonds und andere. Das war der Stand im März. Doch erst jetzt spüren es die Investoren, die in den vergangenen Jahren Milliarden und Abermilliarden in CDO’s angelegt haben. In CDO’s, die mit Hypothekenkrediten besichert sind. CDO’s, Collateralized Debt Obligations, sind die Finanzinnovation, die den Kreditboom befeuert haben gemeinsam mit den Kreditderivaten.
Ganz grob funktionieren diese Instrumente wie folgt: Einen Bank nimmt viele tausend Hypothekenkredite und bastelt daraus ein schönes Portfolio. Dann kommen die Ratingagenturen ins Spiel, die mit ausgefeilten Methoden das Risiko des Portfolios ermitteln. Danach wird das Portfolio tranchiert und die einzelnen Tranchen werden mit Bonitätsnoten versehen. Ganz oben die großen und sicheren Tranchen mit Traumnoten von AAA. Hier liegen rund 80 Prozent aller Hypothekenkredite drin, die 80 Prozent, bei denen auf keinen Fall Zahlungsausfälle zu erwarten sind (wenn die Modelle der Rate-Agenturen stimmen). In den Tranchen darunter steigt das Risiko, dass es zu Ausfällen kommt bis hin zur letzten Tranche, Equity-Tranche genannt, die eigentlich verloren ist, aber dafür extrem gut verzinst wird. Wird nun der erste Kredit im Portfolio notleidend, fällt er automatisch in die Equity-Tranche. Dieses Spiel geht solange, bis die riskanteste Tranche nur noch aus notleidenden Krediten besteht. Dann kommt die nächst sichere Tranche dran und muss die weiteren Zahlungsausfälle auffangen. Der Clou an diesem Wasserfallprinzip: Jeder Investor kann sich in der Tranche engagieren, die seinem Risikoprofil entspricht. Nur wehe, wehe, wenn sich die Rate-Agenturen vertan haben.
Denn außer ihnen weiß niemand, was wirklich in den Portfolios steckt. Die Kredite sind nicht handelbar, sondern nur ihre Verpackungen. Das sind völlig intransparente Dinger, die ein- bis zweimal im Jahr von den Ratingagenturen neu bewertet werden. In dieser Phase sind wir aktuell. Gestern gaben Standard&Poor’s sowie Moody’s, die beiden großen der drei weltweit tätigen Ratingagenturen bekannt, dass sie mindestens 17 Milliarden Dollar Subprime, das hinter irgendwelchen Anleihen steckt, herunterstufen werden. Das ist nicht viel, aber es ist ja erst der Anfang. Der Anfang der Neubewertungen. Und: Noch steigen die Löhne in Amerika, noch gibt’s neue Jobs. Wehe, wehe, wenn der US-Wirtschaft mal die Luft ausgeht.
Wie wenig den Ratingagenturen vertraut wird, hat unlängst Tim Bond von Barclays in seinem Weekly beschrieben: Er schrieb, dass Investoren bei Anleihen, in denen zweitklassige amerikanische Hypotheken verpackt sind, Risikoaufschläge von bis zu 22 Prozentpunkten verlangen. Bei Unternehmensanleihen mit gleicher Bonität seien es nur 0,7 Prozentpunkte. „Der Unterschied stellt die Nützlichkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit der Ratingagenturen in Frage“, so Tim Bond. In Wirklichkeit stellt der Unterschied die Glaubwürdigkeit aller neumodischen Strukturen in Frage. Bislang machen die Investoren nur einen Bogen um die Produkte in denen die kriselnden amerikanischen Hypotheken stecken. Was aber passiert, wenn auch die Verpackungen, in denen sich andere Kredite befinden, von den Anlegern nur noch mit spitzen Fingern angepackt werden? Denn die neuartigen Finanzprodukte sind bislang Schönwetterprodukte, die noch keine Krise durchstehen mussten. (hier noch mal der Link zum Paper von Rosner und Mason, die sehr exakt auf die Gefahren der verpackten Finanzprodukte hinweisen).
Was passiert nun? Barry Eichengreen sagte mir unlängst im Interview „Wir haben keine blasse Ahnung, wo die Risiken liegen und wie die Investoren im Fall einer Krise reagieren werden.“ Genau das treibt die Investoren gerade um: Sie haben keine blasse Ahnung, was jetzt an den Märkten passieren wird, sie haben keine blasse Ahnung, welche Risiken sie wirklich in ihren CDO’s eingekauft haben, sie haben keine blasse Ahnung, ob die Banken, die die Kredite einst vergeben haben, überhaupt Sorgfalt haben walten lassen. Das ist das klassische Principal-Agent-Problem. „Was geschieht, wenn Forderungsveräußerer meinen, keine ausreichende Sorgfaltspflicht mehr einhalten zu müssen, und wenn die letztendlichen Käufer weder über das Know-how noch über Informationen verfügen, die das Risikomanagement der erworbenen komplexen Strukturen erfordert?“, fragt die Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich BIZ in ihrem jüngsten Jahresbericht (Seite 10). Das ist die Eine-Billion-Dollar-Frage!
Die selbe Schludrigkeit, von der in Amerika beim Gewähren zweitklassiger Hypotheken berichtet wird, könnte doch auch beim Gewähren von Krediten an Private-Equity-Firmen geherrscht haben? Finanzinvestoren, die mit immer waghalsigeren Finanzierungen immer größere Räder gedreht haben. Schon gibt es am Markt Gerüchte, Daimler werde Chrysler doch nicht los, weil Cerberus, der Geierfonds, der Chrysler übernehmen will, die Finanzierung über mehrere Milliarden Dollar nicht zusammen bekommt, wenn die Turbulenzen anhalten.
Kurzum, die spannendste Phase hat gerade erst begonnen. Waghalsige Eigenkapitalräuber und andere Finanzhaie werden es schwer haben, noch an die notwendige Liquidität zu gelangen.
Die Märkte werden die nächsten Monate über scheußlich bleiben. Die Aktien dürften fallen, die Zinsaufschläge für riskante Anleihen weiter steigen. Die langfristigen Staatsanleihen sollten von der Flucht in Qualität profitieren, weshalb Niveaus über 4,50 Prozent in Euroland und 5,20 in Amerika recht attraktiv ausschauen. Der Euro marschiert jetzt erstmal in Richtung 1,40 Dollar je Euro. An den ganz großen Crash glaube ich noch immer nicht. Dazu sind die fundamentalen wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen einfach zu gut.
http://blog.zeit.de/herdentrieb/?p=182
Sehr schön: Der Economist fasst den USA-Bären-Thread der letzten Wochen zusammen...
Another pounding
Jul 12th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Problems in America's housing market begin to undermine confidence in the global credit bubble
Satoshi Kambayashi
WHEN the man approaching you is wearing boxing gloves, it makes sense to duck. The crisis in the American subprime-mortgage market was clearly visible months ago. Too many homebuyers with a poor or non-existent payment record were lent too much money. But when the rating agencies on July 10th finally got round to acknowledging the problem, investors were clobbered. Shares briefly wobbled and the dollar sank. Swap spreads, a measure of risk aversion, reached their highest point since 2003. Credit derivatives, where much of the financial innovation in recent years has taken place, recoiled. Investors flocked to the haven of Treasury bonds.
Why were investors so slow to react? It seems they have been consistently blindsided by how widespread the subprime problems have become—as well as complacent about the potential spillover into other areas of the debt markets.
At first, investors thought the subprime issue was confined to a few lenders, but the forthright website www.lenderimplode.com suggests that 97 of them have now been hit. Then they thought that defaults would be confined to a few states in the Midwest but the crisis has spread to heavily populated California and Florida.
The second delay was caused by the way that mortgages had been repackaged and sold. Initially they were bundled into residential mortgage-backed securities or RMBSs; Moody's, a rating agency, downgraded 399 of these bonds, while Standard & Poor's, a rival, indicated it was preparing to downgrade some 612 bonds, worth $12 billion. These bonds are only a small portion of the mortgage-related market. But according to Josh Rosner of the investment firm Graham Fisher, the agencies suggested further downgrades were to come.
The RMBSs are in turn divided up and placed in instruments called collateralised debt obligations or CDOs. These were sold to a wide range of investors, depending on their tolerance for risk. One set of securities, known as an equity tranche, pays the highest returns but is the first to suffer if the underlying bonds default; other securities offer a much lower yield but a triple-A credit rating, because a lot of defaults would be needed to trigger losses.
The result of this process has, in theory, helped the market. Bank failures have been at the heart of most financial crises. But instead of the banks taking the first hit from mortgage defaults, the pain will be spread round the financial system.
However, nobody knows where the risk now lies. Many of these securities are illiquid, so regular prices are not available. Indeed, highly rated CDO tranches may still be owned by banks that do not have to put a value on these securities. They may not recognise the problem until they are forced to by auditors or by ratings downgrades. On July 11th Moody's said it may cut its ratings on tranches of 91 CDOs worth about $5 billion. “My initial analysis suggests we could see massive cumulative losses into the double-A tranches of many RMBS-backed CDOs,” says Mr Rosner. (Double-A tranches, as their name suggests, are just below triple-A.)
[...]
This problem cropped up when two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns, an investment bank, got into trouble in June. The Bear funds had borrowed to enhance returns, and in doing so had to post collateral with lenders, known as prime brokers. When things went wrong, one of the brokers, Merrill Lynch, tried to sell its collateral but soon stopped when it transpired it was only succeeding in driving prices sharply lower. Eventually, Bear Stearns pledged some of its own money to fill the gap.
But prime brokers may also be shrinking the investor pool by increasing the margin that funds must put up when buying CDO assets; according to Matt King of Citigroup, the margin requirement on paper rated at the lowest level of investment grade has risen from 10-20% to 50%. That is bound to discourage some hedge funds.
All this may reduce the pool of potential mortgage investors.
Debt ratings
AAAsking for troubleJul 12th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Not all triple-A ratings inspire total confidence
IN THE depression-era 1930s, when credit worthiness was all that mattered, American government bonds were rated AAAAA—as if the more letters you attached to a borrower, the safer they would seem. In more recent times, the triple-A designation has done the trick. Whether attached to government debt, federal agencies or the strongest corporate borrowers, it has stood as a gold standard among ratings, lowering borrowing costs and reassuring creditors.
During the 1980s and 1990s, scarcity only enhanced its standing. The number of companies issuing such high-grade debt dwindled, as corporate-finance theory encouraged companies to borrow more heavily to increase earnings. According to Standard & Poor's (S&P), a rating agency, only six American non-bank companies carry a triple-A rating today, including Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric.
But the rating is coming in for some stick from politicians and pundits alike, because it has cropped up in connection with that most unsound of loans, subprime mortgages. These are anything but triple-A, but can be repackaged into securities via collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) in a way that makes default an extremely low mathematical probability. In the process, such ratings have made the agencies a great deal of money. Moody's, for example, made more than 40% of its revenues from rating structured products such as CDOs last year.
Marc Dann, attorney-general of Ohio, is investigating whether, in his words, the ratings agencies took part in fraud by bestowing triple-A ratings on structured products created out of subprime loans. Bill Gross, a fund manager at PIMCO, a bond-trading firm, likens the highest-rated tranches of CDOs to a Hollywood madame masquerading as a wholesome, all-American girl.
The ratings agencies are holding their ground. Cliff Griep, the chief credit officer at S&P, argues that ratings attempt to address only creditworthiness, not market risk, and are driven by fundamentals, not fluctuating prices.
But the questions being asked of the agencies are important because banks around the world have been filling their vaults with AAA-rated structured products ahead of international implementation of the Basel 2 regulations on bank capital. Under this new accord, a bank holding triple-A assets is allowed to keep less capital, enabling it to lend more. So banks have stocked up, especially on CDOs. If they were forced to sell securities that had been downgraded, liquidity could dry up.
No one knows for sure what would happen to the value of the triple-A tranches in such a scenario. In this week's ratings downgrades, the highest-quality tranches of CDOs were unaffected.
But the agencies are caught in a dilemma. They know that if the cherished triple-A rating is seen as devalued, it would undermine their credibility. Yet they earn so much revenue from CDOs that working with the banks and funds that structure them has proved irresistible.
Some analysts argue that it would make sense to alter the labelling. John Mauldin, who writes a popular financial newsletter, argues that the ratings agencies should have created a new type of standard, using numbers like “CDO rank 1-10”. That way a triple-A mark would still stand for a port in a storm.
__________________
Guten Morgen & eine schöne Woche!
Mein Vorsatz: interessante und relevante Artikel in Zukunft nicht mehr mit einigen Tagen Verspätung zu posten.
* Alliance Bancorp
* Choice Capital Funding
* Premier Mortgage Funding
* Stone Creek Funding/Morgan Direct/WJ Bradley Wholesale
* FlexPoint Funding (Wholesale)....tägliche Meldungenthe Clearwater, FL-based lender (with reportedly 500-600 branches) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the middle district of Florida on July 3rd.
detailliert unter dem Link zu lesen ( merci wubert)
2007-07-13: Alliance Bancorp - Wholesale Alt-A - (no MSM story yet)
We have received numerous confirmations that Alliance Bancorp (www.loanwholesale.com/) of Brisbane, California, has shutdown and will no longer be funding any loans or accepting any new loan submissions. ....
007-07-12: Choice Capital Funding - Wholesale, Subprime, Alt A - (no MSM story yet)Employees arrived today with a letter on their desks saying Choice Capital Funding is no longer in business. Choice Capital Funding was located in Alpharetta GA and employed approx 40 people......
2007-07-11: Premier Mortgage Funding - Net Branch Lender, Mortgage Banker - (no MSM story yet)the Clearwater, FL-based lender (with reportedly 500-600 branches) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the middle district of Florida on July 3rd.
2007-07-07: Stone Creek Funding/Morgan Direct/WJ Bradley Wholesale - Wholesale Alt-A -The closure of this company (companies?) appears to be a convoluted mess. As we understand presently, around June 14th, WJ Bradley group acquired Stone Creek funding, combined it with WJ Bradley's existing wholesale ops, and called the new division Morgan Direct. However, that combined entity appears to have failed........
Laut den Berechnungen der Wirtschaftsberater von MacroMavens ist bei 23 Prozent aller variablen Hypothekenkredite (ARMs) der Beleihungswert der gekauften Häuser unter die ausstehende Schuld gefallen, was zu "negative equity" führt. Es handelt sich dabei um Hypo-Kredite in der astronomischen Gesamtsumme von 693 Milliarden Dollar.
Dagegen sind die 12 Mrd., die die Ratingsagentur letzte Woche abstuften, Pipifax.
Die "volle Breitseite" kommt aber erst 2008, weil viele dieser meist 2006 aufgenommenen "Option ARMs"-Kredite sich noch in der Option-Schonfrist befinden (die Schuldzinsen werden 2 Jahre - in der Optionszeit - sehr niedrig angesetzt, um Leute zum Hauskauf zu ködern, danach fallen 28 Jahre lang teure, über dem Marktniveau liegende Zinsen an). Läuft diese Schonfrist 2008 aus, drohen massenweise Zwangsliquidationen - wobei die Verluste (-> negative equity) an den Käufern der Hypotheken-Pakete (CDOs) hängen bleiben. Also an Hedgefonds wie die beiden Bear-Stearns-Fonds. Man darf gespannt sein...
Many homeowners are already in trouble. Figures from MacroMavens, an economic consultancy, suggest that 23% of adjustable-rate mortgages, covering loans with a value of $693 billion, are already in negative equity, where the loan is worth more than the property. But the full impact of defaults may not be felt until the low “teaser” rates on mortgages expire and push up borrowing costs. These teaser loans were done on a “two and 28” basis (with low rates applying for the first two years, and higher rates for the next 28). So the worst news from the 2006 vintage may not be felt until 2008.
Quelle: Economist, Link zum Artikel in # 2946
