Sublimierte Marktmanipulation - Programtrading
Auch hier tauchen sie wieder an vorderer Stelle auf: Die üblichen Verdächtigen mit ihrem weitgespannten politischen Altherrennetz - ein Hallo an alle Goldmänner!
...
For most of the past century, regulators put limits on financial actors to prevent them from dominating commodity exchanges, which were much smaller than the bond or stock markets. Only commercial operations, such as farms, airlines, manufacturers and the middlemen that handle their trading activities, were allowed to buy nearly unlimited quantities. The goal was to allow these businesses to minimize the effect of price swings.
The first major change to this regulatory framework occurred in 1991, when Goldman Sachs, through a subsidiary called J. Aron, argued that it should be granted the same exemption given to commercial traders because its business of buying commodities on behalf of investors was similar to the middlemen who broker commodity transactions for commercial firms.
The CFTC granted this request. More exemptions soon followed, including one to the Houston-based energy trader Enron.
"When the CFTC granted the 1991 hedging exemption to J. Aron (a division of Goldman Sachs), it signaled a major shift that has since allowed investors to accumulate enormous positions for purely speculative purposes," said Rep. Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) Now, he added, "legitimate businesses that hedge and take physical delivery of oil are being trampled by the speculators who are in the market purely to make profit."
A second turning point came when Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. The law formally allowed investors to trade energy commodities on private electronic platforms outside the purview of regulators. Critics have called this piece of legislation the "Enron loophole," saying Enron played a role in crafting it.
In the months after the act was passed, private electronic trading platforms sprang up across the country, challenging the dominance of NYMEX....
"Investment banks had been frustrated with the established exchange because they really were never able to get control of it," said Michael Greenberger, a law professor at the University of Maryland and a former staff member at the CFTC.
The most successful of the private platforms was InterContinental Exchange, or ICE, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and a few other big brokerages in 2000. ICE soon opened a trading platform in London, allowing its founders to trade vast quantities of U.S. oil overseas without being subject to regulation.
The exemptions for swap dealers and the development of overseas markets allowed big brokerages to open the door for more hedge funds, pensions and big investors to move into commodities.
In the coming years, commodity investments by funds could grow to $1 trillion, veteran hedge fund manager Michael Masters said in testimony before the Senate earlier this year. In an interview, he said this trend could raise commodity prices for everyone in the coming years and "have catastrophic economic effects on millions of already stressed U.S. consumers."
Meanwhile, commodities have been good business for big Wall Street brokerages. Its commodity trades helped keep Goldman Sachs profitable during the credit crisis, said Richard Bove, a banking analyst at Ladenburg Thalmann.
"Business is lousy right now," Bowie said of Goldman Sachs. "Commodities and currencies are clearly the strongest business they have right now."
In the coming months, swap dealers expect to have yet another venue for oil speculation. The CFTC has stated it would not stand in the way of trading in U.S. oil contracts overseas in Dubai. Goldman Sachs and Vitol are among the major investors in this new exchange.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/.../AR2008082003898.html
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-20-08/s72008-528.pdf
Adobe Systems Incorporated
AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
American Capital, Ltd.
Calgon Carbon Corporation
Dendreon Corporation
Dionex Corporation
Ditech Networks, Inc.
Endwave Corporation
EnerNOC, Inc.
Medis Technologies Ltd.
NetScout Systems, Inc.
NVlDlA Corporation
Overstock.com, Inc.
Quest Software, Inc.
Sangamo BioSciences, Inc.
When I buy a stock, I deliver the cash I’ve committed on settlement day. Why shouldn’t short sellers be required to do the same thing?
…
Calm down, girls. Here’s a reminder: the trading of equities in the U.S. is governed by a set rules and regulations designed to ensure the markets here are fair, open, and transparent. You’re not allowed to trade on inside information, for instance. You can’t trade for your own account ahead of your clients’. Depending on what type of investor you are, you might even face restrictions on what types of securities you can own, and in what size.
…
Here’s one more rule. If you short a stock, you have to deliver the shares at settlement. If you didn’t have to do that—if you could sell as much stock as you’d like without having to deliver anything—individual equities might become subject to manipulation, and market would lose some efficiency and rational-pricing pizzazz. And in fact, there’s evidence that just that sort of manipulation goes on. Take a look, for instance, at the “threshold securities” list the exchanges publish daily. It’s a list of stocks for which sellers failed to deliver 10,000 shares or more over the prior five trading days. Companies will get on that list and stay on for weeks. Zions Bancorp., to pick one name I know well, that escaped the bulk of the credit crunch, and whose fundamentals are improving steadily, has been on the list for nearly a month. That’s not the sign of random clerical oversight; more likely, it’s evidence speculators have targeted the stock and are attempting to manipulate its price via relentless selling.
http://bankstocks.com/...leViewer.aspx?ArticleID=5330&ArticleTypeID=2
Aber halt! Beim Thema Steuerhinterziehung kennt das System kein Erbarmen. Vielleicht sollte die SEC ihre Aufgaben an die Finanzbehörden abtreten, damit die Herren von der Wall-Street merken, daß man Aktien nicht nur beim Kauf, sondern auch nach einem Leerverkauf bezahlen muß.
FirstFed jumps as analyst questions short selling
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2008/08/28/ap5368242.html
http://seekingalpha.com/article/...-america-and-the-rest-of-the-world
§
SEC Issues New Rules to Protect Investors Against Naked Short Selling Abuses
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-204
Washington, D.C., Sept. 17, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today took several coordinated actions to strengthen investor protections against “naked” short selling. The Commission’s actions will apply to the securities of all public companies, including all companies in the financial sector. The actions are effective at 12:01 a.m. ET on Thursday, Sept. 18, 2008.
“These several actions today make it crystal clear that the SEC has zero tolerance for abusive naked short selling,” said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. “The Enforcement Division, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, and the Division of Trading and Markets will now have these weapons in their arsenal in their continuing battle to stop unlawful manipulation.”
In an ordinary short sale, the short seller borrows a stock and sells it, with the understanding that the loan must be repaid by buying the stock in the market (hopefully at a lower price). But in an abusive naked short transaction, the seller doesn't actually borrow the stock, and fails to deliver it to the buyer. For this reason, naked shorting can allow manipulators to force prices down far lower than would be possible in legitimate short-selling conditions.
Today’s Commission actions, which are the result of formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, go beyond its previously issued emergency order, which was limited to the securities of financial firms with access to the Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility. Because the agency's exercise of its emergency authority is limited to 30 days, the previous order under Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expired on Aug. 12, 2008.
The Commission’s actions were as follows:
Hard T+3 Close-Out Requirement; Penalties for Violation Include Prohibition of Further Short Sales, Mandatory Pre-Borrow
The Commission adopted, on an interim final basis, a new rule requiring that short sellers and their broker-dealers deliver securities by the close of business on the settlement date (three days after the sale transaction date, or T+3) and imposing penalties for failure to do so.
If a short sale violates this close out requirement, then any broker-dealer acting on the short seller’s behalf will be prohibited from further short sales in the same security unless the shares are not only located but also pre-borrowed. The prohibition on the broker-dealer’s activity applies not only to short sales for the particular naked short seller, but to all short sales for any customer.
Although the rule will be effective immediately, the Commission is seeking comment during a period of 30 days on all aspects of the rule. The Commission expects to follow further rulemaking procedures at the expiration of the comment period.
Exception for Market Makers from Short Selling Close-Out Provisions in Reg SHO Repealed
The Commission approved a final rule to eliminate the options market maker exception from the close-out requirement of Rule 203(b)(3) in Regulation SHO. This rule change also becomes effective five days after publication in the Federal Register.
As a result, options market makers will be treated in the same way as all other market participants, and required to abide by the hard T+3 closeout requirements that effectively ban naked short selling.
Rule 10b-21 Short Selling Anti-Fraud Rule
The Commission adopted Rule 10b-21, which expressly targets fraudulent short selling transactions. The new rule covers short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or any other market participants. Specifically, the new rule makes clear that those who lie about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement are violating the law when they fail to deliver. This new rule is effective immediately.
# # #
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-204.htm
by Scot Paltrow October 2008 Issue
Under chairman Christopher Cox, the commission has undermined and demoralized its enforcement staff. For the next administration, restoring the agency's role as market watchdog won't be easy.
Christopher Cox
THE BOSS Christopher Cox, chairman of the S.E.C., in his office in February 2007.
For months, Christopher Cox, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has been under fire for a belated response to market upheavals stemming from the subprime fiasco and for being soft on big corporations. He’s eager to dispel his critics. In his 10th-floor office, with a postcard view of the Capitol, Cox appears fit and buoyant despite a recent bout with a rare cancer of the thymus gland. He denies any suggestion that he has oriented the S.E.C. away from tough enforcement and investor protection. “I spend more time on enforcement than on any aspect of my job,” he says.
But a look at his record since he became chairman in 2005 suggests that, behind the scenes, Cox has engineered a series of procedural and tactical changes, effectively reducing the S.E.C. enforcement division’s power. The division, one of four in the S.E.C., investigates and litigates violations of securities laws. Under the new rules, enforcement staffers no longer have the freedom to negotiate fines against public companies in a select group of cases. Instead, the commissioners—three Republicans and two Democrats—dictate the maximum penalty the enforcement division can seek. Since the rule was imposed, penalties have dropped. For example, in March, the commission approved a fine of $10 million against pharmaceuticals manufacturer Biovail, significantly less than the enforcement staff had sought.
At the S.E.C., which has come under fire from Congress for its apparent lack of vigilance in the subprime mess, such tensions between frontline investigators and the politically appointed commissioners to whom they report have become commonplace. Former senior enforcement officials say Cox has used his control over the commission’s calendar to delay major cases and water down others. Cox and other commissioners have shifted the agency’s focus away from strong enforcement action against big public companies and Wall Street firms, instead emphasizing what S.E.C. lawyers consider petty-fraud cases, such as small Ponzi schemes. Penalties against companies, individuals, and brokerage firms have sunk from a high of $1.5 billion in 2005 to $507 million last year.
In the coming months, the S.E.C. will be expected to sort out whether malfeasance contributed to the current economic crisis—and if so, whose. But the fundamental changes at the enforcement division will make this all the more difficult. The division has been significantly weakened by the exodus of top supervisors and is hamstrung by the new limits on its powers. Even if a new administration in the White House replaces Cox, whose term expires in 2009, it is not as though a switch could be flipped to begin more aggressive prosecution. Gearing up would require restoring the depleted ranks and finishing pending cases, both of which could entail substantial delays at a time when the market needs to quickly regain the confidence of battered investors.
Cox did not accomplish these changes on his own. Internal agency politics, critics say, played a major role, with Cox’s Republican colleagues, particularly Paul Atkins, pressing him to roll back enforcement and rein in the division’s independence. Beginning in late 2007, the White House, which nominates S.E.C. commissioners, helped clear the way for retrenchment in enforcement by delaying the replacement of two Democratic commissioners whose terms had ended. From January through July 2008, the commission had just three members, all Republican. This gave Atkins and Kathleen Casey de facto veto power over the more moderate chairman.
The perceived absence of support for major investigations has alienated many staff members and prompted some of the enforcement division’s senior officials to quit. Since Cox took office in 2005, the staff count in the division has dropped 9 percent, to 1,124 people this year. His predecessor, William Donaldson—like Cox, a Republican—long declined to speak publicly about changes at the S.E.C. He told me recently, though, that he was aware of a “high degree of frustration” among the staff. “With the kind of problems we have now,” he said, “any attempt to reduce the effective role of the S.E.C. as a policeman has been a mistake.”
At the time President Bush named him S.E.C. chairman, Cox had served 17 years in Congress, where he stood out as one of the most effective pro-business representatives in a strongly pro- business class of House Republicans. He took the helm at the S.E.C. during a period of corporate backlash against the agency and the stringent regulations imposed by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The departing chairman, Donaldson, was a Bush family friend who had been appointed by the White House with the expectation that he would temper the S.E.C.’s activism. Instead, he embraced the agency’s role as cop. The business community felt “that Donaldson was too tough on corporate America and Wall Street,” says a former enforcement official. “Cox was brought in to chill it out.”
Besides pulling back on enforcement, Cox also cut back on the S.E.C.’s new risk-assessment office, created under Donaldson to help the agency do a better job of anticipating financial upheavals. After the head of that office left, Cox didn’t replace him for nearly two years. Although Donaldson had authorized and filled eight positions and planned to expand the staff to 15, by 2007 the office was staffed mainly by part-timers, who in federal budget records were regarded as the equivalent of only two full-time workers. Cox says in response that he has allocated staff to other departments that he contends perform similar functions.
Also, under Cox, the commission loosened a key limit on short-selling in 2007, scrapping what’s known as the uptick rule, which is meant to forestall plunges in share value by allowing short-selling only when a stock is rising. A year later, after heavy short-selling threatened the survival of certain large financial companies, the S.E.C. temporarily restricted the short-selling of 19 mortgage-company and bank stocks.
Cox and other S.E.C. officials have said that it wasn’t possible to anticipate the effects of the real estate bubble’s bursting. And Cox has said he’s able to do more with less by prioritizing enforcement and oversight efforts. The S.E.C., he told Congress in July, has more than four dozen pending investigations into the credit crisis. Some relate to whether improper short-selling and insider trading spurred the Bear Stearns collapse. But some members of Congress and the federal government clearly aren’t impressed. The Treasury Department has proposed grabbing for itself and the Federal Reserve some of the S.E.C.’s most important powers, including enforcement authority over brokerages and investment banks. At a Senate hearing in May, Senator Richard Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, faulted Cox for endorsing the White House’s request for only a minor increase in the S.E.C.’s budget for 2009. Durbin noted that Cox’s budget request would mean the loss of at least 94 more staff positions throughout the S.E.C. “Developments and trends in the market call for more, not less, vigilance, to protect investors,” Durbin stated in a press release following the hearing.
Cox, in an interview that he allows to go well beyond the allotted hour, defends his record and dismisses repeated interruptions from a secretary. He is adamant that he has stepped up enforcement: “We are redoubling our efforts in every way that we know how.” He attributes the decline in penalties to an inevitable shift in the mix of cases after the resolution of big accounting scandals in the first half of this decade.
Under his leadership, Cox says, the S.E.C. has become forward-looking “in ways that traditionally we might not have been.” And he takes great pains to present himself as a champion of the small-time investor.
After we’ve shaken hands and I’m nearly at the elevator, Cox summons me back to examine a column of framed mementos on his office wall. He’s often mentioned these items when testifying before Congress as symbols of his personal commitment to regulation. They relate to Samuel Insull, the Chicago electricity magnate whose company went bust in 1932, wiping out hundreds of thousands of investors and helping prompt the establishment of the S.E.C. in 1934. The display includes a photo of Insull and a check for $3.36 made out to Cox’s grandfather—all that he got back on a $6,000 investment in the company.
Almost from the moment Cox took office, former enforcement officials say, he began chipping away behind the scenes at the S.E.C.’s enforcement division—the largest and most high-profile of the agency’s four divisions. Approval of the enforcement division’s requests to initiate investigations, which was an expeditious process under former chairman Donaldson, turned into a logjam, as the commission closely scrutinized each one. “It was like someone poured molasses on the enforcement division,” says a former enforcement division supervisor.
When the commission was divided over cases, Cox would simply take them off its agenda. The same supervisor says, “You had cases where the enforcement staff had worked hard for three years. It was finally done, on the calendar. The general counsel has reviewed it. The day arrives for your hearing before the commission, and you’re told that morning it’s been pulled. Taken off the calendar. When’s it going back on? We don’t know.” By mid-2006, this had become routine. “Cases are held up, pulled, held up, pulled,” the supervisor says.
Cox’s treatment of Linda Thomsen, the S.E.C.’s first female enforcement director, was seen by staffers as a sign of the division’s declining clout. A longtime S.E.C. lawyer, Thomsen had been named director by Donaldson just prior to his departure. Her predecessor, Steve Cutler, who had worked closely with Donaldson and several earlier enforcement directors going back to Stanley Sporkin, who held the job in the 1970s, told me that this kind of open-door relationship was the norm. Several former senior S.E.C. staffers say Thomsen had far less access.
Thomsen defends her boss. “This chairman has an extremely busy schedule,” she says. “I can get to him if I need to.” But she acknowledges that “sometimes it can take days.” Cox says, “She has complete and total access to me.” An S.E.C. spokesman says the two met as often as eight times a day during recent settlement negotiations with banks over auction-rate securities. The banks agreed to repay nearly $27 billion to investors.
Some former S.E.C. staffers say Thomsen complied too easily with the push to restrict enforcement. Cox boasts that the commission approves “99.999 percent” of the enforcement division’s recommendations. But some former S.E.C. enforcement officials say he maintains that high percentage by prevailing on Thomsen to water them down. Thomsen confirms that she has revised recommendations “from time to time” but denies that the commission has curbed enforcement efforts. “Everybody’s pro-law-enforcement” among the commissioners, she says. “Nobody likes crooks.”
Demoralized, key enforcement staffers started heading out the door. Veteran S.E.C. lawyer James Coffman left in 2007 after he was passed over for a promotion. He says that Thomsen told him he didn’t get the job because he was viewed as “too tough.” Thomsen, noting that toughness is one of the qualities necessary for an enforcement job, dismissed the notion that anyone would be denied a promotion for being “too tough.”
A budget shortfall led the S.E.C. to impose a hiring freeze in 2005. The enforcement division’s staff is divided into groups, and ordinarily 15 lawyers report to an assistant director in each one. But as the freeze dragged on, some groups dwindled to seven or eight lawyers. An S.E.C. spokesman says that if one group is overburdened, cases are reassigned to a different group.
Enforcement staffers cite two cases as examples of the agency’s retreat from tough prosecution. One is the Biovail case. When eight women died after their bus smashed into a truck loaded with Biovail antidepressant pills, the pharmaceutical maker attributed a revenue decline to inventory lost in the crash. S.E.C. enforcement lawyers charged that not only was the company’s explanation false, but Biovail had also set up a company in Barbados to inflate reported profits and was in cahoots with a pharmaceutical distributor to stage a sham sale of pills, according to the S.E.C. complaint. Although an outside expert retained by the S.E.C. recommended a much larger fine, the commissioners decided on $10 million. Biovail accepted the penalty without admitting or denying wrongdoing. Cox says the commission relied on the advice of the agency’s chief economist.
The other case involved Tenet Healthcare, a hospital company that had allegedly boosted earnings through Medicare fraud. In March 2007, the S.E.C.’s settlement talks with Tenet nearly collapsed over whether the company would be granted a “safe harbor” provision, which protects a company from liability for financial projections that are made in good faith. The S.E.C. had routinely denied this protection in fraud settlements. Accordingly, enforcement lawyers refused to make an exception for Tenet. But on the night before they were set to appear before the commission, Tenet’s lawyer fired off an appeal to the S.E.C. commissioners.
The next day, a majority of the commissioners, including Cox, made it clear that they would grant Tenet safe harbor, according to several people who attended the meeting. The enforcement staff drafted a settlement. (The company paid a $10 million penalty.) The commission’s break with precedent on this and other cases caused consternation among the enforcement staff and helped spur the departure of Randall Lee, the veteran head of the S.E.C.’s Los Angeles office, which had handled the case. Cox says the commissioners took into consideration that Tenet had new management.
A January analysis by the law firm Morgan Lewis found that S.E.C. penalties have dropped by a “staggering degree” and that “the numbers suggest a philosophical shift by the Cox commission in what constitutes an appropriate penalty.”
A spokesperson for the S.E.C., in an email statement, insists that “by any objective measure, the S.E.C.’s enforcement division has never been more effective or enjoyed greater support from the commission. The commission’s unparalleled support has brought unparalleled results from investors.”
While major cases were bogged down, commissioners quickly approved minor ones involving penny stocks, boiler-room operators, and Ponzi schemers who fleeced groups of small investors. According to former S.E.C. officials, this apparent shift in agenda was pushed in large measure by former commissioner Atkins, who stepped down in August after his term expired. One former S.E.C. official claims to have heard Atkins remark that he believed that the S.E.C. was “unconstitutionally constituted.” Atkins denies this, saying that if he had believed the S.E.C. was unconstitutional, he would not have served on the commission. But a friend of Atkins’ says, “If you surprised Paul and asked him what he really thinks of the S.E.C., he’d probably say, ‘Blow it up.’ ”
Atkins, whom one former commissioner describes as “probably the most effective commissioner in the history of the S.E.C.,” benefited from Cox’s desire to build consensus. Cox shunned divided votes, delaying important matters until he could engineer a majority. Atkins wasn’t inclined to compromise. He castigated the enforcement division in speeches around the country and filed detailed public dissents in response to some of the agency’s decisions.
Atkins says the push against small-scale fraud cases has not come at the expense of large investigations. He suggests that by emphasizing such efforts, the S.E.C. adopted a strategy similar to one that former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani employed to reduce the city’s crime rate—cracking down on quality-of-life offenses and securing arrests for minor violations. “You have to concentrate on the muggings and graffiti because that builds up respect for the rule of law,” Atkins says.
But demoralized staffers don’t agree. In one instance, after commissioners had approved penalties in a microcap fraud case, Atkins says an enforcement lawyer came up to the colleague who had conducted the investigation, slapped him on the back, and said sarcastically, “Congratulations on your small case.”
Given the importance of confidence in financial markets, today’s action halts short selling in 799 financial institutions. The SEC’s emergency order, pursuant to its authority in Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, will be immediately effective and will terminate at 11:59 p.m. ET on October 2, 2008. The Commission may extend the order beyond 10 days if it deems an extension necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors, but will not extend the order for more than 30 calendar days in total duration.
Im Verein mit nakedshortsellern und HFs trägt Cox mit seinen widersprüchlichen Vorschlägen und Regelungen, die keinem Wall-Street Ganoven ernsthaft auf die Zehen treten sollen, dazu bei, den Märkten den Rest zu geben.
Solange die SEC nicht bereit scheint, die Möglichkeit des kriminellen NSS im Vorwege auszuschalten, sondern versucht, punktuell einige Kriminelle im Nachhinein auszumachen und zu verfolgen, wird sich an den kriminellen Vorgängen allenfalls temporär etwas ändern. Es bleibt der Eindruck bestehen, daß es sich hier lediglich um ein Scheingefecht zwischen SEC und den üblichen Verdächtigen handelt.
Die Einführung "neuer" Regelungen durch eine Behörde, die seit Jahren ihrer Aufsichtspflicht nicht nachgekommen ist, weil es offensichtlich politisch nicht opportun war, am Vorabend eines großen Verfallstages ist, sagen wir mal "erstaunlich".
Liest man das Folgende, nach vollmundigen Ankündigungen NSS in allen "public traded companies" einzuschränken, so wird die SEC vollends unglaubwürdig:
Given the importance of confidence in financial markets, today’s action halts short selling in 799 financial institutions. The SEC’s emergency order, pursuant to its authority in Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, will be immediately effective and will terminate at 11:59 p.m. ET on October 2, 2008. The Commission may extend the order beyond 10 days if it deems an extension necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors, but will not extend the order for more than 30 calendar days in total duration.
http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm
Zur Zeit laufen Bestrebungen, Cox abzuschießen. Wenn man nicht vermuten müßte, daß sich hinter diesen Bemühungen große vom NSS profitierende Institutionen und HFs in der Verkleidung "kleiner" Investoren verstecken, so könnte man dem fast zustimmen.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121685865187779279.html
Dr. Byrne commented, "At the core of the SEC announcement is a decision that if a hedge fund naked shorts a stock, its broker isn't supposed to let them naked short again. But guess what: they were not supposed to naked short in the first place. Instead of giving the buyer who receives the fail the right to put it back to the naked short selling participant, the SEC once again opts for nerf penalties for financial rapists.
"If the SEC were anything but a hedge fund bootlick," continued Byrne, "it would not have taken the half-measure of a pre-borrow requirement applied only as a penalty for those failing to deliver within T+3, but would have instituted a market-wide pre-borrow requirement (as it did in its July 15, 2008 Emergency Order protecting Upper Caste financial firms), and mandatory buy-ins at T+3.
(OSTK ist immer wieder Attacken von naked shortsellern ausgesetzt, war oft Wochen lang auf der RegSho-list, wogegen sich der CEO vehement wehrt)
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/080917/law074.html?.v=101
2008-213
Washington, D.C., Sept. 19, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange Commission's Division of Trading and Markets today issued the following statement:
"The Commission staff is recommending to the Commission a modification to its order prohibiting short selling in securities of specified financial firms. This modification would extend, for the life of the order, the exemption for hedging activities by exchange and over-the-counter market makers in derivatives on the securities covered by the order."
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-213.htm
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Wertpapier: Dow Jones Industrial Av |
nachdem sie selbst, durch Abschaffung aller Regelungen, die halbwegs für Fairness an der Börse sorgen sollten, das Vertrauen in den Markt zerstört haben -
nachdem sie mit ihrer laissez-faire Politik die Börse zum Casino gemacht haben, damit sich ihre Freunde aus der Investment-Welt gehörig die Taschen füllen konnten,
nachdem sie mit ihren auf Lügen basierten Kriegen den Staatshaushalt bis kurz vor den Ruin getrieben haben,
nachdem sie die Inflation so angeheizt haben, daß die Gelddruckmaschienen schon fast nicht mehr nachkommen,
nachdem sie illegale Praktiken, wie z.B. naked shortselling zum Nachteil der Anleger de facto Jahrelang toleriert haben.
Die Retter des Finanzsystems?
So sehen die aus!
Angehängte Grafik:
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http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=867811580&play=1
Angehängte Grafik:
washington_mutual___price_vs.gif (verkleinert auf 54%)
washington_mutual___price_vs.gif (verkleinert auf 54%)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26982493/